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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to trace the origins of 
the Quebec separatist movement and to place the movement 
in the context of Canadian history from 1763 to 1983*
The study concentrates on five principal aspects of 
Quebec separatism, 1) The culture and world-view of French 
Canadians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?
2) the origin and development of French Canadian nationalism;
3) French Canadian expectations concerning federalism, and 
how the Canadian federal system has responded to the demands 
placed upon it by the separatist movement; 4) the debate 
between Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque concerning the 
advantages and disadvantages of a separate state of Quebec; 
and 5) the rise of the Parti Quebe^ois in the context of 
twentieth century separatist parties.
The study places heavy emphasis on historical developments 
in the belief that the Quebec separatist movement can best be 
understood in the perspective of time and by the analytical 
possibilities it offers. The study is based on the assumption 
that the American reader lacks a clear understanding of the 
forces which have shaped Canada--particularly French Canada—  
and that only by examining current events in an historical 
context can a thorough comprehension of Canada's present 
dilemma be reached.
It is suggested that the primary goal of French Canadians 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the
survival of their language and culture through isolation. It 
is also suggested that, in modern times, the nationalism of 
survival changed to an aggressive and outward-turning 
nationalism that sought to protect French Canadian language 
and cultural rights not only in Quebec, but nationwide.
It concludes that the Parti Quebecois is the latest 
manifestation of modern Quebec nationalism, and that the 
party seeks to secure French Canadian rights through the 
threat of the secession of Quebec if such rights cannot be 
achieved within the Canadian federation.
QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM 
A Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis
INTRODUCTION
On a state visit to Canada in 1967 * French President
Charles De Gaulle stepped on the balcony of the Montreal
/
City Hall.” Vivre le Quebec! h e  proclaimed, "Vivre le 
Quebec libre.” ^
De Gaulle’s choice of words to end the speech had done 
more than excite a cheering crowd of enthusiastic French 
Canadian well-wishers. His use of a separatist slogan spar­
ked consternation in governmental circles in Ottawa, and 
many believed his visit would only foment a rising tide of 
separatist sentiment that called for the establishment of an 
independent Quebec. Nonetheless, while his speech angered 
some officials, and Prime Minister Pearson cut short De 
Gaulle’s visit, no one was expecting an immediate fulfillment 
of his prophecy. Indeed, in subsequent elections in 1970 and 
I973» separatists made a poor showing; if anything, people 
felt, demands for Quebec's independence had subsided.
Nine years later, however, "Vivre le Quebec libre" 
would again be heard throughout Montreal and the rest of
1
Peter C. Newman, A Nation Dividedt Canada and the Com­
ing of Pierre Trudeau ( New York: Alfred K„ Knopf, 1969), n. 
A28.
2
3La Belle Province, but this time not as a far-fetched, roman­
tic notion. The new Parti Quebecois, under the able leader­
ship of Rene* Levesque, had gained in stature. On November 
15» 1976, it defeated the Liberal Government of Robert 
Bourassa by winning 7i seats in the 110 seat provincial par­
l i a m e n t ^  percent of the popular vote), a stunning upset 
which took the country by surprise.
Prior to the election, P.Q. leader Levesque had announ­
ced the intentions of his party: to establish an independent
»»
Quebec, based on the principles of "sovereignty-association*, 
Although Levesque had no detailed manifesto of exactly what 
"sovereignty-association” entailed, he said that he envis^* 
ioned a state that would be autonomous in all respects—  
political, social,,and cultural— while retaining certain 
economic ties with the rest of Canada such as a common cur­
rency, certain defense ties, and trade relations based on the 
pattern of the European Common Marketc
Levesque had stated that the implementation of "sover- 
eignty-association” would take place after he had achieved 
a consensus of the Quebec electorate. He declared, therefore, 
that within five years of his election to power, he would 
place a referendum before the people which would decide the 
issue of Quebec's independence from the rest of Canada.
During the interim period between the election of the 
P.Q. and the referendum of I98O, separatists and federalists 
waged an intense battle in the province to win the; support 
of Quebec's electorate. Separatists argued that the time had 
long passed when Quebec's economic and social life should be 
controlled by a minority of English-speaking people. Federal­
ists argued with equal fervor that to separate from Canada 
in the fashion described by Levesque would bring about tremen 
dous economic hardships in the province that neither the 
government nor the French-speaking business community was pre 
pared to handle. The Quebec legislature, under P.Q. leader­
ship, tested the waters by passing various pieces of legis­
lation designed to ensure the use of the French language in 
schools and businesses in Quebec. It required that all per-* 
sons coming to live in Quebec send their children to French- 
speaking schools; it mandated that companies operating in 
Quebec be able to communicate with their employees and the 
public- in French or be fined. Further, companies were given 
until 1983 to meet the requirements s 1) that executives and 
personnel have a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that 
the number of French-speaking personnel at all levels be in­
creased; and 3) that French be used in all documents and in­
ternal communication. It authorized the establishment of a
French language office to see that regulations were carried 
out and enforced.
English Canadians in Quebec reacted sharply to the 
measures. Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "un­
acceptable" and a violation of the "human rights" of English- 
speaking Canadians. As a practical politician, Trudeau 
realized that he would have to negotiate a compromise with 
the separatists if he wanted to keep the confederation in­
tact. Declaring in an address before Parliament that his 
government was willing to consider constitutional changes 
to advance the cultural aspirations of the disaffected 
French-speaking minority, he announced the formation of a 
new governmental group to be called the Task Force on 
Canadian Unity, and declared that to save Quebec and halt 
the developing rift between the two language groups, English- 
speaking Canadians must become reconciled to more French in 
their lives. He urged Quebeckers to forsake the unilingualism 
of the PQ and to accept the argument for a truly bilingual 
Canada.
Importantly, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a 
willingness to face the constitutional issue. "I 
cannot emphasize strongly enough," he said, "that the ques­
tion of unity is not confined to the issues of language nor
confined geographically to the province of Quebec." He lis­
ted numerous dissatisfactions in other provinces, such as 
the feelings of westerners that their interests were under­
represented in a central government dominated by more pop­
ulous Ontario and Quebec, and the unhappiness of the once 
prosperous eastern provinces over their economic imbalance 
with the more affluent central and western areas. As a 
temporary concession, Trudeau announced that the govern­
ment would be willing to allow the Parti Quebecois to go 
ahead with its proposed provincial language legislation 
because of what Secretary of State Roberts called the " in­
security of French Canadians about the future of their
3
language in an overwhelmingly English-speaking country."
Levesque's initial victories proved chimerical, however. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, by an overwhelming majority, de­
clared unconstitutional language Bill 101, which had made 
French the exclusive language in Quebec. Levesque's hoped- 
for referendum victory oh the "sovereignty-associationY pro­
posal was also defeated by a wide margin in 1981, leaving 
the future of the Parti Quebegois and its drive for an 
"associate state" in doubt.
Hypotheses. Aims and Methods
In 1977» when this'thesis was conceived, I hypothesized
2
Robert Trumbull, "Trudeau Willing to Consider Aid 
For Canada's Language Minorities," The New York Times. Julv 7 
1977, p. A3. --------- — :------- *
3 m"Ottawa Yields to Quebec on Language Temporarity,”
The New York Times. June 23, 1977, p. All.
7that the P.Q.’s election would lead, inevitably, to a separ­
ate nation of Quebec. Time and circumstances have eclipsed 
that hypothesis, and I am forced to conclude with Eric L. 
McKitrick that "nothing is more suceptible to oblivion than 
an argument, however ingenious, that has been discredited by 
events." This being the case, it will be necessary to re­
view the development of French Canadian separatism in the 
context of more recent history.
Much has happened in the last six years to warrant fur­
ther study concerning the reasons for the P.Q.*s initial vic­
tory and the causes for its subsequent defeat on the referen­
dum 1 issueyoTo the changes in the political climate which 
brought about the decline of support for the P.Q.®s drive 
for "sovereignty-association" one must add the fact that 
Canada*s constitution, since I867 subject to the approval 
of the English Parliament concerning its amendment process, 
has now been patriated, leaving constitutional amendment 
exclusively in Canadian hands. This certainly must rank as 
the major political change in French Canadian/English Canadian 
relations to take place in over a century. One must also 
question the role of the French Canadian Prime Minister,
Pierre Trudeau, who has been in power longer than any other 
Prime Minister in Canadian history, in shaping the federal 
response to the separatist challenge. What factors were
8responsible for Trudeau's decision to patriate the con­
stitution? Have the constitution's new provisions concer­
ning the entrenchment of French Canadian culture and lin­
guistic rights done anything to assuage French Canadians' 
dissatisfaction! with the current state of their minority 
position? What can be expected of English Canadians in terms 
of their willingness to give French Canadians a larger role 
in Canadian affairs in general, one not relegated to Quebec 
alone? Will there be a greater effort on the part of English 
Canadians toward wider use of the French language throughout 
Canada and to incorporate French in business and government 
outside the province of Quebec? These are questions which may 
not be fully answered for some time to come and, with the 
exception of Trudeau's motivation for constitutional reform,* 
will not be attempted in this thesis.
What will be attempted in this thesis is an examination 
of French Canada's role in the Canadian federation and the 
efforts English and French Canadians have made to seek 
accommodation over the years. It will attempt to examine not 
only the major issues that have come to the fore in English 
Canadian/French Canadian relations in recent decades, but 
also the structures and patterns within which accommodation 
has been sought— if not always achieved.
9Chapter 1 will survey the background of the French- 
speaking population in Canada and the subsequent conquest 
of French Canada by the British. It will examine the sources 
of conflict between the two groups and how the groups 
achieved a modus vivendi despite strident— and often 
violent— confrontations .
Chapter 2 will explore the origins of French Canadian 
nationalism, its form and content, style and purposes, 
methods and leadership. It will attempt to show how the 
above-mentioned elements have changed over time to ac­
commodate new circumstances and different strategies and 
goals. It will hold as its central theme that the tactics 
of French Canadian nationalism have fundamentally changed 
from violent confrontation to political action or, in 
other words, the abandonment of revolutionary nationalism 
for ballot-box change. It will trace this development 
from'the eighteenth century, through the separatist parties
of the 1950*s and 608s and will conclude by looking at the
/
current status of the separatist Parti Quebecois.
Chapter 3 will -ffocus on the constitution and the federal 
process in Canada. Specifically, the chapter will concentrate 
on the reasons for Quebec®s entry into the confederation; the 
degree of French Canadian support for the concept of federal­
ism; the specific provisions of the constitution that are 
sources of dissatisfaction to French Canadians; the question 
of repatriation of the constitution and the entrenchment of 
French Canadian rights.
10
The chapter will include a section on specific weak­
nesses of the constitution that have been the focus of 
academic discussion and debate among English and French 
Canadians alike. It will develop the hypothesis that 
the "consociational" model is the most useful in explaining 
how a nation such as Canada, with strong cultural cleavages, 
has managed to accommodate the factionalism inherent in 
societies where ethnic, linguistic and religious differences 
prevail. In addition, the thesis will attempt to show that 
the consociational pattern of accommodation, which prevailed 
in the past, has begun to break down in the wake of a change 
of leadership in Quebec.
Finally, the chapter will attempt to analyze the pro­
visions of the new constitution, specifically, those dealing 
with the entrenchment of French Canadian language and cul­
tural rights.
Chapter ^ will explore the underpinnings of separatist 
philosophy, examine the origins of separatist parties in 
Quebec during the twentieth century, and survey the evolu­
tion of separatist methods— both revolutionary and electoral—  
and trace their development up to the victory of the Parti 
Quebecois in 1976.
Chapter 5 will examine closely the two major protagon­
ists of the current Quebec debates Pierre Trudeau and Rene 
Levesque. Specifically, it will address the fundamental 
issues of Trudeau's concept of federalism and Levesque's
11
separatism. This debate has been going on since the 1960’s 
and is the backdrop of everything that has occurred in the 
1970's and 80's. In addition, it will draw on the ideas ex­
pressed by each man concerning his vision of what French 
Canada is and what each expects it to be. It will trace the 
development of each man’s personality and the factors which 
have shaped the world-view of each.
Chapter 6 will deal with recent events in Quebec since 
the P.Q. victory in 1976, It will examine the sources of 
P.Q. support in 1976, the measures taken by the P.Q. in 
the areas of language rights, education, business regulation 
and public policy. It will attempt to explore the reasons 
behind the P.Q.'s loss on the sovereignty-association issue, 
and the prospects for the future of the P.Q. in light of 
the referendum defeat.
Finally, chapter 7 will draw some general conclusions 
concerning the future of French Canadian nationalism, the 
prospects for Canadian federalism, the conflict between 
Trudeau and Levesque, and the obstacles facing both Levesque 
and the P.Q. concerning Quebec independence.
CHAPTER I
QUEBEC AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS 
THE SEEDS OF A SEPARATE STATE
The Land
The geography of Quebec provides an immediate introduc­
tion to the idea of an independent state. With its enor­
mous size and its very distinct boundaries, it is not 
difficult for one to think of Quebec as a separate nation, 
Quebec is the largest Canadian province; it covers ap­
proximately 600,000 square miles--fifteen percent of the 
total land area of Canada. Further, it is separated from 
both the United States and the rest of Canada almost en­
tirely by water (especially if its boundary with Labrador 
is ignored, as it is on Quebec's official maps). Hudson Bay 
borders it on the west, Hudson Straight and the Atlantic
Ocean on the north, the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the east,
1
and the Ottawa and St, Lawrence Rivers on the south.
Quebec's internal geography is also of primary importance
1
Jay and Audrv Walz, Portrait of Canada (New York; 
American Heritage Press, 197077 P* 170•
12
13
/
because it proved to be a source of division for the Quebeg- 
ois: it first precluded rapid economic growth, then its 
most promising areas came under the control of the English 
rather than the French. Essentially, Quebec can be divided 
into three regions running northeast to southwest. On the 
southern extreme is the St. Lawrence Valley, a fertile 
agricultural area that is the center of the densest pop­
ulation. Directly north are two mountain ranges, the 
Laurentians and the Appalachians, that would effectively 
keep the Quebec populiiation along the St. Lawrence. Though 
not impassable, they did discourage-emigration
out of the semi-fertile valleys until it was necessitated
2by overcrowding. Furthest north is the tundra-like region 
that has some economic value in its mineral resources but 
which even today remains practically uninhabitable( under 
two people per square mile). Thus it was that during the 
early history of Quebec, population was concentrated along 
the only navigable waterway where settlement was relatively 
easy— the St. Lawrence.
The People
The French colonial presence began in 1608 when Samuel 
Champlain sailed up the St. Lawrence and founded, v/hat was to
2
John Warkinton, Canada; A Geographic Interpretation 
(Toronto; Methuen, 1968) , p. 3(T5~»
3
Rand-McNally World Atlas, Imperial Edition (New York; 
Rand-McNally and Co), p. 236.
Ik
become Quebec City. He was soon followed by Jesuit priests, 
among them Father Marquette, and the fur traders. Remarkably, 
the French were able to endure and expand their tiny colony 
throughout what was called New France despite Indian attacks 
and harsh winters. By 1682, exploration had taken place as 
far as the western tip of Lake Superior and all the way down 
the Mississippi. The entire watershed was claimed in the name 
of Louis XIV of France. Meanwhile, of course, the British 
were firmly entrenched along the east coast of the present- 
day United States and around Hudson Bay. Gradually, animosity 
grew as the British poached in French lands to the south of 
Hudson Bay and expanded further westward from the colonies.
War broke out occasionally in the early 1700's but with 
relatively little effect on either side.
The French who settled in the St. Lawrence valley soon
realized that they were not merely travelers or explorers
visiting the region or French officials on duty in the
colony. New France was their country, and to show their in­
tention to identify themselves in ..the new land, they took the 
name habitants. The word meant that they were there to stay 
as residents, to inhabit. Later generations born in the 
colony would come to be known as Canadiens, whose world­
view, habits and collective traits would make the French 
of Canada different from those of France.^ 
kWilliam K. Lamb, Canada's Five Centuries (Toronto? 
McClelland and Stewart, 1971JT p. 36.
Ibid.
Ibid.
15
By 175k9 New France, except in physical expanse, was 
still a tiny colony. Its total population was only about 
55f000 and there were only two cities of any size, Mon­
treal and Quebec City (8,500 and 5*000 respectively).'*
The economy was based on small farms and fur-trading out­
posts; there was little industry. Surrounded as the French 
were by hostile elements, the Catholic church served as a 
bastion of French culture in the wilderness? and in 
addition to gaining profits from the fur trade the habitants 
spread the gospel among the Indians, thus giving their 
colonizing efforts a distinct missionary zeal.
With the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 175&* the 
competition between England and France in the Old World was 
transferred to British and French outposts in the New World. 
This conflict would set the stage for France's final 
struggle to remain a colonial power in Canada.
At 10 o'clock on the morning of September 13* 1759* two 
armies faced each other on the high plateau above the cliffs 
of Quebec. It was there, on the Plains of Abraham, that 
France's dreams for further exploitation were dashed when 
General James Wolfe's army overran the French position and 
defeated Montcalm. That evening, the remainder of the French 
army retreated from the east of Quebec. The city was left 
virtually defenseless, and on September 17 it capitulated.
Ibid., p. 58.
16
Long before that, however, Montcalm was dead. "I shall not
g
live to see the surrender of Quebec,” he had said.
The Treaty of Paris in 1763 ceded all possessions in the 
northern part of North America except two small islands to 
Britain, but that was not to end the French presence. The 
military and most of the elite deserted Canada but some 
60,000 farmers, trappers and voyageurs were left behind to 
fend for themselves. They clung together, working, teaching,
o
and praying in French. In this solidarity can be found the
roots of French Canadian nationalism. From the 1760*s, as
the French held together and turned inward, survival or la
survivance became the goal of French Canadians after the con-
10quest. Je me souviens --"I remember”—  was the watchword.
The British Canadians reached out to both the American
colonies and the Commonwealth, while the French Canadians
were more concerned with preserving their traditional way of
life. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the
11English were the sole cause of French isolation. Indeed, 
the British military governors were well disposed to the 
French and, although the official British position was to 
assimilate the Quebeqois, the Quebec Act was signed in 177^ 
as a result of Governor Guy Carlton's bringing pressure to 
bear on the British Parliament.
o
John Saywell, Canada, Past and Present (Toronto; Clark- 
Irwin, 1975)> P* 56.
Q
Lamb, p. 65®
^°Saywell, p. 56.
■^Lamb, p. 69.
1?
Mason Wade, a French Canadian historian, calls the Quebec
12
Act their Magna Carta. He notes that the problem with the 
/
Quebe^ois was not that they were French but that they were
Roman Catholic and, as such, excluded from all civil rights.
For example, all the other provinces were given elected asir^o
semblies before 177^« In the Quebec Act, Quebec itself was
given only an appointed council because the British did not
trust the French electorate. Nonetheless, the Quebec Act did
assure some measure of religious freedom for the Quebeyois.
/
The Quebetpois were finally granted representative 
government by the Constitutional Act of 1791* This Act also 
divided Canada into two separate regions: Upper Canada, con­
trolled by the United Empire Loyalists (present-day Ontario)% 
and Lower Canada(the present province of Quebec). Neverthe­
less, the French were relegated to minor positions in the 
appointive legislative and executive councils, even as their 
numbers assured them an overwhelming majority in the legis-
13
lative assembly.
The English who took up residence in the newly-conquered 
territory were divided among those who tried to gain the 
sympathy of the local population, liberal-minded British 
military officers, and those who came for the sake of profits 
and displayed an openly hostile attitude toward both native
12
Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1760-1967. Vol II. 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968)’, 5°•
13
J.M.S. Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge, rev. ed. 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), p. 11A.
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French and immigrant British administrators; merchants and 
adventurers, mostly from New England, Many of these new 
arrivals were British Loyalists, who flocked to settle in 
Canada along the St. Lawrence from Montreal westward. Some 
had settled on the land but most had come to engage in trade 
and commerce. It was not long before the British minority 
and the French majority were engaged in competition. Through­
out the first half of the nineteenth century Montreal was 
outdistancing Quebec in importance, and the city of Montreal 
was;lin fact, populated by a British majority®
In the economic field, the British wanted to develop 
trade and commerce and to levy taxes to build harbors and 
canals? the French, who lived largely on the land, objected 
to paying taxes to assist the commercial English-speaking 
city'dwellers• Politically, the English continued to enjoy 
positions on the British governor's appointed council, and 
the French protested that the governor should listen to 
their advice and not that of the English-speaking merchants
15and bankers 0
In 1837r the battle of words became a battle of acts. 
Louis Joseph Papineau, the French leader of the assembly, 
roused his followers, the Patriotes. to armsinveighing 
against the English-speaking Chateau Clique for its
Kenneth McNaught, The Pelican History of Canada( Bal­
timore s Penguin Books, 19&9)» P* ?C*
15
Ibid., p. 71
favoratism toward the mercantile interests of Montreal
businessmen, and against the British leaders who refused
recognition of ministerial " responsibility” to the French
majority in the House, In his famous Ninety-Two Resolutions
he enumerated the province's political grievances. However,
Lord Russell, speaking for the British government, made clear
16
that the demands for autonomy would not be conceded. In
May of 1837, Papineau declared," The democratic flood has
poured irresistably down the slope of time and growing
faster and faster, will topple the barriers which may be
17
erected against it."
The first violence of "Papineau's Revolt" flared after 
a meeting called by the Patriotes in November of I837 in 
Montreal. Although Papineau fled the city, the government 
mistook this move as an attempt to arouse rebellion in the 
countryside and dispatched military units to areas of known 
Patriote sympathy. Because the rebellion had been ill-con­
ceived and poorly executed, most of the rebels were either 
killed or captured during an encounter with British troops 
at St. Eustache. Papineau and his immediate circle fled to 
the United States. The British, meanwhile, dispatched Lord
Durham to conduct a full investigation of the causes of the 
18
rebellion.
16
Saywell, p. 56.
17
Wade, p. 18^.
18
Careless, pp. I92-I93.
20
There were, in fact, a number of reasons for the 
rebellion, but Lord Durham saw it primarily as a racial 
question* In his famous report, he wrote:
I expected to find a contest between a govern­
ment and a people* Instead, I found two nations 
warring in the bosom of a single state, not of 
principles but of races; and I perceived that 
it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of 
laws or institutions until we could first suc­
ceed in terminating the deadly animosity that 
now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada 
/Quebec? into hostile divisions of French and 
English.19
Durham criticized the French Canadians,characterizing them 
as ”a people with no history, no literature.” Believing that 
the French were backward and the British merchants progres­
sive, Durham maintained that the only answer to the racial 
conflict was to swamp the French population. Unite Upper 
and Lower Canada, he argued, and in a short time the com­
bined English-speaking population of the two colonies 
would outnumber the French. Assimilation of the French would 
then only be a matter of time.
Since, as Lord Durham pointed out, there were also good 
economic reasons for the union of the two colonies, the 
British government followed his advice and united the 
colonies in 18^1. But Durham's attack only served to make 
the French Canadians more determined to maintain their own
^Saywell, p. 57*
20Ibid.. p. 58.
culture; to make them attach themselves more firmly to their 
language, religion, and the values of their rural, agricul­
tural society; and to make them impress je. me souviens even 
more indelibly on their children. In politics, French 
Canadian leaders were quick to oppose any move that smacked 
of inequality; or threatened their survival. This elaborate 
game of chess, largely played out in the assembly, paralyzed
the government of the colony and was one of the reasons for
21
confederation in I867.
Confederation once again divided the two Canadas, this
time into the provinces of Ontario and Quebec— the former
overwhelmingly English-speaking and the latter overwhelmingly
French-- and united them along with the other colonies in the
Canadian federation. Politically, the federal union did not
reflect a desire on the part of the English and the French
to live more closely together, but it was a reflection of
the fact that they could not live together under a unitary
22
system of government. Moreover, the federal union was based 
on the hope that the two peoples could live together if 
there were nothing to fight over. The constitution, therefore, 
gave to the provinces all matters of special concern to each 
cultural group, while the federal government was given 
direct responsibility for broad national policies that did
21
lb id.
22
Thomas A. Hockin, Government in Canada (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., Inc.I 1975)» P« 12.
not involve religious, linguistic, or cultural interests*
The Constitution also guaranteed the educational rights of
the Protestant English minority in Quebec and the Roman
Catholic religious minorities outside Quebec, and the use
of the French and English languages in the Canadian
21Parliament and the Quebec legislature* J Thus, the founding 
fathers of the Confederation hoped that Quebec would no 
longer be obsessed with survival for, although it rep­
resented a minority in Canada, it had control of its own
2kinstitutions m  the Province of Quebec*
In the economic sphere,following confederation, however, 
the French and British were far from equal* Confederation 
did usher in the industrial revolution for Canada* Railroads 
were started in Montreal and spread to the West; but from 
Montreal east to Quebec there were still only small farms 
inhabited by Roman Catholic families. In 1867, Quebec was 
still a rural region while Ontario, the Maritime Provinces 
and the Prairie Provinces, either populated or dominated by 
the British, showed signs of emerging into the industrial
2 5era.
Once again, geographic factors determined the patterns 
of development. The mountain ranges running parallel to the 
St* Lawrence valley, plus a lack of capital to invest
21R. MacGregor Dawson and W.F. Dawson, Democratic 
Government in Canada, ^th ed. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1971), p* 100.
2kRamsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadian Question 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, I966), pp, 59-°l•
25
Warkinton, p. 305*
in mining ventures, forced Canadians to look to the United 
States for supplies of iron ore and coal. Although parts of 
southern Quebec, specifically Montreal, could get some raw 
material from coal fields in western Pennsylvania and the 
iron ore mines near Lake Superior, for the most part the 
metallurgical industry developed in Ontario. Since the 
regions east of Montreal could not import these essential 
raw materials because the St. Lawrence was shallow and 
could handle only limited shipping, Ontario emerged better 
offthan all of Quebec. Added to this was the fact that 
the British parts of Quebec, Montreal and the southern 
parts of the province, were economically more advanced 
than the French parts. Nowhere was this more obvious 
that in the disparity of wealth between Montreal and
Quebec City. With the continued expansion of the railroads
/
between Ottawa and Montreal, the latter was able to make
up ground on the former. Moreover, industrialization
could proceed at a moderate pace in Montreal because it
had access to large amounts of investment capital, whereas
'25eastern Quebec could not secure the necessary funds• ^
The net effect of this pattern of industrialization was
25
Ibid., pp. 310-330.
a shift in population from the French sector to the British. 
Indicative of their will to survive, the French relied on 
the revanche du berceau, "revenge of the cradle,” and in­
creased their numbers one hundred times in two hundred years. 
This population increase did serve the purpose of preventing 
French Canada from being overwhelmed by the British; but it 
neither lessened the British domination of such financial 
centers as Montreal nor made the French Canadians any 
wealthier. Thus, it was that Quebec was left with a sub­
stantial French majority which had the bulk of its wealth
27controlled by the English. r
For their part the French, who found themselves lagging 
farther behind in the economic sphere also found themselves 
discriminated against in the cultural realm. The ink on 
the British North America Act was hardly dry when the French 
Canadians found that the conflict of cultures could not be 
removed from national life. Moving beyond the borders of 
Quebec, French Canadians soon realized that Canada was 
basically an English-speaking country.: They encountered an 
alien and often hostile culture that refused to provide 
schools where their children could be educated in their own 
language and religion, and forced them to work in 
English if they wanted to succeed. Even the province of
26
Jay and Audry Walz, p. 172.
27
Warkinton, p. 351®
28
Donald Reisebrough, Canada and the French (New Yorks 
Facts on File Publications,
25
Manitoba, where there was a large French-speaking population 
and where French language rights had been guaranteed in 1870, 
abolished French schools and ended the right of members to 
speak French in the provincial legislature in 1890.
that their language and culture hindered them from assuming 
positions of influence within the Anglo-dominated commercial 
center of Montreal. More important, however, was the fact 
that Quebeckers found their traditional system of education 
precluded them from gaining entry to the business world. 
Since the time of Champlain, the Catholic Church had main­
tained control of Quebec's educational establishment, and 
the Church was more interested in training the young in law, 
religion or education rather ..than in the more "worldly" 
vocations. By contrast, English youths had been schooled in 
such areas as engineering, finance and business adminis^: 
tration. Thus, whatever economic development took place in
the province^took place under British control.
Because the French Canadian realized that he was often 
powerless in Ottawa, Quebec assumed a larger importance: it 
was only in Quebec that he had a province where his language 
and culture would be respected. As Henri Bourassa, a 
brilliant French Canadian nationalist,put it, the French
29
"Quebec, Uneasy Province," Christian Century 86 
(March 26, 1969)» P* ^280
W ithin found
29
Canadian was like an Indian who had no rights once he left 
the reservation. Only in Quebec could he remain French. La 
survivance became the touchstone of French Canadian life.
An example of the fact that Ottawa turned a deaf ear
to French Canadian feeling came outside Quebec in 1885 when
✓
the Metis, French-speaking half-breeds in the Northwest 
Territory, rebelled against the Canadian government. Even 
though federal authorities had been guilty of serious mis­
management in western Canada, the rebellion was quickly 
crushed and its leader, Louis Riel, captured. English 
Canada demanded that he be executed;but the French 
Canadians asked for mercy, pleading that he was fighting 
for the survival of a people and arguing— with some jus­
tification— that he was insane. Pressured by a united 
English Canada, the government followed the letter of the 
law despite an almost unanimous chorus from Quebec demanding 
that Riel's life be spared.
As Quebec entered the twentieth century it found itself 
in a quandry. Even as Quebec became more industrialized as 
a result of the development of hydro-electric power from the 
St. Lawrence and a booming lumber business, the French be­
came anxious about the preservation of their language, cul­
ture and heritage. They had to face the prospect of
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2?
modernization or lose control of their destinies to the 
Anglo-Saxon enterpreneurs• The dilemma was that they could 
not enjoy the benefits of their heritage and modernization 
at the same time. This situation was to obtain throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century. Quebec lagged 
behind the other provinces in both education and income 
^see tables 1 and 2^ 7 while at the same time it struggled 
against the assimalative pressures resulting from industrial­
ization and economic integralism.
The next serious political confrontation between French 
and English Canada came with the conscription crises of 1900 
and 1917. English Canada demanded that the nation send troops 
to assist Great Britain in the Boer War in South Africa^but 
French Canada argued that the conflict was of no vital con­
cern to Canada and opposed participation. Nonetheless, Sir 
Wilfred Laurier, then Prime Minister and himself a French 
Canadian, had to bow to the demands of the English Canadian 
majority. Likewise, the conscription crisis of 1917 fueled French 
Canadians* animosity toward their English counterparts.
With Canadian forces suffering higher losses in: Europe in the 
first half of 1917» and with the government getting fewer 
and fewer recruits, Ottawa decided that a draft was necessary.
For the most part, English Canada supported the federal 
position, but Quebec was vehemently opposed. The Quebe^ois
28
felt no responsibility to serve a federation that was doing
little for them. Henry Bourassa, Premier of Quebec, warned
that conscription "would soon transform the most peaceable
perhaps most orderly, population of the Americas into a
30
revolutionary people." Riots broke out in Quebec and the 
first talk of leaving the federation was heard from French 
Canadian nationalists. As it turned out, the war was over 
sooner than expected and only 50*000 conscripts were sent 
overseas. But from these crises and defeats— and every crisis 
was a defeat— French Canada learned the painful lesspn that 
national politics could center on racial issues.
The Fragmented Canadian Identity
In addition to the historical, geographical, social^and 
economic factors which have tended to distinguish Quebec and 
its inhabitants from the rest of Canada, there are also a 
number of very important psychological ’considerations 
which have made a sense of national unity between French- 
speaking and English-speaking Canadians difficult to 
achieve and have tended to fragment the Canadian identity.
From the historical perspective, for example, Seymour 
Mo Lipset has remarked that two nations, the United States
3*and Canada, resulted from the American Revolution. Two other
30
Saywell, p. 23*
31
Seymour M. Lipset, Introduction to Public Opinion and 
the Canadian Identity by Mildred Schwartz (Berkeley: Univer­
sity of California Press, 1967), P*
29
observers of the Canadian scene, S.D. Clark and A.R.M.
Lower, suggest that Canada, the North American nation
formed from the losing side in the American Revolution,
has a counter-revolutionary tradition which is also a
32clue to understanding Canadian values. What is more, 
as Mildred Schwartz observes, "Whereas after the revolu­
tion many supporters of the American cause left behind 
north of the new international border emigrated south, 
many thousands of Tories moved north. And from what 
emerged as a separate Canadian identity has been jus­
tifying itself as not being American." ■?? S.Di Clark 
adds that "Canadian life can almost be said to take 
its rise in the negative will to resist absorption in 
the American Republic." ^
With respect to Quebec's traditional values, Porter 
notes that because of Quebec's parochial structure, its 
traditional resistance to liberal ideas, and because the 
Catholic Church held sway in Quebec immediately following 
the conquest, Quebeckers feared the revolutionary doctrines 
espoused by the United States. Consequently, when American
32
S.D. Clark and A.R.M. Lower," Revolution and Counter­
revolution, the United States and Canada," in The Revolution­
ary Theme in Contemporary America, ed. Thomas R. FordTLex- 
ington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1965)* P» ^2.
33
Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and the Canadian 
Identity(Berkeley: University of California Press,1957),
P*
3^
Clark and Lower, p. 22.
35
John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social 
Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
i%5;. P. 370.
30
forces invaded Canada during the American Revolution, Quebec 
did not grasp the opportunity to throw off British colonial 
rule and side with the U.S. against England. Further, when 
the 1789 Revolution broke out in France— with its decidedly 
rationalist and anti-clerical overtones— the French 
Canadian clergy sought to cut the people off from both 
sources of contaminations the United States and France.
Thus it was that the Quebec leadership found union with 
the British monarchy preferable to the radical doctrines 
of the Enlightenment.
As for the outward symbols of national identity, the 
British flag flew over Canada until the 1960's, and the 
highest court of appeal was the Judicial Committee of 
the British Privy Conncil until approximately the same 
time. Until 1982, the Canadian constitution was the 
British North America Act, passed by the British Parliament 
iin- I867. Any amendment to the Act was subject to the pro 
forma ratification of the British Parliament.
All of this has tended to prevent Canadians from having 
a strong sense of national identity. S.M. Lipset observed 
that although Canada has been very successful in achieving 
economic growth and a high standard of living, it still 
lacks a strong sense of national pride:" and identity." It
is still not certain what it is," Lipset claims," A rm
North American nation* not much different from the United
States, which a significant minority thinks might join
the United States, a British nation with a large French
subculture, two nations, one French and the other English,
which exist in a loose confederation, or some combination
3 6
of these and other concepts."
The Unified French Identity^
It is with respect to identity that the French-speaking 
Canadian (Quebegois) has a distinct advantage over his 
English-speaking counterpart. Whereas the British Canadian 
is somewhat uncertain of what Canada represents to him, the 
French Canadian is quite sure of the meaning of Quebec. He 
knows the traditions and folkways of his ancestors, their 
rural way of life and their strong attachment to the Roman 
Catholic faith. He has been taught the names of French 
Canadian heroes of the past— Champlain, Riel, Papineau, 
Bourassa— who fought for, and sometimes died, to preserve 
his culture. He is painfully aware of le. conquete , the 
forceful subjugation of his homeland, the dominance of 
the British. Overarching all of these things is his cherished 
language, the most salient feature of his lifestyle and his 
means to transmit what he has learned to his progeny. Thus 
it is that through his culture and his territory, the French 
Canadian feels himself part of a distinct nation.
36
S.M. Lipset, Intruduction to Public Opinion and the 
Canadian Identity$> p. 7 ®
CHAPTER II 
THE PARTI QUEBECOIS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CANADIAN NATIONALISM
In order to understand the place that the Parti
Quebecois occupies in terms of the development of French
Canadian nationalism, it is necessary to trace the origins
of nationalist thought in French Canada. While nationalism
has remained a prominent theme in the history of French-
English relations in Canada, it would be wrong to conclude
that its context and content have remained the same at
all times. Nationalist expression has crystalized today
in a way which is fundamentally different from past forms.
It has changed from a rather vague nation to one of concrete
demands for a separate state of Quebec. It has undergone
a significant shift in emphasis, from a defensive inward-
1looking philosophy of survivance to an outward looking 
and aggressive orientation, symbolized by the doctrine of 
maitre chez nous.^
My hypothesis is that French Canadian nationalism has 
passed through several distinct phases in its evolutions in­
ward turning nationalism (defensive nationalism); constitu­
tional nationalism; political nationalism; anti-imperialist
1
"survival”
2
"Masters in our own house"
32
33
nationalism; modern nationalism(which includes both liberal 
and socialist nationalism); revolutionary nationalism; and, 
finally, electoral or "ballot box" separatism. Each of 
these phases will be considered in terms of its symbols, 
leaders, trends*and expressions. The psychological, social, 
and political factors which have given expression to 
French Canadian nationalism at different periods will be 
examined, and an analysis will be made of the institutional 
and associational devices which have encouraged and 
directed the forces of change.
The first task is to define exactly what we mean by 
nationalism, for the exact dimensions and nature of the 
subject have been a source of much academic debate and 
discussion in recent years. According to Michael Brunet, 
"nationalism is a manifestation of the national and 
spontaneous solidarity that exists among members of a 
human group sharing a historical and cultural tradition 
from which the group derives its distinctive identity."-^
A somewhat different approach to nationalism is that of 
K.R. Minogue, who draws a distinction between "nationalism" 
and "patriotism." Patriotism, by Minogue*s yardstick means 
devotion to one's country, a "sentiment of loyalty by vir­
tue of which one feels identified with the political 
communityi" a "spontaneous reference to the sharing of a
3
Michael Brunet," The French Canadians Search for a 
Fatherland," in Nationalism in Canada, ed. Peter Russel 
(Montreal: McGraw-Hill-Ryerson, Ltd., 1966), p. 47.
3^
common soil, language, culture, history, folkways, customs
and values— all of which result in a sense of pride as well
Ll
as a sense to duty to the group.*' Nati onadism, on the 
other hand, is a response to an outward threat. In this 
respect, according to Minogue, "Nationalism is a political 
movement which seeks to defend an objective we may call
e;
national integrity."
For our purposes, we will consider Louis Snyder's 
concept of nationalism as our working definition. According 
to Snyder, " Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling, 
or sentiment of a group of people living in a well defined 
geographic area, speaking a common language, possessing a 
literature in which their aspirations are expressed, at­
tached to common traditions and customs, venerating their 
own heroes, and, in some cases, having the same religion."
As for the precise form of nationalism that will pre­
vail at a given time, it is necessary to define the suc­
cessive stages through which nationalism passes. Minogue, 
for example, holds that there are three distinct stages 
which may be used to trace the development of nationalisms 
1) stirrings— the period in which the nation becomes aware 
of itself as a nation suffering oppression; 2) the struggle
K.R. Monogue, Nationalism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1967), p. 23.
5
Ibid.
^Louis Snyder, "Global Mini-Nationalism-s : Autonomy or 
Independence," Contributions in Political Science, No 71, 
Global Perspectives in History and Politics( Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), p. xv.
35
for independence— this may involve terrorism, guerrilla 
warfare, riots or a process of peaceful negotiation*
During this time there is an exposition pf national 
virtue and the emergence of heroes? 3) the process of 
consolidation— which is keeping the nation, once it 
has achieved independence, from falling apart*
The Character of French Canadian Nationalism
Until quite recently, French Canadian nationalism was 
tied closely to the values of traditional society. These 
values tended to inhibit the expansion of the -role of 
the state, whatever may have been the implications for 
economic and social development. The major premise of 
this traditional ideology was that the "nation0 was,and 
should always be,essentially agrarian, and that the truest 
expression of the French Canadian identity lay in the 
parish community. Industrialization and urbanization, it 
was felt, could only weaken the nation. The notion of 
agrarian superiority held sway over many nationalist intel­
lectuals even until the middle of the twentieth century.
For example, in 19^3» clerical nationalist Richard Ares 
wrote, "By tradition, vocation, as well as necessity, we 
are a people of peasants. Everything that takes us away from 
the land diminishes and weakens us as a people and encourages
7
Minogue, p. 29*
36
Q
cross-breeding, duplicity and treason.” As late as 1956, 
the report of the Tremblay Commission, a provincially 
appointed commission on constitutional problems, declared 
that "the consolidation arid expansion of agriculture to 
the extreme limit imposes itself as the first article of
Q
a programme of social restoration and stabilization.” 7
By the mid-twentieth century, however, the traditional 
nationalist arguments had become outmoded, for the phil­
osophy whicih extolled the virtues of agrarian existence 
did little to focus attention on social and economic prob­
lems faced by the bulk of French Canadians now living in 
cities. Thus, during the 1960*3, there was a marked shift 
away from traditional ideology. Writing in 1963? Leon Dion 
observed that nationalist ideology had undergone significant 
changes in direction and scope.” This nationalistic revival,” 
he claimed,” fuels the great drive for development seen in 
every field of activity and in every segment of the com­
munity.” 10
Origins of French Canadian Nationalism
Before the British conquest of 175^? there was little 
nationalistic feeling among French Canadians. This, of
8
Richard Ares, quoted by Ferdinand Dumond and Guy Rocher 
in ”An Introduction to a Sociology of French Canada,” in 
French Canadian Society, ed. Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin 
(Montreal: McClelland and Stewart, 196^), p« 3^6.
9 *
Dale Postgate and Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social 
Change and Political Crisis(Montreal: McClelland and Stewart,
1976), po 65
10
Lion Dion, The Unfinished Revolution(Montreal: McGill- 
Queens, 1976) , p. 33«>
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course, is understandable because they still regarded them­
selves as citizens of France. For the most part, these 
soil-tilling habitants, voyageurs, soldiers, seigneurs, 
and the clergy were occuped with establishing their colony, 
and had no real sense of separateness from their European 
origins. Their feeling of group consciousness came only 
after the British conquest, as a result of the conflict 
with a culturally alien group.
Moreover, there were other important internal forces at 
work which helped to restrain nationalistic expression.
Because Quebec's clergy was imbued with the doctrines of 
royal absolutism and the principles of obedience to authority 
as established by Rome, these influential church leaders did 
much to persuade the habitants to accept British rule. Even 
more, there was an alignment of French Canadian notables 
with the British administrative class. French-English 
marriages took place between British functionaries and 
professional soldiers, on the one hand, and the daughters 
of the merchant and professional French Canadians. This had 
the effect of splitting French Canadian solidarity along 
class lines, and widening the gap between French Canadian 
rural and city masses and their intellectual and com­
mercial 3_eaders. It was only during the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century that national solidarity 
grew into political consciousness. French Canadians were
38
then more aware of their minority status and of the fact
11thay they were "charter members of the country•"
Defensive Nationalism
Between 1?5^ and 1840, French Canadians began to strug­
gle for constitutional and civil rights# Bonenfant and 
Falardeau have referred to this period as a time of "de­
fensive nationalism" which climaxed in the Papineau 
Rebellion of 1837-38# To be sure, Papineau was familiar 
with the ideas of the French philosophes concerning the 
concept of nationality, but they claimed that Papineau was
"a parliamentary liberal and a great patriot, forced by
12circumstances to be a nationalist."
Notably, a decade before Papineau*s Rebellion, the 
Canadian Party, which had changed its name under Papineau*s 
leadership to the Patriotes Parti, adopted a rallying flag 
which consisted of three horizontal stripes bearing the 
colors of green, white and red, similar in design to the 
French revolutionary tricolor. At the time of Papineau*s
11
Everett C# Hughes, French Canada in Transition 
(Chicagoi University of Chicago Press, 19^3)» P« xi•
12
Jean C. Bonenfant and J# Falardeau, "Cultural and 
Political Implications of French Canadian Nationalism," in 
French Canadian Nationalism, ed. John Saywell (Montreal; 
McGill-Queens University Press, 1965)* PP* 19-20.
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13
”92 Resolutions," the party included an impressive array 
of French Canadian political leaders and orators such as 
LaFontaine, Vigner, Morin, Nelson, Duvernay, Parent,and, 
of course, Papineau. Its philosophy drew on many of the 
ideas being expressed in Europe in the wake of the French 
Revolution: social progress, democracy, reform and liberty.
The party also had a number of newspapers to disseminate 
its propaganda: Le Vindicateur,and La Minerve in Montreal;
Le Liberal and Le Canadiene in Quebec City. The latter's 
editor, Etienne Parent, had himself coined the Patriote's
1 h
slogan, "Nos institutions, notre langue. et notre droits." 
Other newspapers which served the Patrlote purpose were 
L'Echo du Pays and Le Fantasque.
The party's activists were supervised by its Comite^ 
Central et Permanent, which centralized information and 
propaganda and which had the duty of organizing meetings ,pro­
viding speakers and literature, and otherwise uniting and 
stimulating "popular forces."
Developing attthe same time, but independent of the 
Patriote party, there emerged another movement dedicated 
to the cause of French Canada. This was the Saint Jean 
Baptiste Society, which had taken root several years
13
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Lower Canada," adopted by Papineau and his followers to show 
their determination to throw off the English yoke. See J.M.S. 
Careless, Canada (New York: St. Martins, 1970), p. 180.
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before 1837 through the efforts of Jacques Vigner and Paul 
Duvernay. The Society, its founders hoped, would be the 
first great associational device to bind together the 
masses and elite among French Canadians who had been drift­
ing further and further apart.
The Society, like the Patriotes) party of Papineau, 
had a flag, an emblem, and a definite purpose. The motto,
"Nos institutions, notre langue, et notre droits," was 
borrowed from Etienne Parent. Likewise, the flag had the 
same green, white and red colors as the Patriotes* flag.
Its emblem was the maple leaf, conceived as "the symbol 
of destiny of the French Canadian people."Although they 
were separate organizations, the link between the Saint 
Jean Baptiste Society and the Patriotes* party was 
strengthened by their common purpose. In fact, it was from 
the ranks of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society that the 
leaders of the Patriotes* party’s Permanent Committee were 
later drawn. The Society, for its part, continued to 
glorify and popularize, through its annual speeches and 
demonstrations, a reverence for tradition and the in­
stitutions of the past, and to emphasize the emotional 
and mythlike interpretation of the historical development 
of the French Canadians. This later developed into a 
recurrent theme of a national mission for the French 
Canadian people.
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Constitutional Nationalism
The first phase of defensive nationalism gave way in 
the 1840's to a period of "constitutional’1'nationalism 
under the Union Regime* This was largely in reaction to 
the British attempt to assimilate the French Canadians 
following Lord Durham's recommendation that Upper and 
Lower Canada be united. The two provinces were actually 
united in the Act of Union in 1841.
One of the French leaders, La Fontaine, seemed ably 
equipped to defend French Canadian interests. Fortunately, 
for French Canada, the reform movement sanctioned the 
principles of ministerial responsibility--that is, con­
trol of the executive by the people's representatives.
Lord Durham had, in fact, acknowledged the necessity of 
applying this principle in the colonies, as it had been 
in Great Britain a few years earlier. La Fontaine knew that 
ministerial responsibility would mean control over the 
executive by French Canadian representatives, and to 
attain that aim he became allied with the reformers of 
Upper Canada. This served to temper nationalistic fervor 
and to redirect it into more practical concerns such as 
education, local development, and agriculture.
While these developments were taking place in the 
political arena, young French Canadians were being social­
ized toward French Canadian values in a number of classical
colleges that had been founded either by the local clergy
/
or by teaching orders from Europe* The Ecole Litteraire 
of Quebec had been fostering an ardent group of writers, 
poets, historians,and novelists who exalted the symbols, 
ideas, and values of the French Canadians, They placed 
emphasis on the history of the race, the mother country, 
the Roman Catholic Church, the language and folkways of 
French Canadians, and the attachment to the soil. Text­
books underlined ecclesiastical and religious landmarks 
of the history of the French in Canada.
Nonetheless, during this same period, there were also 
sharp differences among the French Canadians themselves con­
cerning the philosophical direction of French Canada, Where­
as Papineau's ideas, for example, had been drawn from the 
salons of Paris, the clergy opposed the ideas of the "En­
lightenment »" They held that its doctrines were too 
radical, too democratically minded, too free thinking, and 
too anti-clerical. The conflict between liberal thinkers 
such as Papineau and the clergy eventually resulted in the 
Church reestablishing its dominance over thought in Quebec, 
which in turn brought about a more conservative form of
nationalism. The church was to retain its power over 
thought in Quebec until the mid-twentieth century, and 
lost its grip only as Quebec became more secularized.
Mercier, Riel, and the Rebound of Political Nationalism
The fragile consensus between French and English
Canada gave way shortly after confederation in 186?.
latent feelings of nationalist sentiment emerged in
response to events not in Quebec but in the new province
of Manitoba, part of the former Northwest Territories.
The infringement of rights of the French Canadian minority
in this area received considerable attention in Quebec,
especially from Liberals and the ’’national1' movement
/
directed by Honore Mercier. Mercier®s objective was to 
create a "united French Canadian front, erasing former
1 5party lines, for the defense of French Canadian rights."
The movement emphasized electoral reform, administrative 
readjustments, provincial autonomy, decentralization,
tariff protection, and opposition to the Canadian Pacific
, 16 pro ject •
The Riel'-affair in 1885 galvanized Mercier®s movement.
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Opposition to the railroad was due to French Canadian 
feeling that rail~access to their enclaves in the hinterlands 
would result in British Canadian dominance of French-speaking 
areas outside Quebec0
Louis Riel, "chief” of the French Canadian half-breeds, the 
Metis, in Manitoba, had become spokesman for the French 
Canadians living along the Red River in Manitoba, While 
both English and French Canadian half-breeds were concer­
ned about the fate of their free life on the plains if 
settlement should begin in earnest, the more numerous 
Metis were also concerned about the fate of their Catholic 
religion and French customs if English Canadians poured in. 
Their fears became intensified when William McDougall, the 
new Canadian lieutenant governor, reached the Red River to 
take over the colony.
Riel, a clever but somewhat unbalanced man, set up a 
"provisional government" on his own. He took over Ft, Gary 
and stopped McDougall at the border of the settlement. Riel 
purpose in setting up his government was to win terms from 
Canada so that the Red River could enter the Dominion as 
a separate province with guarantees for Metis land and 
protection for French rights, as in Quebec, Delegates 
from the settlement traveled to Ottawa, and Prime Minister 
John McDonald sent a new representative to replace Mc­
Dougall • The negotiations gave the Riel government almost 
everything it demanded in the hope that it would peacefully 
disband•
Riel, however, made a serous error in executing an
^5
English Canadian who had defied his authority. English- - 
speaking Canadians in Ontario demanded that Riel be 
brought to justice as a traitor and a murderer. Moreover, 
when Manitoba became part of the dominion, Ottawa came 
under increased pressure to assert its authority in the 
area, and an expeditionary force was dispatched to subdue 
Riel and disband the Red River colony.
Riel was quickly tried and executed once the forces 
sent by the federal government arrived on the scene. While 
English Canadians applauded the move, French Canadians 
regarded him as a martyr who had been victimized by 
fanatic "Orangists•" Popular meetings were held in many 
French Canadian communities and villages, and there was 
an uproar throughout the province of Quebec.
It was on the occasion of Riel*s execution that Mercier 
proclaimed the formation of a great "national" party which 
would gather in all those who resented the Riel outrage.
Their first objective would be to overthrow, by all con­
stitutional means possible, the conservative government of 
John A, MacDonald. Mercier*s following included Quebec 
Liberals and Nationalist Conservatives who had broken with 
their party over the Riel Affair, and the Ultramondists of 
Quebec and Montreal (remnants of Papineau’s Patriotes party).
In practice, Mercier*s nationalist movement was both
rhbtorieal and political. With the help of Sir Oliver Mowat,
Premier of Ontario, Mercier found an ally .against McDonald,
and he again affirmed the rights of the provinces. Like
the predominant nationalist leader who followed him, Henri
Bourassa, Mercier focused-on two important issuest 1) French
Canadian interests outside the province of Quebec; and 2) the
opposition to British imperialism. Mercier®s slogans were
/ .
echoed m  such newspapers as La Verite m  Quebec and 
L'Etenard in Montreal. Both stood for national causes such 
as provincial autonomy, the development of agriculture, the 
protection of minorities and official recognitionnof the 
French language.
Nonetheless, Mercier®s brand of nationalism— though' it 
did arouse a certain amount of popular fervor— did not reach 
down to a very large portion of the population. Although he 
himself was very popular in French Canada, his popularity 
tended to distract from his nationalist message. Further, 
Mercier encountered opposition from the traditional foes of 
liberalism and nationalism, the clergy. Thus it was mostly 
among college students that Mercier#s brand of nationalism 
gained adherents.
^7
The Anti-Imperialist Nationalism of Henri Bourassa
What, was significant about Mercier's nationalist 
thought was that it was highly successful in integrating 
the sacred with the secular point of view# Building on 
this success Quebec's Premier, Henri Bourassa, came on 
the scene at a time when recent events in French Canadian 
life had once more intensified the French Canadian feeling 
of solidarity# This was especially the case when the 
Manitoba school question was settled to the disadvantage 
of the French-speaking minority in 1890 and the provincial 
government renounced language guarantees given to the 
French-speaking citizens of the province#
In the first years after Confederation, Bourassa main­
tained, the federal government had been true to the concept 
of a bilingual and bicultural nation# Evidence of this 
was to be found in the Manitoba Act of I87O and the North­
west Territories Bill of 1875» each of which had accepted 
French as one of the official languages and had established 
a denominational school system. Where the federal government 
had erred, however, was in allowing the territorial govern­
ment of the Northwest to extinguish the legal status of 
French in I890. Because the territorial legislature's ordinance, 
which had changed the language laws and school system,
violated the spirit of the I875 federal law, a law superior 
to the law of the Northwest Territories, the territorial 
ordinances were actually illegal. However,. by accepting 
the 1905 Sifton amendment, the federal government legitimized 
the illegal school and language ordinances, thus turning its 
back on the rights of western French Canadians. By giving 
both French and English official status in Parliament, the 
Fathers of Confederation made it clear that they wished both 
languages to co-exist everywhere in public life--in church, 
in court, and'in government, Bourassa said. These rights 
would be meaningless if the English provinces prevented 
French Canadian children from acquiring a perfect knowledge 
of their own language.
Furthermore, Bourassa held that the economic pull of the 
United States would slowly absorb Canada and that the best 
way to combat such absorption was to uphold the values of 
the French Canadians: the rejection of materialism by the 
preservation of Catholicism; the value of agriculture; the 
maintenance of the French language and French Canadians cus­
toms •
Finally, Bourassa insisted that the failure to accept 
cultural duality would threaten the continued existence of 
the Confederation: French Canadians would never feel that
k9
Canada was their homeland unless their culture was free to
develop. Hence national duality was dependent on cultural
duality and "reciprocal respect for the rights of the two 
17races." The alternative was instability and crisis.
It should be noted that Bourassa did not favor the
idea of a separate nation of Quebec? he emphasized the
integrity of French Canada within the context of a broad
Canadianism. Bourassa was, above all, a fierce "Canada
firster." His sentiments on this can be found anywhere in
his prolific writings, and particularly in his articles in
Le Devoir» the daily newspaper he founded in 1910. In a
pamphlet on the 1911 tariff agreement between Canada and
the United States, Bourassa wrote that "the general and
superior interests of Canada must have priority over the
more particular class or provincial interests ... Now or
never is the time to say 'Canada to the Canadians' and in
doing so, to yield neither to the Americas nor to the
18other parts of the Empire."
Modern Nationalism and the Coming; of the "Quiet Revolution"
The advent of the Duplessis regime in the late 1920's 
marked a twenty-year hiatus in the intellectual development 
of nationalistic thought in Quebec. This was due to the
17Joseph Levitt, Henry Bourassa on Imperialism and Bi- 
culturalism 1900-1918(Torontor Copp, Clark, 1970), p. 37*
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nature of the Duplessis government, which ran the province
like a virtual fiefdom during the 1930's, -^0 's and 50*s,
and was faced with no significant opposition party during
its entire tenure. Above a3.1 else, Duplessis did his utmost
to stifle both criticism and constructive dialogue. Dion
claims that Duplessis deliberately avoided contact with
and the sponsorship of intellectuals, "because he knew
1 9instinctively that such a step would be suicidal."
It should be noted at once, however, that Duplessis's 
reactionary regime held power with the full cooperation and 
support of the Catholic Church, which preferred his con­
servative doctrines to any kind of liberal thinking.
Education under Duplessis showed no evidence of modern or 
progressive ideas, the Church believing that the older con­
cepts of the "virtuous" agrarian life, religious piety, 
and non-secular vocations should be emphasized in lieu of 
such worldly subjects as law, business,and economics.
Given this fact, it is easy to see why the more progres­
sive English-speaking provinces pulled ahead because of their 
superiority in preparing themselves for the modern life of 
the twentieth century. In this respect, Quebec's backwardness 
may be ascribed to injurious policies implemented by its own 
provincial government rather than a conspiracy on the part of
19Dion, The Unfinished Revolution, p.
English-speaking Canadians to hold them back#
As Quebec moved toward modernization in the mid-twen­
tieth century, the type of nationalism advocated by the 
conservatives, i.e. a nationalism which accepted a 
traditional society as its framework, became less and 
less suited to a society where isolation meant economic 
backwardness and educational stagnation,, Nevertheless, 
the conservatives continued to preach a doctrine that 
French Canadians remain faithful to their past and 
preserve their Roman Catholic faith.*Only by following 
the guidance of their clergy, by supporting local elites,
and by avoiding fratricidal struggles could they hope
20to remain true to their roots and their calling.
It was chiefly against industry and the cities that the 
conservative nationalists preached. The economy, as they 
saw it, had to be at the service of culture and not the 
other way around. Unavoidably, industry and the cities were 
to French Canadians places of "perdition,” that is, of 
assimilation into thelAnglo-Saxon world. Even more, the 
conservative nationalists argued, French Canadians should 
not even attempt to penetrate such "alien" reaches, for to 
do so would cause them to lose their unique identity. In­
stead, French Canadians were urged to return to the land,
20Mas on Wade, The French Canadians', p. 65*
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to develop farm settlements in new areas.
Politically, the conservative nationalists did not 
differ from their English counterparts inasmuch as they 
sought to consolidate Canada*s independence from both 
Britain and the United States, However, conservative 
nationalists remained aloof to any proposals to stimulate 
pan-Canadianism, They viewed Canada as an artificial union 
based on a marriage of convenience. Their patrie(homeland) 
was still Quebec,
The conservative nationalists strongly favored de­
centralized federalism and made this a part of their 
ideology? French Canada's culture could only be protec­
ted, they argued, if the government of Quebec had broad 
political powers vis-a-vis the central government. Various 
later opinions among constitutional scholars concerning the 
nature of the federal compact— the "two nations theory,”
the "federal bargain” theory, the doctrine of "associated
21
states” are all grounded m  conservative thought.
As for the separatist sentiments of conservatives, one 
has no difficulty in finding such pronouncements in the 
writings of conservative thinkers such as Abbe^Groulx,
Groulx espoused ”un etat francais” that would be independent 
of the rest of Canada, The issue of separatism, however,
21
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remained a divisive issue among conservative nationalists, 
Bourassa and his followers were fiercely opposed to a 
separatist solution, Groulx, though opposed to control from 
Ottawa, nevertheless distrusted Quebec’s leadership under 
Maurice Duplessis, whom he accused of having betrayed the 
hopes that had brought him to power in 1935» and following 
in the steps of Honore Mercier and Alexander Taschereau 
in jeopardizing Quebec's natural resources for the benefit 
of foreigners.
In addition to the conservative nationalists' opposition
to urban living, industrialization» and modernization in
general, they were also opposed to the liberal philosophies
of individualism and materialism which they viewed as
corrosive influences on French Canadian values. They also
made known their distaste for such things as majority
rule, American style employers' associations, and labor
22unions acting as interest groups.
As for the political functions served by the conser- 
'vative nationalist creed, conservative nationalism did 
flourish in three cultural contexts: 1) among the higher 
elites, whose interests in religion, politics and business 
were supported by the conservative -tenets of Catholicism, 
messianism, anti-liberalism and agriculturalism• 2)
22
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the political culture of the lower elites and those in 
prominence locally (parish priests, doctors, notaries) who 
used its philosophy to inculcate the virtues of piety and 
simple living in training the next generation of French 
Canada's elite; and 3) among the ’’masses,” i.e. farmers, 
laborers, craftsmen, and factory workers, because it made 
them accept their lot unquestioningly.
Liberal Nationalism
Although dominant in Quebec politics from 1840-1960, 
conservative nationalism did not remain entirely unchallenged. 
From 1950 on, there were a number of individuals who stood up 
in the name of the liberal creed. Because liberalism was 
often associated with anti-clericism, it was not widely 
accepted. Nonetheless, Wilfred Laurier, who was Prime 
Minister of Canada from I896 to 191? under the Liberal 
banner, obtained widespread support from the French 
Canadian electorate. This was due primarily to two facts:
1) by that time the Liberal Party had lost much of its for­
mer radicalism in Quebec? and 2) the Liberals were successful 
in exploiting the ’’ethnic feeling” among French Canadians, 
thereby securing their votes.
It was not until 1950 and the creation of the periodical 
Cite Libre that liberal concepts became widely disseminated, 
thus paving the way for the domination of liberal ideology.
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Its editors, Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier,
fought against the authoritarianism and clericalism that
were part of the conservative nationalist doctrine. The
periodical argued that Quebec had to catch-up to modern
times, Yet, it was not separatist in its orientation. The
model it put forward for Quebec to follow was that of the
European and United States liberal democracies. It made no
attempt to focus Quebec’s attention on the peoples of the
Third World, their quest for independence, and the general
trend toward decolonization throughout former colonial
empires. Its editors were somewhat take by surprise when
✓
the separatist R.I.N. (Rassemblement pour 1 * independence 
nationale) was formed in i960.
From a political standpoint, it was the election of 
i960,and the victory of the Liberal party, which marked the 
actual triumph of liberal nationalism. It brought to 
fruition modernizing sentiments that had been building up 
in Quebec. The conservative doctrines of Duplessis that had 
kept the government out of the drive for development and out 
of the lives of Quebec's citizens, gave way under liberal 
nationalism to a party that sought to modernize the province 
and attain a measure of political, financial and cultural 
sovereignty as well.
The new Liberal regime did flirt with the idea of sep­
aratism, especially in 1962-63 under Quebec's Premier,
56
Daniel Johnson. It was during the 1960's that Quebec's de­
mands for greater autonomy increased over the mounting ob­
jections of the federal government and English-speaking 
Canada. In response to Quebec's demands and in hopes of 
avoiding a major confrontation over autonomy issues, the 
federal government established the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963* Nonetheless, the 
members were unable to agree on any political solution 
to the Canadian problem. Subsequent provincial-federal con­
ferences in 1965 and 1971 were unable to achieve any prac­
tical solution to the impasse.
The major theme of liberal nationalism was the motto 
"maitres chez nous 9" masters in our own house. Although 
Quebec's government did not take an active role in invest­
ment , because traditional laissez-faire practices had pro­
duced a dependence on American capital, it did take the 
initiative in such areas as pensions and the creation of a 
large number of public financial and industrial corporations, 
especially with respect to the nationalization of electric 
power companies under Resources Minister Rene" Levesque.
In the field of education, the state assumed a new role 
with the establishment of a Department of Education. Liberal 
reforms included free schooling, open access to education, 
establishment of regional schools, introduction of two and
2lf> f . 5three year CEGEP's, which put an end to the elitist
classical colleges, the updating of curricula, and the
setting of higher standards for teacher qualification.
Civil service and governmental reform also became a
major task under the Liberal administration of Jean Lesage,
elected in i960. Competence now became a key factor in
determining suitability for public service rather than
political patronage. On the local level, the Liberal
regime encouraged community development and mobilization.
v
In I963, the Bureau d'amanagement de l'est Quebec (Eastern 
Quebec Regional Development Office) was created following 
federal-provincial agreement.
In sum, the Liberal regime's reforms were instrumental 
in opening, at long last, the doors of tradition to the in­
fluence of modernization. It gave expression to the provin­
cial government's possibilities for action, and strove for 
provincial self-reliance. It stressed modernization in all 
areas of Quebec society and attempted to strengthen social 
organizations to promote change.
Social Democratic Nationalism, Socialist Nationalism, 
Revolutionary Nationalism, and the Nationalism of the Parti
Quebecois
Socialism, or even Scandinavian or British-type democratic 
2U- <College d'enseignement general et professionel, part of 
Quebec's secondary educational system between high school and 
university® offering two and three-year term academic and non- 
academic programs.
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socialism, had never taken root in conservative Quebec.
There were.Marxists and non-Marxist socialists in Quebec 
well before the i960*s. However, it is only since the 
end of the 1950's that they have managed to surface and 
to.form social movements with some following.
The rise of native Quebec socialism coincided with the 
"liberation" movement, the decline of the Union Nationals. 
party in Quebec politics. The Liberal victory in i960 
gave the socialist movement even greater impetus. The 
socialists promply took aim at the new Liberal government 
as their only source of opposition— the conservative 
Union Nationale now having been ousted from power. At the 
same time, the socialist movement was influenced by the 
changing tide in Quebec nationalism during the 1960's,
and especially by strong separatist sentiments being ex-
^  25 pressed. ^
The difference between social-democratic nationalism and
socialist nationalism in its Marxist-Leninist form is more
than a matter of degree. A large ideological gulf exists
between social-democratic nationalism as exemplified by the
Parti Quebegois and the Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism
2 6advocated by intellectuals such as the Parti pris group than 
exists between social democratic and liberal nationalism--
25
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Parti pris- (position taken)- A radical publication 
founded by a leader of Quebec's early revolutionary movement,
G. Maheau.
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particularly with respect to ideology, sources of leader­
ship and support, and electoral motives.
While socialist nationalism is doctrinaire and attempts
to arrive at a precise Marxist-Leninist definition of the
theoretical bases of its course of action, social democratic
nationalism is pragmatic and, when necessary, does not
hesitate to adjust its ideological premises to the needs of
effectiveness as shown in the ideological debates that have
27taken place since 1969 within the Parti Quebegois. Similarly, 
while socialist nationalism assumes that socio-economic 
contradictions in Quebec are far-reaching and must necessarily 
lead to class struggle, that imperialist capitalism and the 
bourgeoisie must be chastized and the working class supported, 
social democratic nationalism holds a consensus view of soc­
iety and tries to gain the electoral support of the middle as 
well as lower classes.
Perhaps the only major similarity between social 
democratic nationalism and socialist nationalism is that 
they are anti-system in their orientations. Both aim 
at doing away with the Canadian political community, both 
attack the existing political regime, and both condemn in 
varying degrees and for different reasons, the established 
political authorities. What is most significant about
27
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socialist nationalism, however, is that it has helped to
shape the continuing political discussions within the PQ
and contributed to moulding some features’ of the PQ's
ideology. With respect to the above, Dion claims that
socialist nationalists are In touch with the concerns of
the PQ and often close ranks with it. Because the PQ is
the only party which is leftist and advocates independence,
many socialist nationalists support it for that reason and
29vote for its candidates during elections.
From a philosophical standpoint, socialist nationalism 
and the Parti Queipegois" social-democratic nationalism reject 
the Canadian political system. They are unable to agree 
on the kind of political regime that would best suit Quebec.
In other areas, they are more closely aligned. For example, 
both argue that the Canadian Confederation, the political 
system born out out of the British North America Act, does 
not serve the best Interests of Quebeckers, and that there 
is no good reason to think it can be reformed to any sig­
nificant extent. In addition, both hold that the government, 
the House of Commons, the federal administration and the 
Supreme Court, all feature a permanent Anglophone majority 
and that it is therefore only natural that they should 
first of all serve the interests of the Emglish-speaking majority.
29
Dion, p. 143.
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Attempts to correct the situation and to introduce "equal­
ity between the partners" have always led to resounding 
failures, such as the fiasco of the Commission on Bi­
lingualism and Biculturalism and the ineffectiveness of 
the Official Languages Act*
Furthermore, in launching an offensive to promote 
multiculturalism throughout Canada, as the federal govern­
ment has done since 1972, the government has once again 
shown its inability to comprehend Quebec's desires, social- 
democratic nationalists argue* What is more, the relative 
position of French Canadians throughout the country is 
rapidly weakening, as shown by the 1971 federal esensus.^0 
French-speaking minorities, except in New Brunswick, are 
dwindling away? it is not possible to change the demo­
graphic, social and economic factors responsible* In a 
few years, many claim, there will be practically no 
French Canadians left outside Quebec. The ratio of French 
Canadians to the rest^of the country's population can only 
maintain its downward trend. Even in Quebec, given the 
current socio-political context, the ratio of French 
Canadians to English Canadians is falling off alarmingly, 
particularly in the Montreal area.
3°
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Moreover, attempting to answer French Canada's demands 
by changing the Constitution and revamping the confederation 
is ludicrous, according to spokesmen of socialist nationalism. 
They feel that English Canada and the federal government have 
given ample proof of the unacceptability of such adjustments. 
From the socialist viewpoint, Anglophones are right to 
oppose political decentralization or the granting of special 
status to Quebec, since such measures would weaken Canada. 
Hence, the Canadian government and English Canada can do 
nothing for Quebec and, therefore, the only logical 
solution is to divide the Canadian political system so as 
to provide for two strong independent governments, subject 
to later arrangements between them to meet common economic, 
defense, and other requirements.
Social democrats and socialists also hold in common 
similar arguments • concerning the justifications used since 
19^5 by the peoples of Africa and Asia to win independence 
and secure their rights to political self-determination.
Both groups draw inspiration from the postwar experience 
of colonized peoples to liberate themselves from colonial 
powers. Various Quebec independence movements have not been 
equally vocal in denouncing the colonialism, from which, in 
their view, Quebec suffers. But they all use anti-colonialist 
arguements to some extent: socialist nationalists very
31Minogue, p. 126.
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aggressively; social democratic nationalists, such as those 
of the Parti Quebegois. more moderately. Such anti-colonial­
ist sentiments, though directed primarily against the 
Canadian political system, are also directed against the 
United States, against whose economic pull Canada itself is 
largely defenseless.
It should be noted in historical context that while old- 
style European nationalisms were predominantly liberal, those 
that appeared after the Second World War--in Yugoslavia,
China, Korea and Vietnam, Africa and South America--tended
32
toward socialism. More recently, national liberation move­
ments have drawn upon more or less homegrown versions of 
Marxism-Leninism, Ideologically, Quebec is different from 
these, mainly because its postwar independence movements 
have had much difficulty in combining their doctrine with 
Marxism-Leninism in a way that is credible and attractive to 
a wide cross-section of the public.
This is not to say, however, that Quebec has not been the 
scene of violent, revolutionary nationalism that has been wit­
nessed in both the developed and undeveloped world.
In I963, a group of young radicals founded the F.L.Q.
/ ' \(Front du liberation du Quebec)• The founding of the F.L.Q., 
and actually a great deal about the organization, is still
32
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shrouded in mystery. George Shoeters one of the founders
of the organization, had ties with Castro, but anything
- „ 3 3
more about potential outside influence is unknown. ^ What
is known is that the F.L.Q. and its militant wing, the
Army for the Liberation of Quebec(A.L.Q.), raised a great
deal of havoc throughout Montreal. Beginning with the theft
of weapons from armories, they graduated to threats of
blowing up a hotel where N.A.T.O. dignitaries were staying
in I963» and eventually to planting bombs in mailboxes.- In
*  . .a communique, they stated their desire 5 1
to completely destroy by systematic sabotage 
all symbols of colonial institutions /"federal/ , 
in particular the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
and the Armed Forces, all information media in 
the colonial language English that we scorn, 
all commercial establishments and enterprises 
that discriminate against Quebecois and that do 
not use French as their official language.3^ '
Premier Jean Lesage offered a fifty-thousand dollar re­
ward for any information leading to the arrest of members of 
the F.L.Q., but even with police crackdowns little progress 
was made because theydid not know the suspects for whom they 
were looking. Beyond the fact that the- suspects were young the only 
information that came in was speculative theories. Some in 
the police and government felt that the terrorists were 
Algerian secret army fanatics or communist inspired national­
ists, or perhaps a lunatic fringe of the separatist movement.
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Only after police raids on college campuses turned up 
weapons stolen from armories, leading to a few arrests, did 
the rash of bombings cease. Shoeters himself was arrested 
and charged with the murder of one of the bomb technicians 
who was attempting to disarm a mailbox. The fact that the 
violence ended so quickly after a few arrests tended to 
support the theory, at least in iy6jt that the F.L.Q. was 
a very small organization.
The five-year hiatus of F.L.Q. violence ended in 1968.
By mid-year there had been nine bombings, and by March, 1969, 
there were sixty more. On October 5» 3-970, the F.L.Q. ®s 
campaign of terror reached a climax when James Gross, the
/
British Trade Commissioner, was kidnapped. In a communique, 
his abductors identified themselves as the F.L.Q. and made 
two demands? 1 ) that twenty-three "political,prisoners" be 
paid one half million dollars and released? and 2) that the 
news service read and publish an“F.L.Q. manifesto denoun­
cing "capitalists" in Quebec(whether French or English-
speaking) and criticizing Quebec's provincial government for
35
allowing itself to be a tool of the "oppressors."
The government first decided on a hard line refusal to 
meet the terrorists demands. But as more communiques were 
issued, threatening Cross* execution, the government 
relented and read the manifesto on October 15® That same
35
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day, Quebec's Minister of Labor, Pierre LaPorte, was also 
kidnapped by the F.L.Q. Years later, investigation would 
show that the two acts were not planned in tandem. The 
F.L.Q. worked in individual "cells" of five to ten mem­
bers, and it was only when the "Chenier Cell" decided that 
the "Liberation Cell," which kidnapped Cross, was going 
to let an advantage slip away that it decided to kidnap 
Pierre LaPorte.
After consultation with Robert Bourassa, Quebec's new­
ly elected Premier, Trudeau decided that a true conspiracy 
of terror was underway and .imposed the Emergency War 
Measures Act. Martial law was declared, in effect, for the 
entire province and over three hundred arrests were made 
without charges and without release of names. At some point 
during the period, Pierre LaPorte was killed.
After a tremendous manhunt, an exchange was finally 
arranged in which Mr. Cross was freed and his abductors 
were allowed passage to Cuba. On December 22, 1970, after an 
intensive investigation, LaPorte*s murderers were captured.
They were found to be a 27-year-old school teacher, two 
23-year-old laborers, and a 19-year-old former student.
The War Measures Act was replaced by the milder Public Order 
Decree which expired in April of 1971.
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The Nationalism of the Parti Quebecois
The Parti Quebecois has given increased momentum to the 
Liberal and Social Democratic forms of nationalism in that 
it, too, stresses the modernization of the province and the 
use of the apparatus of the state to effect change0 Its goal 
is to ensure that Quebec becomes modern while at the same 
time retaining its culture and language.
In his Potion Quebec, Levesque noted that traditional 
nationalist arguments no longer serve Quebec's current 
realities. “The age of automatic unanimity has come to an 
end," he said in Potion. "We are going through a sudden 
acceleration of history, whose main features are the un­
precedented developments os science, technology, and 
economic activity. There are potential promises and dangers 
immeasurably greater than the world has ever known.
Levesque stresses in Potion that in order to achieve 
a society that will be in full control of its own destiny, 
language and culture, it will be necessary to meet three 
basic conditions. First, Quebeckers must secure once and for 
all the safety of their "collective personality." The 
primary prerequisite for this, he claims, is the power for 
"unfettered" action by the state in many areas previously 
assigned to* the federal government, such as citizenship
39 .
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and immigration. Second, as a means of achieving this ob­
jective, Levesque holds that it will be necessary to have 
a strong provincial state, one that will exercise jurisdic­
tion over commercial and industrial corporations, financial 
institutions, and will have the power to monitor and, to 
some degree to control, the movement of investment and 
capital. Furhtermore, he holds that the duplication of 
jurisdictions in the economic sector between the federal and 
provincial governments creates problems for provinces seeking 
to plan their economic activity. It thus follows, he claims, 
that the third basic minimum is that the government of Quebec 
should exercise its power by giving direction to the 
economy. In sum, he argues, Quebec's overriding objective 
to "to seize for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec, the 
right to all eszential components of independence ... the 
complete mastery of every last area of decision-making.
This means that Quebec must become sovereign as soon as 
ko
possible•"
40
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CHAPTER III 
FEDERALISM AND FRENCH CANADA
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the key
point of difference between separatists, such as Rene
Levesque, and federalists, such as Pierre Trudeau, is the
question of Quebec's relationship to the federal structure
now in place. The gravity of the constitutional issue,
according to constitutional scholar J. Murray Beck, is that
"what is involved is nothing less than whether Canada
should remain an orthodox state or whether it should exist 
1
at all." Although a new constitution has been implemented 
which addresses some of the issues Quebec has raised in 
the past, language and cultural rights for example, there 
are still questions whether the new constitution will 
ultimately resolve the problems Quebec had blamed on the 
old constitution.
Quebec, it should be noted at the outset, has never 
rested easily within the federal framework and, from time 
to time, any number of proposals have been put forward to 
accommodate Quebec's desires while at the same time leaving 
Canada a united country. Extreme separatists would, of
1
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course, argue that Quebec has no place at all in Canada, 
and have urged that the province divorce itself entirely 
from the rest of the country. Thus far, however, this 
notion has not received the kind of support that would 
make it a viable option.
Within the past 20 years there have been numerous 
attempts to bring together provincial and federal rep­
resentatives to dlLscuss the status of the confederation 
and ways to make federalism work for all. These have taken 
the form of constitutional committees, federal-provincial 
commissions, conferences, panels, discussion groups— both 
governmental and academic— plenary sessions, and a host of 
extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional formats* The 
fact that Canada's basic law has comeuup for discussion 
with such frequency may indicate to some that there is 
genuine desire among various groups to reach accommodation 
on important constitutional issues? others, however, might 
question(with equal justification) the soundness of Canada's 
federal system and the prospects for its continuation in 
light of this almost continuous effort to frame a new con­
stitution. Richard Simeon, for one, holds that, in I867, 
Canada's founding fathers did not forsee the necessity of 
extensive federal/provincial negotiations. They anticipated 
that federal authority would always prevail in case of con­
flict with the provinces, as it does in the United States.
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As time went on, however, federal/provincial interaction
increased* The demands of a modern state required a better
means of settling conflicts, as the parliamentary institu-
2
tions of the nation had failed to do.
Within the past quarter-century the constitutional prob­
lem has, by Edward M. Corbett's measure, taken on "an in­
creased air or urgency.” This was due, he claims, to Ottawa's 
assumption of many areas formerly under provincial control, 
an action which aroused discontent "not only in Quebec but in 
most of the English-speaking provinces as well."^ Further­
more, Corbett notes that the B.N.A. Act (Canada's constitution) 
has allowed fluctuations of power over the course of its 
existences from federal ascendancy during the early period of 
confederation to provincial autonomy in the late nineteenth 
century and back to "a unitary, centralized state which 
emerged from World War I I . W h i l e ,  during the early 1960's, 
there was some evidence of a return to a. degree of provincial 
ascendancy, he notes that "the new dynamic of French Canadian
nationalism threatened the very basis of the constitutional
c
relationship on which th,e confederation rests.
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Three questions '.arise from the previous dis­
cussion. 1) Why has the constitutional question become more 
urgent in recent years? 2) Had a framework ever developed 
for the resolution of conflict between the federal govern­
ment and Quebec? 3) If so, what was its nature and why does 
it not function as a means of conflict resolution today?
It will be hypothesized here that the method of 
accommodation previously existing was that of "consociational 
democracy" and that, in recent decades, the demand for-in­
creased use of extra-constitutional methods has been brought 
about by the demise of consociationalism in Quebec-Ottawa 
relations•
The Federal Idea in Canada
The decision to adopt a federal system of government in 
Canada was the result of the interplay of a number of factors. 
It is important to note that before the adoption of the 
British North America Act in I867, the relationships then 
existing were between separate colonies and territories and 
the United Kingdom, not with each other. The absence of a 
central government was attributable to the fact that Canada 
had not experienced the revolution and war which had driven 
the thirteen American colonies together.^ Additionally,
6
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Canadians had good reason to doubt the efficacy of a federal 
structure, for at the time Canada's founding fathers were 
considering which form of government to adopt the United 
States was engaged in a bloody civil war over states' 
rights•
In 1867* the British Parliament passed the British 
North America Act at the request of the colonies of Canada 
(Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick* This 
act entered the three into a federal union to form :i one 
Dominion under the name of Canada*
The British North America Act(B.N.A. Act) divided the 
Dominion into four provinces. The preconfederation province 
of Canada became the provinces of Ontario and Quebec? Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick retained their former limits* In 
1870, the Parliament of Canada created Manitoba* In 1871, 
British Columbia entered the union%and in 1873* Prince 
Edward Island. Alberta and Saskatchewan were created in 
1895* Finally Newfoundland entered the confederation in 
19 9^.
Provisions of the British North America Act gave Canada 
complete internal self-government. Later Canada assumed 
complete control of its foreign-policy as well* It is now a 
sovereign state. Until 1982, certain parts of the Constitution 
could be changed only by an act of the British Parliament,
7^
but the new constitution enacted that year places all 
amendment powers in the hands of Canada's parliament.
The sole reason that full amendment powers had not been 
transferred to Canada under the old constitution was 
that Canadians were unable to agree on an amending for­
mula©
The B.N.A. Act gave the Canadian Parliament power to
"make laws for the peace, order and good government of
Canada in relation to all matters not assigned exclusively
n
to the legislatures of the provinces."' That is to say, 
the residual powers were vested not in the provinces as 
in the United States, but in the federal government. In- 
order to preclude potential conflict, the Act added a list 
of examples of this general power. These included defense, 
raising money by any kind of taxation, regulation of trade 
and commerce, navigation, shipping, money and banking, 
bankruptcy and insolvency, patents and copyrights, criminal 
law and criminal procedure, and any "works" declared by 
Parliament to be to the advantage of Canada® Amendments 
have added unemployment Insurance and the power to amend 
the Constitution, except in regard to the division of 
powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures, 
the rights guaranteed to the English and French languages,
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the constitutional rights of certain religious denomina­
tions in education, the requirement of an annual session 
of Parliament, and the maximum duration of Parliament. 
Finally, the Act gave Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures concurrent ;power over agriculture and 
immigration(with national lav; prevailing over provincial 
in case of conflict) and amendment provisions for con­
current jurisdiction over pensions(but with provincial 
law prevailing in case of conflict)•
Quebec's View of the Constitution
As Edward M. Corbett notes, "If English Canada had 
followed the advice of the man who was largely responsible
for the fashioning of the Confederation , ord Durha
today's critical situation would have been resolved one 
way or the others French Canada would have been well on 
the way to complete assimilation, or cultural dualism
At the time of confederation, French Canadians were 
quite concerned that their language and culture be preserved 
in Quebec(as they felt that this was their homeland), but 
were not especially concerned with establishing religious, 
language and cultural rights in other provincesc Quebeckers
O
would be accepted as a matter of course from sea to sea."
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preferred the federal solution because it would allow 
them at least some measure of control over the province's 
internal affairs, particularly with respect to language, 
religious and educational rights. John A. MacDonald gave 
way on the unitary system he preferred when Quebec in­
sisted on federalism.
There were several good reasons for Quebec to opt for 
confederation. For example, many feared annexation by the 
expansionist United States. Quebeckers were anxious to 
protect their own institutions and felt that a Canadaian 
federal system would be enough to guarantee them. For a 
brief time, the federal solution did seem the best avenue.
It provided French Canadians with a means of participating 
in the affairs of the nation while giving them a province 
where they would be in the majority. Moreover, in I867, 
the provinces did control the governmental functions which 
seemed most important for the protection of French 
Canada's distinctiveness ’ education, civil law, and mat­
ters respecting religious life0 Even such a prominent 
and influential legislator as Hector Langevin predicted, 
albeit too optimistically(as events were to prove, "in 
the federal Parliament there will not be questions of 
race, nationality, religion or locality, as the legislature 
will only be charged with the settlement of great national
7?
questions which will interest alike the whole confederacy
9
and not one locality only."
At the beginning of confederation, many Quebeckers 
did believe that Quebec would be able to maintain its own 
language, customs and institutions* Special provisions of 
the B.N.A. Act made Quebec bi-lingual in its legislature 
and courts. What is more, the Constitution of I867 made 
French one of the two official languages of Canada. Never­
theless, not all French Canadians were totally satisfied 
with the constitutional arrangement. Many feared that their 
minority position "would be even more vulnerable than ever 
in a scheme that united Quebec with the Maritime Provinces 
and looked forward to the addition of the Prairie West and 
Pacific Coast territories in the future. Others felt that 
the federation placed so much power in the hands of the 
federal government that a legislative union was being 
created in fact if not in name. A.D. Dorin, a Quebec legis­
lator, expressed his reservations when he said, " I know 
that majorities are usually aggressive and how the possession 
of power engenders despotism. I can understand how a majority* 
animated a# this moment by the best feeling might in six or 
nine months be willing to trample on the rights of the 
minority while acting in good, faith and on what it considered
9
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10to be its rights."
Another legislator, Outinard, was also concerned about
/
the talk he had heard about a "new nationality" from the 
supporters of the confederation. Would this mean the as­
similation of French Canada into the English-speaking 
"nation?" Even Future Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier, in 
an I87I speech before the Quebec legislative assembly, 
declared, " It-is an historical fact that the federal form 
was only adopted for the purpose of preserving for Quebec 
that exceptional and unique position it holds on the 
American continent. I am jealous to see that this position
is preserved in fact and with the poet I say, 'My cup Is
11not large, but from my cup I drink.'"
The years following confederation would provide both 
supporters and opponents of the federal scheme with evidence 
to support their positions. French Canadians, to be sure, 
benefitted from increasing economic progress and played an 
active role in the policies which were designed to give 
Canada its full nationhood status. Certainly, it could be 
said that they had almost complete control over political 
and cultural matters inside Quebec. But there were also 
disappointments. The first major crisis came in 1885 when 
the MacDonald cabinet let the death sentence of Louis Riel
IQ
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stande Shortly thereafter, in the province of Manitoba, 
French schools were abolished and English became the 
exclusive language in the provincial legislature, even 
though a large French-speaking population existed in the 
province. Added to these "injustices" were later conflicts 
with federal authorities over British imperialismlin 
South Africa and the conscription crisis of 1917• What 
made these conflicts even more unpalatable was the fact 
that while French language rights were being curbed out­
side Quebec, the English-speaking minority inside Quebec 
rested assured that nothing would ever be done to infringe 
upon Its educational and.''.religious privileges. These acts 
ultimately made French Canadians more aware of the plight 
of French Canadians nationwide. One student of French.. 
Canadian attitudes, A.I. Silver, suggests that, by 1900, 
most French Canadians had become convinced that the
future existence of Confederation was based on maintaining
12French Canadian rights throughout Canada. He further 
maintains that this attitude goes directly to the root of 
the perennial question English Canadians ask of French 
Canada:"What does Quebec Want?" The answer, he says, is 
that as "spokes-province" of Canada's French Canadian 
citizens(no matter in v/hat province they reside), Quebec
12
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wishes to see that French Canadians* rights outside Quebec
proper will always be protected. The fact that Quebec did
not insist upon these rights being upheld throughout
Canada in I867 does not allow one to conclude that such
demands are inappropriate today.’4 Living people change,
1 8and acquire new needs," he holds. ■
"Federalism in Ferment?" Minority Versus Majority
When the Fathers of Confederation convened at Char­
lottetown, New Brunswick in I867, and later in Quebec 
City, to.formulate the principles for the union for 
British North America, one of the first problems they 
had to grapple with was that of the place of a minority in 
a majority state. There we:re, of course, several types 
of minorities including, in Sir John MacDonald*s view, 
the rich. But "the most important minority was French 
Canada•*When the French Canadians received their first 
legislative assembly through the Constitutional Act of 
I79I, they saw it primarily as an instrument of survival 
for their group, and as a defense mechanism against British 
authorities and the growing British population who con­
trolled the executive and legislative councils. The Act of 
Union of 18L1 fused the two parts of Canada into one,
13
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although maintaining separate departments in certain fields 
such as justice and education. But these steps did not 
alter the basic social and political realities. French 
Canadians contindied to speak French in the legislature and 
elsewhere, and demanded the full application of respon­
sible government, a valuable vehicle for the defense of 
their interests. It is important to note that those who 
pressed hardest for the dissolution of United Canada in 
the 1860's were not the French Canadians but the English, 
who insisted that French influence had become excessive.
The federal scheme that came about in 186? was a 
result of a process of approximately three years of 
negotiations. The process of confrontation and compromise 
among differing interests was every bit as difficult for 
Canada as it was for the United States in 1787* It could be 
said that Canada's task was more difficult, since Americans 
did not have to deal with a sizeable ethnic or linguistic 
minority in their nation. Moreover, Americans were able to 
reconcile differences among themselves, and Canadians have 
hot— even in the span of 100 years—  been able to come to 
terms with the French Canadian fact. William L. Living^ 
ston notes that, "Unlike Australia and the United States,
Canada was virtually an invention for bringing together 
two quite different nationalities, the French and English
82
and the history of Canadian federalism has been very
largely a history of efforts to reconcile the different
values and aspirations of the two groups which comprise
1 ^the Canadian nation."
The British North America Act established a limited 
official bilingualism, in that in debates in both houses 
of Parliament, members may use either English or French, 
the records and journals of both houses must be kept in 
both languages, Acts of parliament must be published in 
both, and either language may be used in any pleading or 
process in courts set up by Parliament, Furthermore, in 
1969 Parliament adopted the Official Languages Act, which 
declared that English and French enjoy equal status and 
are the official languages of Canada for the purposes of
X
the Parliament and Government of Canada.
Except for limited official bilingualism and certain 
educational rights for minorities, the Canadian constitution 
of I867 provided no specific protection for basic rights, 
like freedom of worship, of the press, or of assembly.
Such rights had been protected by ordinary law, but all of 
them could be abolished or curtailed by Parliament or the 
provincial legislatures. Such action would have been con­
trary to the Canadian tradition, however, In i960, the
1^ . .William L, Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of
Federalism,” in Canadian Federalism. Myth or Reality?, ed,
J, P. Meekison (Toronto: Methuen, 1977) t p. 278,
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Parliament of Canada,accepted in principle the concept of a 
Bill of Rights, though it was not then written into law, 
and the present government proposed a constitutional 
Charter of Human Rights in the early 1970*s. Both measures 
placed such rights beyond the power of either Parliament 
or the legislatures and were formally incorporated in the 
1982 constitution.
With respect to the amendment process, the constitution 
of I867 provided that each provincial legislature has ex­
clusive power over the amendment of the provincial con­
stitution (except as regards the office of Lieutenant Governor, 
the legal head of the provincial executive), that is to say, 
natural resources, direct taxation for provincial purposes, 
prisons, hospitals, asylums and charities, municipal insti­
tutions, licenses for provincial companies, property and 
civil rights, and administration of justice and other matters 
of local or private nature.
Thus it appears that, at least on the surface, Canada's 
constitution of I867 afforded all the liberties that anyone 
could ask for. What the constitution lacked, however, ac­
cording to some constitutional scholars, was a purposeful 
raison d'etre, Alan C, Cairns, for example,, held that one 
major weakness was the nature of the British North America Act 
itself which, by Cairns's measure, "is a document of
monumental dullness which enshrines no eternal principles
1 5and is devoid of inspirational contentc" This is due» -he 
claims, to the fact that Canada lacked the imperative of 
revolution and war that gave meaning to the U.S. Con­
stitution. Moreover, Cairns holds that significant con­
sequences of this lack of purpose were the threats of 
secession and the constant bickering over the constitution. 
Its apparent longevity has not made it a "living institu­
tion.” The new constitution of 1982, although containing 
provisions enumerating specific rightsxis still based on 
the British North America Act. Cairns sees much of the 
drive for a new document as based on the premise that the 
British North America Act is a century old and has outlived 
its usefulness."He claims, "the rather trite conclusion
automatically follows that a constitution, or constitutional
16document, so heavy with years must be out of date.”
The Consociatlonal Model: Conflict and Accommodation in 
Canada
Since Arend LijpharVs pioneer study of consociatlonal 
democracy a number of political theorists have expanded on 
the concept. Lijphart's original study was an attempt to 
develop hypotheses concerning how segmented polities, i. e.
15
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those with significant cultural, linguistic, or religious 
cleavages, were able to diminish conflict and achieve ac­
commodation on issues which tended to divide the polity
17along lines of cleavage*
In his study of Canada and consociationalism, Kenneth 
MacRae notes that consociationalism has been approached 
from three principal standpoints: 1 ) as a pattern of 
social structure, emphasizing the degree of religious, 
ideological, cultural or linguistic decision-making and 
conflict resolution; 2) as a pattern of elite behavior 
and mass-elite relationships, emphasizing the process of 
decision-making and conflict resolution; 3) as an under­
lying characteristic of the political culture arising
from circumstances that may antedate the period of mass
.... 18 politics•
In the first approach mentioned above, MacRae contends
that the more a society is segmented around a single
cleavage line, "the more it is an appropriate site for
19the development of consociatlonal politics." 7 What
17
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should be examined, he contends, is to what extent lines
of cleavage appear in institutional structures, and then
to observe to what extent elements of cohesion and co-
20operation actually emerge in the political system.
In the second instance, consociationalism as a pattern
of elite behavior, MacRae holds the most important:-aspect
21to be ."the capacity and good will of the elites." Cit­
ing Lijphart, MacRae points out that the most important 
characteristic is not what particular institutional 
arrangement is chosen, but rather how elites cooperate to 
counteract disintegrative tendencies in the system. By 
Lijphart8s yardstick, three possible outcomes among sub­
cultures characterize solutions of the consociational type—
mutual veto, autonomy, and proportional representation;
22
while others— repression, separatism, and assimilation—  
do not. That separatism is given by Lijphart as evidence 
that a consociational arrangement no longer obtains suggests 
the need for a deeper analysis of what has contributed to 
the breakdown of consociational democracy in Canada.
The third example, and perhaps the most significant in 
terms of our examination of the separatist movement, is the
20
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view of consociatlonal democracy as an underlying charac­
teristic of the political tradition. As Lijphart observes, 
"In this view, it is the existence of older patterns of 
elite cooperation in the premodern period that paves the
way for a politics of accommodation in an age of mass 
23politics." v He suggests that two possible outcomes of 
elite cooperation are; 1) elite cooperation as a pattern 
of learned behavior(a deliberate response to the disin­
tegrative perils of segmentation); and 2) elite cooperation 
as a long-standing characteristic of the political system
(a factor which helps to moderate tensions as mass party
. 2 A
formation develops along pluralist lines.)
If consociational democracy Is to be successful, by
Lijphart's definition, four requirements must be fulfilled:
1) the elites must be able to recognize the dangers of
fragmentation? 2) they must have the same commitment to
maintaining the system; 3) they must be able to transcend
subcultural cleavages at the elite level to work with the
elites of other subcultures, and 4) they must have the
ability to forge appropriate solutions that will accommodate
2 5the divergent interests and demands of the subculture.
23
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Other factors which contribute to elite accommodation are 
the existence of external threats, a balance of power 
among subcultures, and popular acceptance of government 
by the elite cartel."Over time," Lijphart holds,"inter­
elite cooperation becomes habitual and consociational
2 6norms become more firmly established."
Canadian Applications: Methods of Elite Accommodation
In order to understand the mechanism of consociational 
politics in Canada, one must look for evidence of accom­
modation not in compromise among parliamentary parties, 
but within the party in power and in the workings of the 
federal system. With respect to this, Presthus argues 
that "the cabinet may be regarded as the prime symbol and
ultimate agent of natural synthesis among the political 
27elite." MacRae concurrsrthat "longstanding and firm 
traditions require the cabinet to be faithfully represen­
tative not only of the provinces but also of religion and
language, even to the extent of some sacrifice of effic- 
,,28lency.
In this context, there are a number of historical exam­
ples of how consociationalism has operated in Canada. Prime 
Ministers during the early years after confederation sought
2 6
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to achieve balanced representation in the cabinet, not
only of provincial interests but also of language and
religious groups. In 1873, Alexander Mackenzie's cabinet
consisted of "five Catholics, three members of the
Church of England, three Presbyterians, two Methodists,
29one Congregationalist and one Baptist." 7 Even prior 
to Confederation, there existed an institutionalized 
form of consociationalism during the Union Regime of the 
1840*s, which combined the present-day provinces of 
Quebec and Ontario, in which there developed a system 
of double prime ministerships and twinned ministerial 
portfolios In ministries that were carefully balanced to 
give equal weight to French and English sections of the 
province 9 £
Moreover, both'sections of the ’province developed a 
two-party System and each of the foiir parliamentary groups 
worked primarily In loose coalition with its counterpart 
in the other section. That is to say, the Lower Canada 
Bleus worked with Upper Canada Conservatives, while the 
Lower Canada Rouges worked with Upper Canada Reformers. 
Although this pattern worked for a while, during successive 
elections,the coalitions became increasingly unbalanced 
and the result was political.' deadlock. The proposal for
29
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a "double majority,” in which the dominant group in 
each section would collaborate regardless of party 
platform, became untenable when the dominant Blues 
of Eastern Canada could not work with the anti-Catholic 
reformers of Western Canada.
Confederation, with its division of United Canada into 
the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, solved the problem of 
provincial deadlock by giving each province its own, 
separate legislature. Nonetheless, the prospects for 
achieving the same kind of consensus between French 
and English-speaking groups that had been obtained in 
the pre-confederation days of United Canada grew slimmer 
as the entry of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia titled the 
balance in fovor of the English-speaking majorityo The 
province of Manitoba, which entered confeaeration in 1870, , 
had consociational institutions similar to those of United 
Canada, including an ethnically balanced Upper House, 
equality for the English and French languagesP and a 
denominational school systeme The provinces of Alberta 
and Saskatchewan also adopted these same patterns.
V/hat upset the consociational balance in all three 
of these newer provinces was a massive English-speaking 
migration during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
In Manitoba, a statute of IS90 made English t,he sole official
language. In 1882, the Northwest Territories adopted a 
similar measure, with the approval of the federal govern­
ment. The 1905 Sifton Amendment provided the Prairie 
Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan with the constitu­
tional means to curb minority rights in these provinces.
While French Canadian influence was curbed elsewhere 
in Canada, the province of Quebec itself became the channel 
by which French Canadians made known their discontent. 
Quebec's leadership thus became the tool by which French 
Canadians vented their dismay over what they believed to 
be a violation of the compact made between the two cultures 
during confederation, namely, that French Canada's language 
and Roman Catholic re3.igion would be honored and protected 
nationwide. Thus, it fell upon Quebec to shoulder French 
Canada's cause and take it to the federal level.
Although Quebec and the rest of French Canada wished to 
see a restoration of French rights throughout the country, 
Quebec did not, however, push the issue too heavily in 
the federal Parliament. As long as Quebec itself did not 
suffer adversely, and as long as It remained conservative and 
traditional, nothing was done to challenge confederation.
But the adoption of a federal system in I867 did add another 
dimension to the consociational pattern which had prevailed 
under the Union Regime. Whereas before the division of 
United Canada, English and French groups had worked out a
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pattern of accommodation within the province, confederation 
placed the new provincial "boundaries atop the axes of 
cleavage already existing between English-speaking Canada 
and the majority of French-speaking Canadians, Thus, French 
Canadians in Quebec began to see themselves as a distinct 
religious, cultural, linguistic and political entity. As 
MacRae observes:
We encounter here a situation of overlap­
ping cleavages by which province, language, 
and religion are linked and interrelated.
In this respect, Quebec is indeed a subcul­
ture that departs significantly from all 
other provinces and from the Canadian aver­
ages • And if the image of a famille spirit- 
uelle can no longer do justice to Quebec * s 
diversity, the image of a Lager» a defensive 
complex in a hostile environment, is not in­
appropriate , 30
Throughout the late nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century, there were other occasions where Quebec opposed 
federal authorities in the name of French Canada: the Boer 
conflict of 1900 and the conscription crises of 193-7 and 
19^1* Two reasons that these crises did not divide the 
confederation were* 1) that Quebec? still remained a 
traditional society in which its language and religion were 
protected, and 2) the consociational pattern of pre-confed­
eration days had been supplanted by one in which Quebec's
30
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political elites reached accommodation with federal elites 
concerning how crises were to be managed.
The importance of the elite model lies in the fact 
that "even in the absence of national identity or consen­
sus, if there are strong limited identities or subcultures 
it is possible for the political leaders of these units 
consciously to practice accommodation at the elite level in
order to maintain the political system and make it operate 
31effectively."^ This is done through keeping "transact
tions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society—
or similarly, among different nationalities in a multicul-
32tural state— to a minimum."^ Noel adds,'
In the perfect(i,ec most extreme) case of con- 
sociational democracy each of the units in the 
system would be perfectly encapsulized, There 
wcmld therefore be no horizontal communication 
whatever at the mass level. Instead, there 
would be only vertical communication between 
mass and elite within each unit, and com*", 
munication across subcultural boundaries would 
be entirely a function of the political elite.
Two important differences, however, between the theor­
etical terms of the consociational model and actual political 
systems are, 1) that even when the actual subcultures are 
separated by a language barrier there is always a certain
31 S.J.R. Noel,"Political Parties and Elite Accomo­
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amount of horizontal communication between the elite of one 
subculture and the masses of the other. 2) Even if it is 
theoretically possible that consociational democracy could 
function satisfactority, if among the masses of the differ- 
end subcultures there was absolutely no attachment to the 
national political system and no sense whatever of a 
national identity, some popular support is always present.
What distinguishes the consociational political system,
Noel notes, "is the relative weakness of its mass national 
sentiments and the overcoming of this weakness through 
accommodation at the elite level."
Elites and the Party System
In answer to the question "Who constitutes the elite?," 
MacRae suggests that the answer be sought in the polity's 
political parties because of their natural propensity to 
appeal to a wide spectrum of interests. In addition MacRae 
holds that a study of the elites in the political parties 
is useful in determining the success of accommodation efforts 
and is crucial to gauging how well the polity copes with 
segmentation.
An examination of Canadian parties and those cited by 
Lijphart in his studies of Europe reveals, 1) that the
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Canadian political parties have traditionally had low 
ideological profiles; 2) Canada has an electoral sys­
tem that places a high premium on winning single mem­
ber constituencies; and 3) there exists a strong ten­
dency toward single-party control of the legislatures 
and one-party ministries. European examples— the Nether­
lands, Switzerland--by contrast demonstrate a tendency 
toward more ideological parties, proportional represen­
tation and coalition ministries like the Swiss federal 
pattern. Similarly, Canadian provinces tend to single­
member constituencies and one-party ministries.
The political history of Canada shows that federal 
politics in the first half-ohntury after Confederation 
v/as characterized by a two-party system in which both 
Liberals and Conservatives sought to obtain as wide a 
spectrum of support as possible. Though other parties 
appeared on the scene during the 1 9 2 0 ®s and became an 
enduring part of the political edifice, the two-party 
system remained. Those third parties that did arise—  
the Progressives, the C.C.F., and Social Credit-r- held 
that their aim was not to create permanent minor groups 
but to simplify the party system by forcing a realignment 
of political loyalty nationwide, Each of these third 
parties sought to achieve major party status, and cam­
paigned accordingly before the electorate. The lack of
the third parties' ability to become a significant force 
in federal politics may be explained by the fact that 
no federal party has sought to become identified as the 
representative of a specific province, region u religious 
denomination or cultural group. Thus, consociational 
democracy in Canada has taken place within the party in 
power at the federal level and not in compromise among 
various parliamentary parties.
The Breakdown of Consociational Politics? Causes and 
Consequences
The modernization of Quebec and the decline of the 
tradition-oriented Duplessis regime brought about a 
simultaneous decline in consociational politics. First, 
the Union Rationale was a provincial party and as such 
was not active at the federal level as a major party. 
Duplessis was content that as long as federal authority:' 
did not interfere with Quebec's traditional way of life, 
and his control over the province, there was no need to 
challenge Ottawa on any matter. Thus, the Union Rationale 
was autonomy conscious, but only insofar as Duplessis 
sought to keep Quebec out of the mainstream of the 
twentieth century.
The coming to power of the Liberal regime in
9?
i960 marked an important watershed in Quebec’s economic and 
social developmentc The Liberals strove for a modern state, 
a "Quiet Revolution," under the direction of Premier Jean 
Lesage. As D.C. Thompson points out, "It has been argued 
that the radical modernization of Quebec since the death of 
Maurice Duplessis in 1959» has exorcised the preoccupation 
with survival and replaced it with the leitmotif of enanouis- 
sement . “Moreover, Lion Dion observes,
Nowhere else, perhaps than in Quebec during 
this period, has the new order challenged 
the old so suddenly and so brutally. Nowhere 
else, perhaps, is the social framework so 
channel this tide of social change. Few 
societies have experienced such profound 
changes In so short a space of time as 
Quebec during the last decades demograph- 
ically, In education, in religious outlook 
and in political life, these changes have 
taken on themagnitude: of a .‘revolution. . .
At a dizzying pace, traditional values have 
been discarded, the elite dispossessed, the 
leadership contested.36
Among the most significant changes brought about by the 
modernization process were,l) ideological changes, in which 
Quebec became more secularized in Its attitudes and beliefs. 
The Church, which had once held sway over the province’s 
educational and intellectual establishments gave way to
35
D.C. Thompson, Introduction to Quebec Society and 
Politics: Views from the Inside(Montreal: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1973)» P« 9*
36
Leon Dion,"Towards a Self-Determined Consciousness," 
i-n Quebec Society and Politics, ed. D.C. Thompson, p. 27.
98
state control in education and social policy; 2) demographic 
changes in the province's rural base, the mainstay of the 
Church's power and a bastion of conservative values, began 
to erode during the 1920's soithat by the 1960's the 
transformation to an urban society was complete; and 3) 
political changes, In which Quebec's party system underwent 
a fundamental shift from being controlled by a tradition- 
oriented provincial party &nd came under the Influence of 
a pro-federal party dedicated to the extension of French 
Canadian rights.
Although not a separatist party, the Liberal regime 
did seek to secure French Canadian rights, ‘particularly 
with respect to the use of the French language, both in 
Quebec's business community and in the federal bureau­
cracy. The Liberals did not advocate that Quebec attempt 
to; form a new nation, but did insist that French Canadians 
be given a more active role in the affairs of the entire 
confederacy, and that this role allow them to retain their 
language and culture0 In order to achieve this, they adopted 
a much tougher bargaining stance vis-a-vis Ottawa on language 
and fiscal issues. As such, the Liberals did not reinforce 
the lines of cleavage with respect to Quebec alone, but 
attempted to extend the notion of a bi~lingual Canada 
to ;all the provinces and throughout the federal government.
The Parti Quebe^ois, meanwhile, concentrated its
efforts on Quebec alone. Like the Liberals, it was
dedicated to a modern Quebec, but it sought to achieve
a unilingual Quebec that would not have to bargain with
Ottawa concerning the ways and means that French rights
would be preserved. Thus, the P.Q. did seek to delineate
the lines of cleavage to coincide with Quebec's provincial
boundaries. Whereas under the Liberals, the "lines of
correlation between political parties and any of the axes
37of cleavage had been conspicuously absent," Quebec 
under the P.Q. was to be a sovereign state with only 
loose ties to the rest of the confederacy. Thus also, the 
P.Q. by its actions, does not conform to the consociational 
pattern established by Lijphart in that 1) its elites 
do not recognize any danger of fragmentation, 2) they do 
not have the same commitment to maintaining the system,
3) they have difficulty In transcending subcultural 
cleavages at the elite level and working with elites of 
other subcultures, and 4) they seem unprepared to forge 
solutions with other elites that will accommodate divergent 
interests in the polity. Moreover, the P.Q. appears to fit 
the mold of an anti-system party which, according to
“^ MacRae, p. 247.
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Giovani Sartori, is a party that "undermines the legitimacy
of:'the regime it opposes.1 The rise of a modern Quebec
along with the establishment of a more expansion-oriented
Liberal party and a separatist-oriented Parti Quebejpois
prompted C. White, J. Millar and W. Gagne to observe that
"the Confederation, and in particular Freneh-English
relations, can be viewed as a consocia.tional democracy,
which!)has been faltering for some time and which has since
39i960 almost completely broken down."
Response to Crisis; Federal/Provincial Diplomacy
As Simeon noted in the beginning of this chapter, 
Canada's founding fathers did not anticipate the need 
for extensive federal/provincial negotiations because 
they believed provincial and federal interests would not 
overlap. The emergence of a modern Canada, along with 
with a modern Quebec in the 1960*s, forced a reexamination 
of this original assumption. With all provinces now 
demanding a larger role in the making of national policy, 
the Pearson regime(1963-I968) began a series of federal/ 
provincial conferences. These meetings provided contact 
between ministers and civil servants at both levels of
38
Giovani Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A. Frame- 
work for Analysis(Cambridge. England: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), p. 113. J
39
C. White, J. Millar and W. Gagne, '‘Political Integra­
tion m  Quebec During the 1960's,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, 
Vol. 3(1971), pp. 57-58.
101
so that common problems could be discussed.
The name given to these conferences, this process, was
"co-operative" federalism. Prior to the Pearson regime,
provincial premiers met on a one-to-one basis with federal
authorities who left them "little room for maneuver" and
"little choice but to accent the nackage deal the federal
40
government offered them."
Supporters of co-operative federalism, such as Jean 
Luc Pepin, held that federal/provincial conferences were 
a pragmatic way of dealing with the shortcomings of the 
constitution." It is illusory," he says," to expect the 
constitution to cover all circumstances; the broad dis­
tinction between general and particular interests has 
never really been valid. The aim should be to achieve 
the joint participation of all the governments in the
Li, l
principal functions of the state." Moreover, supporters 
of co-operative federalism argue, each level of government 
maintains separate jurisdiction over different aspects of ■; 
the same sub ject( even though-' the distinctions disappear 
as close co-ordination of policy is attained). As Corbett 
points out, when discussing relations between the central 
government and Quebec,
40;
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The criterion is aptitudetjurisdiction is de­
termined by ’/'hat each order of government is 
best equipped to do in principle, but also in 
accord with the needs of the moment* Special­
ization is decided on the basis of competence, 
with the best qualified government assuming 
responsibility regardless of any additional 
requirements except the agreement of the two 
nationalities
However ideal the concept of co-operatrive federalism 
may sound, it is not without its critics, many of whom are 
French-Canadian nationalists. Opponents of co-operative 
federalism charge that neither the federal parliament nor 
the provincial legislatures are given an adequate role 
under the system. Their .major objection >:is that in these 
closed sessions, with a few dozen advisors, the Prime 
Minister and the provincial premiers reach decisions on 
important matters of mixed jurisdiction* Following the 
discussion, the premiers then seek legislative approval, 
but the result is that both federa.1 and provincial legis­
lators are asked merely to approve the decisions that
43
have already been made.
One suggestion to remedy this defect was put forward by 
Professor Norman Ward, who has recommended a Ministry of 
Federal-Provincial Affairs in Ottawa* This would bring 
issues to the floor of the House of Commons on a continuing
Ibid *, p. 167 »
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basis and abolish the need for federal-provincial confer­
ences, which tend to be executive rather than democratic 
meetings. Ironically, the concept of a Ministry of Provincial 
Affairs is not new. There was a Secretariat of State for 
Provincial Affairs during the first few years following 
confederation but this office was abolished in 1873 during 
a time of Increased federal ascendancy.
French Canadian! nationalists also express reservations 
about the way in which co-operative federalism brings about- 
a blurring of judicial lines implicit in ad hoc appraisals 
of which government— federal or provincial—  is best 
equipped to deal with a given set of issues. As cooperation 
advances 1 the distinction between federal and provincial 
jurisdictions becomes lost. Hence, they argue, cooperative 
federalism is a major step toward a unitary state. It is a 
myth, they charge, that in the long run will result in a 
continuing intrusion of federal power into areas the Con­
stitution allots to the provinces. Of course, if written 
constitutional limitations wezeutaken literally, the federal 
government would have little to do with programs such as 
education, regional economic agencies, or social security. 
However, the demands of these programs are now beyond the 
means of the provinces and hence, by attempting to meet 
these demands, the federal government relies on ad hoc
1 04
solutions to avoid the separations of power defined by the 
Constitution. Written constitutional guarantees are thus 
superseded by expediency, the Quebec nationalists claim, 
leaving basic rights to "the mercy of governments and 
politicians whose successors may feel free of all restraint 
where the minorities' constitutional rights are concerned.1'
A.W, Johnson has outlined what he feels to be the four 
main alternatives for the direction of Canadian federalism.
The first is to move toward more centralization, on the 
assumption that as all nations, including Canada, will move 
toward a "global community", ethnic and regional interests 
will become submerged. The second is to strengthen the 
regionalization of government, on the supposition that the 
advantages of unity can be preserved even though such 
regionalization would weaken the federal governmento The 
third is to have“greater regionalization in Quebec only, 
assuming that a higher degree of centralization would prevail 
in the rest >of Canada. The fourth - alternative is to 
"somehow marry the stronger regional governments and the 
strong central government on the assumption that strong
federal and provincial governments can somehow reconcile and
lil±
harmonize their priorities."
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Concerning greater centralization, Johnson holds "that 
there is a strong case for this based on the fact that 
greater interdependence between the provinces exists 
today than ever before in terms of social, and especially 
economic, ties. However, as a tool for solving the ques­
tion of Quebec's need for more independence, Johnson 
readily admits that it will fail."Quebec would rather 
separate than be submerged, and the peoples and premiers 
of English-speaking Canada y/duld have to become uncharac­
teristically submissive before a substantial centralization
^ 5of government could be realized."
Similarly, Johnson maintains that progressive decen­
tralization offers some attractions in that it would 
conform ’to Quebec's demand that more power be concentra­
ted in the provincial capital. This would allow other 
provincial governments to pursue :the-r regional and provincial 
economic programs to which they are committed, and allow 
Quebeckers to be "masters in their own house." On the 
negative side, Johnson notes, "the cost of this alternative, 
too, is high. The vehicles of national economic policy would 
tend to remain static, or be diminished, as provincial 
economic powers grew. Federal fiscal policy would decline in
k5
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importance as the federal resources of the central govern- 
ment were progressively transferred to the provinces."
B. Special Status
An additional way to balance the forces of unity and 
diversity in Canada— the first of the two which lie between 
the extremes of centralization and decentralization— is to 
provide for a greater regionalization of government in 
Quebec only. This increase in regionalization could take 
the form of a special status for Quebec within the present 
federal structure, or it could call for giving to that 
province "associate state" status.
Johnson acknowledges that, unlike the case with pro­
gressive regionalization throughout the whole of Canada, 
which would seriously weaken the central government, "it 
does not follow logically that the same price would be 
paid if that course were to be followed only in Quebec."
The four concepts that constitute the "state partic- 
ulier" are;
1) that under such an arrangement, the government 
of Quebec would assume full responsibility for 
most if not all federal-provincial programs and 
would receive from the federal government a fis­
cal transfer which would fully compensate the 
province. The government of Quebec would also 
be compensated for new federal-provincial pro- 
grams-^such as medicare--whether or not the
46
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province undertook a program similar 
to that required in other provinces,*
2) the government of Quebec would assume 
all responsibility for certain purely 
federal programs, principally the 
family allowances and old age security 
income maintenance programs, and would 
be compensated by means of a fiscal ••. . - 
transfer from the federal government j
3) the government of Quebec would gain the 
right to be consulted with respect to 
other federal policies, including fiscal» 
tariff and trade policies and probably 
monetary policy;
the government of Quebec might expect to 
assume certain aspects of federal juris­
diction, such as the right to conclude 
international agreements in the fields 
of provincial jurisdiction.
As with the previously-mentioned possibilities, the 
special status option also has disadvantages as well as 
advantages. Concerning fiscal questions, especially with 
reference to taxes, some 100 percent of the individual 
income tax and between 50 and 100 percent of the corpor­
ation taxes would be transferred to the government of 
Quebec.1 This would mean, that federaljtax.es would fall 
most heavily on provinces other than Quebec,, while the 
economic benefits would be felt across the whole country.
The offshoot of such a special status situation would 
also mean that the people and governments of the other
Ibid.f p. 106.
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provinces would have to accept the application of these 
policies in their part of Canada, thought not in Quebec, 
and rely on voluntary co-operation of the .government of 
Quebec for the application of similar policies in that 
province•
Federal monetary and trade policies would naturally 
continue to apply throughout the whole of Canada? however, 
they would be formulated in the context of special consul­
tations with Quebec, unless, of course, the other provinces 
were to insist upon similar rights* Just how extensive 
this consultation would be and what it would involve is 
a moot point* If it were to mean, for example, that Quebec 
would have the right to express its views on federal 
policies, the situation would not be much different than 
it is now. If, on the other hand, there existed some con­
stitutional obligation upon the government of Canada to 
gain Quebec's consent, or if Quebec had veto power over 
legislation, then it Is difficult to visualize any region 
in Canada being prepared to give Quebec a priority voice 
in these economic policies.
Similarly, special status would call for Quebec's 
exercising full control over all federal regional develop­
ment policies, and some advocates of special status state 
in their writings that Quebec should also have a voice
in general economic policies— fiscal and credit, tariff and 
trade, and manpower training— since regional economic 
measures can function properly only if they operate in 
harmony with these general policies. Moreover, special 
status in the field of economic regional policy could come 
to mean the use by the government of Quebec of a range of 
special powers for the purpose of influencing its indus­
trial and resource development: its larger share of the 
corporation tax, its control over special federal regional 
measures, its right of consult with the central government 
on federal economic policy, as well as the usual loan 
guarantee':-and industrial estates programs to be found in all 
the provinceso The question would remain, however, if,
! ' 1  f
given the different economic interests of the several 
provinces in Canada and the keenness of competition between 
them for industrial resource development funds, wpuld 
’’special status” be acceptable to the people and the govern­
ments of the other provinces?
Another significant question about special status is 
its effect on social policy and the distribution of benefits 
and costs of the federal programs Involved. Shared-cost 
programs have already been the subject of intense discussion, 
and Quebec now enjoys a "special status" with respect to 
some programs in this fieldo Newer federal-provincial
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programs, however, have not provided any special options 
for Quebec: the province, like all others must start 
a universal and public medical care program, for example, 
in order to qualify for the new federal medicare grants.
And, like the other provinces, Quebec has been told that 
when Its medicare program is well established, new fiscal 
arrangements will be considered under which it could 
assume full responsibility for its program. To have 
given Quebec special status without such a stipulation 
would have been tantamount to giving the province full 
compensation whether or not a qualifying program were 
started in the province. Similarly, for this program to 
work, it is assumed that the other provinces would re­
frain from asking for similar treatment.
A further question which arises with respect to the 
special Issue is- that concerning social policies which 
are stricltly federal and designed to achieve income re­
distribution. The government of Quebec would become the 
sole agency responsible for income maintenance programs 
such as family allowances and old-age security pensions.
Tax Issues with respect to "special status" are even 
more complex. It is obvious that tax revenues from the 
rest of Canada would have to continue to flow into Quebec
Ill
if taxes were not to rise as a result of the provincial 
government's assumption of full responsibility for income 
redistribution. Since income In Quebec is below the 
national average, the current federal Income redistribution 
measures that now apply automatically across Canada result 
In a net influx of some 200 million dollars per year for 
Quebec. Under special status, Parliament would continue 
to make tax payments to Quebec but would forego any con­
stitutional right to make payments to persons in Quebec. 
Again, there is also considerable doubt as to whether tax­
payers in other provinces would be willing to accept the 
proposition that they ‘ought to make contributions to 
maintain the revenues of the government of Quebec while 
having no say, through federal representation, concerning 
how those revenues would be distributed. And would not 
the possibility arise that other provinces would demand 
similar privileges if they felt the need in the future?
What his more, under a special status arrangement, the 
government of Quebec would have superior constitutional 
powers in relation to those enjoyed by other provinces, par­
ticularly with respect to its ability to influence Canada's 
economic policy and its competitive advantages in the fields 
of industrial and economic development. The question 
naturally arises, from the perspective of other provincial
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governments, whether the present intergovernmental arrange­
ments would persist in the face of this new balance of 
power. Could not Quebec, with its special ficsal status 
and equalization payments, to which the citizens of other 
provinces have contributed, finance competitive tax in­
centives to industry? In short, wJould the special fiscal 
status enjoyed by one provincial government force a re­
adjustment designed to bring into balance the fiscal power 
and responsibilities of all provinces?
Concerning the operation of the machinery of government 
in Ottawa, Parliament would no longer have jurisdiction with 
respect to income redistribution measures, new federal- 
provincial programs, or regional economic development.
Thus, the Quebec government would be recognized as the 
responsible spokesman for the views of Quebeckers concerning 
federal' economic policies; Quebec cabinet ministers would 
replace Quebec's own members of Parliament on many heretofore 
federal matters. The Parliament of Canada would come to 
legislate on two classes of questions, those in which 
Quebec M.P.'s had a vote,>and those in which the opposite 
was the case. Hence, the broader the range of respon-" 
sibilities transferred to the government of Quebec, the more 
Parliament would be legislating with respect to the nine
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other provinces only* Simply put, Quebec's M.P.'s would 
have the same say in forming a federal government as 
did the others, although they ■ .wo.uld be less affected by 
it. The dilemma is that there would be two classes of 
voting in Parliament, but there could only be one govern­
ment. On a more concrete level, Johnson concludes with 
respect to the above, "The extent of this transfer of 
powers, if carried to the conclusion advocated by some, 
would be a relatively independent Quebec, associated with 
the rest of Canada to the extent that it was advantageous 
to do so. Parliament would legislate for the two parts
of Canada only in respect to such matters as tariffs and
h, 9
trade, currency and monetary matters, and defense«'
Johnson notes that one of the major ironies of the 
adoption of ''special status" is that although Quebeckers 
would be to a greater degree "masters in their own house," 
they would be the subjects of what would be more like a 
unitary provincial state and that "for Canadians in other 
provinces, too, special status would lead more in the 
direction of a unitary state, as it became easier and 
more convenient to centralize powers in Ottawa." T?ne 
resulting paradox, he claims, is that in an attempt to 
strengthen the forces of diversity by greater regional­
ization, the forces for pluralism would be diminished.
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C. The Associate State Option
A final option to be discussed in this chapter is that
of an "associate state." The main thrust of this option
would be to create two sovereign states, one English and
one French, and to delegate authority from each to a
new confederal body of limited powers. This arrangement
would .'.be, according to some advocates, analogous to the
European Common Market in terms of the powers given up
by its members. Other proponents hold that the associate
state should be given broader powers, including trade
and monetary policy and international relations. Johnson
notes that "whatever the case, this approach seems to
assure a centralization of powers in both states— a kind
<1
of 'dual* centralism." ^
The "associate state" option, in contrast to other op­
tions previously discussed, would make the notion of a 
federal regime superfluous, for under this option Quebec 
would be, in effect, a separate country. Three features of 
the "associate state" option are that 1 ) there would no 
longer be a federal state or federal government machinery 
as currently constituted. Each state would influence common 
economic policies, which would be developed through nego­
tiations written into the new confederal agreement. 2) Each
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state would have its own regional development policies, 
subject to the agreed economic policies, and 3) each state 
would have its own income redistribution and its own 
social security measures.
Such an arrangement, in short, would do away with the 
need for parliamentary representatives: by substituting a 
confederal apparatus in which delegates appointed by the 
governments of the two member states would make all 
decisions. And it would be assumed that mutual self- 
interest would be relied upon to force a reconciliation 
of the conflicting inter^stssof the two states.
The idea of an "associate state" comes ^ closest to
/
Rene Levesque's idea of "sovereignty-association," and 
for all practical purposes the two concepts are one in 
the same. Levesque first put forth his idea of "sovereignty 
association" in his book entitled Option Quebec as part of 
the P.Q. manif estoin 1968. However, it should be noted 
that, rather than being a concrete plan of action, Option 
Quebec could best be described as a polemic expressing 
Levesque's views of the inadequacies of the current federal 
structure in terms of Quebec's linguistic and cultural needs.
Levesque begins Option by rejecting the notion of 
"special status" which he describes as a concept that 
only "gives one the impression of security..., as if Quebec's
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sovereignty meant anything more than a simple political
<2rearrangement in a marginal area of North America*"-^
What is more, Levesque says,
The moment it was suggested, the absurdity 
of this alternative became apparent: apart 
from the fact that the Canadian federation 
was to have inflicted upon it a constitu­
tional deformity that would make it an ob­
ject of curiosity in the world— a fact 
that we knew from the enunciation of the 
thesis— the "privileges” accorded to Que­
bec* •.would give rise to just as vehement 
protests in other provinces as independence 
itself*53
Levesque suggests that his ’’sovereignty/association 
plan would create a Quebec that is both "sovereign” and 
"independent" of the rest of Canada while at the same time 
it would retain an "economic association" with the other 
nine provinces* According to Levesque, such an arrangement 
would "conform to the second great trend of our times: the 
new economic groups, customs unions, common markets, etc. *
He envisions a "new" relationship of two nations, one with 
its homeland in Quebec and another free to rearrange the 
rest of the country at will which would be freely associated 
in the new adaptation of the current "common market** for­
mula, making up an entity,which would, perhaps— and if 
so very precisely— be called a “Canadian Union." He
Rene Levesque, Out ion Quebec(Montreal:McClelland and 
Stewart, 1968), p. 9.
53
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
54
Ibid,, p 28.
suggests that such a union would included the following 
features:!) a monetary union;2) common tariffs?3) a pos­
tal union;4) joint Quebec/Canada administration of the 
national debt; and 5) co-ordination of policies. With 
respect to foreign policy, Levesque holds that Quebec 
and Canada would have equal participation in the for­
mulation and participation in defense policy "in pro­
portion to our means." ^
Levesque stresses in Option that it Is necessary to 
create a state which is both modern and French. The old 
methods of retaining Quebec's uniqueness In language and 
culture by adherence to traditional values no longer serves 
Quebec's interests in a modern world. Levesque observed 
In Option that Quebec's traditional society is gone; that 
today most Quebeckers are city-dwellers and workers; that 
the old policies of survivance no longer serve Quebec's in­
terests •
In order to achieve a modern society, Quebec must meet 
what Levesque terms "three basic minimums•" First, he states 
that Quebecois must "secure once and for all the safety or 
our collective personality. The prerequisite to this,is, 
among other things, the power for unfettered action in 
fields as varied as those of citizenship. Immigration and
and employment• *' Second, as a means to attain the above 
objective, it will be necessary for Quebec to maintain a 
strong provincial government, " one that would exercise 
jurisdiction over commercial and industrial corporations, 
money and banking, and would have the power to exercise 
a reasonable controllover the investment of our capital*.'" -57 
Third, it will be necessary to eliminate the duplication 
of jurisdictions between the federal government and the 
government of Quebec." The fact that certain economic tools 
belong to the federal government while other powers whose 
exercise also influence economic life belong to the provin­
ces creates:a difficult problem in the rational planning of 
economic activity The government of Quebec should,
therefore, exercise its powers by giving direction to the
economy, rationalizing its marginal industries and
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developing secondary industries."
The financial arrangements Levesque suggests between 
Canada and Quebec would consist of 1) a common currency 
and 2) a common market. The first would be achieved, he 
claims, by a treaty of "five years duration" during 
Quebec’s transition period from federal state to "associate 
state." At the end of this initial period, he says, "we 
would have created for once an original model which would
56
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be sure to inspire imitation by any number of countries." The 
second feature of the union, the "common market," he holds 
is already established elsewhere in'the world." The heart 
of the common market," he claims,"is the customs union, 
which forbids member states to levy tariffs on goods ex­
changed between them." Like the common currency arrangement, 
the customs union would require the conclusion of another 
agreement which would call for "prior negotiations during
60
which it would be possible’to rectify certain anomalies."
As for how a sovereign Quebec would be financed,
Levesque asserts that, "in achieving its political liberty,
Quebec naturally would take back complete control of its
61
fiscal resources." Past fiscal relationships with Ottawa,
he contends, have proved disadvantageous for Quebec, as
the benefits Quebec receives from federalism have not
kept pace with the amount of federal taxes extracted from
the province. By severing financial ties with Ottawa,
Levesque holds, the "vast" sums Quebec spends on the federal
bureaucracy could be channeled into projects of exclusive
benefit to Quebec and would "put an end to the infernal
squandering of money that has gone on shamelessly in Ottawa
for years, at the expense of Quebec taxpayers as well as
62taxpayers elsewhere0" J
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Concerning the relationship between Quebec's government 
and private investment, Levesque contends that "the level 
of private investment in Quebec has nothing to do with (and 
no one has brought forth the slightest proof to the con­
trary) political developments," ^  He attributes
Ontario's higher level of investment to its "direct con­
nections" to large sums of U.-S, capital and Ottawa's 
favoritism toward the province. In an independent Quebec, 
he suggests, one method that could be used'to obtain 
additional revenue for the province would be a transfor- 
mation of the system of "concessions•" By this, Levesque 
means that Quebec would be less incluned to allow exploita­
tion of its natural resources such as forests and minerals, 
by companies controlled from outside the province without 
a substantial return to the province in terms of tax 
revenues. Such companies would ;also be required to take 
more direction from the government of Quebec in how they 
ran their operations as well as conceding a larger role 
for Quebecois in the management of enterprises inside 
Quebec•
As for those who argue that such measures would bring 
about "capital flight" from the province, Levesque maintains 
that corporations such as insurance and trust companies
63
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would merely be required to incorporate in Quebec if they 
had not done so already. To those who raise the specter 
that corporations will transfer their profits abroad, 
Levesque states,
This happens and will always happen whatever 
the political system. The process will reach 
a level that can be termed that of "serious" 
flight only if conditions are unfavorable for 
the reinvestment of "mobile" funds. The only 
efficient solution, apart from emergency 
measures, such as the control of the movement 
of capital, is to create the best possible 
conditions for business to flourish. In no 
way does this require us to perform a col- o 
lective act of licking the investors' boots, 
but rather we must pay strict attention to, 
such things as better technical training,
As with special status, there are significant ques­
tions raised by the associate state/sovereignty association 
model. First, would the mutual interdependence of the two 
entities guarantee the survival of the French Canadian 
nation in the face of the significant economic and political 
pull exerted by the United States and Canada? Although 
proponents of an associated state assume a "common market" 
arrangement, it is possible that, for example, British 
Columbia and the Prairie provinces would prefer to align 
themselves closer to the United States than to Ontario 
and Quebec, Or, perhaps, the Atlantic provinces might 
draw closer to the New England states.
65
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Even assuming that the associate state model were 
established and functioned just as its advocates suggest, 
it seems logical to ask whether Quebec would be less ex­
posed to external(i•e• non-French) influences than Canada, 
in general, is now? Struct countermeasures to obtain 
rigid regulation of Quebec's financial institutions might 
restrict capital from the rest of Canada and the U.S. to 
the point of choking off development and investment. Such 
a precipitous fall in investment capital might well cause 
French Canadians to abandon their cultural and language 
demands and seek employment outside the province, thus 
draining away manpower.
Steps to Patriation of the Constitution
The I93I Statute of Westminster, which removed Canada 
from the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
except for the B.N.A. Act, recognized Canada's right to 
conduct its own foreign policy, and clarified the position 
of the Governor General as being an emmisary of the Monarch 
and not of the government of Great Britain, began the pro­
cess of patriation. However, over the ensuing three decades, 
the provinces were unable to agree on any amending formula, 
so'that full patriation was not possible.
In 196^, the provincial attorneys general submitted 
a proposal for amendment to the provincial legislatures. 
However, the Quebec National Assembly vetoed the idea on 
the basis that it did not give greater constitutional powers
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to the provinces. During the next five or six years, Quebec 
continued to insist that the provinces(read Quebec) be 
given greater powers. The 1971 Victoria Conference agreed 
in principle to a charter that included an amending formula, 
but Quebec and Saskatchewan would not give it their approval. 
In 1976, the provinces agreed that patriation should be 
tied to substantive constitutional change.
In terms of the political situation in Quebec, 1976 
was also a crucial year in that the Parti Quebecois, 
dedicated to a sovereign province of Quebec, was elected 
and announced its intention to place a referendum before 
Quebec's electorate to determine whether the province 
should remain within the Canadian federation. A "yes" vote 
on the referendum would have made all questions with 
respect to constitutional change superfluous. In 1980, 
however, the referendum on sovereignty/association was 
rejected, and the federal government again stated its 
desire for a re-examination of federalism with the patria­
tion question being given top priority.
Quebec's objection to patriation stemmed from the fact 
that, as Corbett notes, "French Canadians have traditionally 
been in a paradoxical position on this question. They have 
constantly striven for the fullest degree of autonomy, but
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they have been unwilling to abandon any external safeguard 
against possible encroachements by the central government 
on the rights of the provinces or minorities." Corbett 
further claims that, traditionally, Quebec feared that 
the transfer of the amending power would permit the majority 
of the provinces to modigy the constitutional balance of 
power to the detriment of one province with a French- 
speaking majority."
Constitutional Change, Levesque and the P.Q.
At the time federal-provincial negotiations were taking 
place in 1981, Quebec's Premier, Rene Levesque, gave three 
reasons for not signing the proposed amendment agreement.
The first, he claimed, was a gap in the formual for 
amending the constitution. Second, the held that the clause 
guaranteeing Canadians freedom of movement, with the prospect 
of the immigration of a large number of non-French-speaking 
Canadians into Quebec, could alter the province's linguistic 
balance. Although at the time the government pointed out 
that the provisions of Bill 101, which established French 
as the language of work in the province would remain con­
stitutional, the Supreme Court of Canada later struck the 
bill down, thus adding to Levesque's apprehensions.
Third, Levesque held that the Charter's provisions concer­
ning minority language rights would limit the powers of 
the Quebec legislature, inasmuch as the new constitution 
would impinge upon the Quebec Assembly's ability to 
negotiate reciprocal agreements with other provinces 
concerning language rights. Although the government 
held that other provinces had offered to reciprocate on 
the question of the language of primary education, Levesque 
held that the Charter's provisions did not go far enough 
to protect French-speaking minorities. That is to say, 
•theThe Constitution promoted a bi-lingual Canada, but 
Levesque desired a. unilingual Quebec.Fourth, Levesque ob­
jected to the fiscal provisions of the Charter. In April 
of 1981, Levesque had agreed, along with seven other 
provincial premiers, to accept a basic formula for provin­
cial compensation. The provision that a province could 
"opt out" of any amendment which impinged upon provincial 
powers, while at the same time the province could receive 
federal financial compensation, was dropped in November. 
Levesque held that the right to financial compensation 
had been crucial in his earlier decision to support that 
provision of the charter.
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Analysis of Levesque's Criticisms
Whether the new constitution will provide the protec­
tion of language and culture that Quebec seeks remains open 
to question. First, Levesque's concern that the immigration 
of non-French-speaking Canadians would eventually dilute 
the French-speaking population may have some merit if it 
is assumed that all non-French-speaking residents will 
continue to have their children educated in English. 
English-speaking Canadians in Quebec, coupled with 
immigrants from outside Canada, might, over time, diminish 
the use of French among the province's population.
A more serious question arises in the area of con­
stitutional amendment, for the constitution can be changed 
if such a change has the approval of seven provinces and 
at least half the population. If all the predominantly 
English-speaking provinces decided to amend the charter in 
a manner unfavorable to Quebec, they will have the 
requisite numbers to put the action through over Quebec's 
objection. Moreover, population trends might change in 
future years to the entent that the western provinces,
Alberta and British Columbia, with their predominantly 
English-speaking populations, could be decisive factors 
in altering the nation's population patterns.
With respect to education, since there is no prohibi­
tion limiting the number of English-speaking schools in
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Quebec, there is reason to assume that English-speakers in 
the province will increase rather than decline. Although 
French schools in other provinces need not fear an ab­
ridgement of their rights, as happened in Manitoba in 
1890, it would be ludicrous to assert that the French in 
Quebec will undertake any large-scale migration in order 
to establish larger French-speaking enclaves in other 
provinces© Hence Levesque's concern that French Canadians 
could well find their numbers diluted, and thus his 
belief that immigrants should learn French, not English.
Nonetheless, there are many— among them Prime Minister 
Trudeau— who declare that Levesque is unduly alarmist In 
his assertions that French Canadian rights do not have 
equal protection under the new constitution and will soon 
be trampled upon by English Canada. In the first place, 
they argue, French schools both inside and outside Quebec 
would be in no danger of being displaced, as were those 
in Manitoba earlier. The only real dilemma French schools 
would face would be to convince immigrants that it is more 
advantageous to learn the French language than the English 
language.
Second, concerning the constitutional amendment issue, 
it is difficult to forsee a situation in which all the 
English-speaking provinces would adopt any measure so
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distasteful to Quebec as to cause the province to recon­
sider leaving the Confederation. Mow that French Canada's 
cultural and linguistic rights have been entrenched in 
the Constitution, there would be little reason for Quebec 
to fear the amendment procedure as adopted in the new 
constitution of 1982, unless English Canada deliberately 
sought to eliminate the entrenched provisions concerning 
French language rights and French Canadian culture. Although 
such a possibility exists, it is highly improbable that the 
English Canadian provinces would take such action.
The New Constitution; A New Direction for Canadian 
Federalism?
On April 17, 1982, Queen Elizabeth II formally signed 
a proclamation patriating Canada's constitution. The act 
placed all decision-making powers formerly held by the U.K. 
Parliament at Westminster into the hands of the Canadian 
Parliament•
The basic framework of the new constitution remains 
the British North America Act, now referred to as the 
Constitution Act of 1867. The major addition to the 
constitutional body of law is the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. What makes the new Charter different from the 
one passed by the House of Commons at the suggestion of
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Prime Minister Dieffenbaker in i960 is that it is en­
trenched in the constitution, whereas the previous law - 
could be amended, repealed, or superseded by other laws.
The new Charter cannot be altered except by a constitutional 
amendment that would require the action of the federal 
government and at least seven provinces which have at least 
half of the population.
Certain articles of the new constitution bring it in 
line with the constitutions of other western democracies, 
such as the United States. These enumerate specific free­
doms, of conscience and religion, thought, opinion and 
expression, and association. The right of universal suf­
frage is guaranteed as are limitations on the duration 
of Parliament. Other provisions assure freedom of movement 
in and out of the country, prohibit illegal search and 
seizure, protect against arbitrary arrest, cruel and un­
usual punishment, and enumerate the rights of accused 
persons•
Section 16 specifically addresses the question of 
language rights. It entrenches English and French as 
the official languages of Canada and gives equal status 
and equal rights to both languages in their use in all 
institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
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Presumably, this would prohibit such actions as those 
taken by the Province of Manitoba in I890, which did 
away with French language guarantees, particularly with 
respect to education.
Concerning educational and linguistic guarantees, 
Section 23 entrenches the rights of linguistic minorities 
to education in their language. It guarantees all citizens 
of the nationrwho ^ received their primary education in 
either French or English the right to have their children 
educated in the same language, if it is the minority 
language of the province in which they reside. The section 
also provides that children have the right to be educated 
in the minority language of the province of the province 
whether or not their parents had received their education 
in that language.
Section 25 gives further protection to minority 
language rights such as those of the Canadian Indians, 
whoowish to educate their children in Cree. Section 26 
holds that such language guarantees are Mconsistent with 
the preservation and enhancement of the multinational 
heritage of C a n a d i a n s A s  Canada Today points out,
Section 26 has significance since Canada 
has always emphasized its cultural diver­
sity. The United States in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries considered 
itself a ’’melting pot” in which immigrants 
became culturally homogenious. Canada pur­
sued a different image, a ’’mosaic,” in 
which distinct cultures~-French, English, 
Ukranian, German, Scottish, Irish and many 
others--remained distinctive but harmonious.
CHAPTER IVV
THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT AND 
THE RISE OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS
Although organized separatist movements and parties 
are of relatively recent vintage in Quebec, French Canadians 
have dreamed of having their own nation ever since the 
time of the British conquest of 1760. This was especially 
true during periods of intense friction and discord such 
as the Riel affair, the conscription crisis and, more 
recently, the conflict over language rights and constitutional 
guarantees•
Most observers agree that modern separatism began in
1957» when Raymond Barbeau formed the right-wing Alliance
Laurentienne. This movement exhibited strong clerical and
corporatist tendencies, but in terms of actual support, its
following was small. Three years later, another separatist
movement, this one on the left, was organized under the
/
name Action Socialiste pour 1*independence nationale (ASIQ);
it, too, had limited support.
A more moderate group, the Rassemblement pour l*in-
dependence nationale (RIN), appeared the same year as
/
the ASIQ under the leadership of Andre d'Allemagne and 
1
James William Hagy, "Queoec Separatists: The First 
Twelve Years," Queens Quarterly,(Summer 1969), Vol LXXVI-2, 
p. 229.
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Marcel Chaput. Chaput split with the RIN over its refusal 
to back him in a provincial election and formed his own 
separatist party, the Parti republican du Quebec (PRQ).
Barbeau asked his followers to throw their support to the 
PRQ. Nonetheless, the PRQ proved to be a short-lived party,
2
as it was beset by financial difficulties from its beginning.
The Philosophy of Separatism— Causes. Reasons
Perhaps the most articulate explanation of the
rationales for separatism has come from the pen of Dr.
Marcel Chaput. Chaput*s book, Pourquoi Je Suis Separatiste
(Why I am a Separatist), is significant in that it lays
down, in.concise and detailed form, practically every
significant pro-separatist argument that has been made
either before or since the book*s publication in 1961.
In his introduction to Pourquoi. Chaput makes the
following claim:
The world is made up of separatists. The man 
who is master of his home is a separatist.
Each of the hundred nations striving to main­
tain its national identity is separatist.
France and England are mutually separatist, 
even in relation to the Common Market. And you 
who long for a real Canadian constitution, you 
are a separatist. The only difference between 
you and me is that you want Canada to be free 
in relation to England and the United States, 
and I want Quebec to be free in relation to 
Canada.3
2Ibid., p. 230.
3
^Marcel Chaput, Why I am a Separatist, trans. Robert A. 
Taylor (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishers, 1975)» 
p. iv.
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Chaput goes on to describe his basic arguments in 
favor of'-a separatist solution to Quebec's aspirations.
While acknowledging that a break from Canada would not 
resolve all of Quebec's problems and, in fact, would 
create many new. ones, he nonetheless holds the self- 
determinist view that "it is highly desirable that a
1l
•normal man or nation be free.”
Chaput defines what he calls the "six dimensions of 
separatism," which is an answer to those who ask about 
the actual desirability of an independent Quebec, 1)
Quebec's independence would allow French Canadians to en­
joy the liberty to which they are historically entitled.
2) Political independence is desirable because it would 
take the French Canadians out of their position of numerical 
helplessness. 3) Economically. political independence is 
desirable for Quebec because, without control over political 
power, economic independence remains a dream. 4) Culturally. 
Quebec wojAld benefit from independence by being a unilingual 
country. 5) Sociallv. Quebec's independence would be desirable 
in that it would "contribute to making life in Quebec a co­
herent whole," Politics would support the economy and both 
would contribute to culture, thus allowing French Canadians 
to develop their own institutions oriented toward the French' 
Canadian way of thinking. 6) Psychologicallyt independence 
h
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would be desirable because the French Canadian would no 
longer feel as a second class citizen. He would have a 
nation and a culture he could call his own.-*
To those who say that the federal government in 
Ottawa would react with force against separation, Chaput 
cliams that all free nations of the world would champion 
Quebec's desire for political independence, and that the 
United Nations would be obliged to send a peacekeeping 
force in the event of an invasion by either the federal 
government or the United States. Chaput even exclaims in 
Pourquoi, "The more I think about ' it, the more I am temp­
ted to wish for such an invasion, because it would be
"6
the most certain and speedy way for us to gain independence.
He sees Ottawa's reaction in such an eventuality as 
one of desperation and disorder, a feeble attempt to make 
piecemeal concessions in the areas of bilingualism and 
the appointment of a few French Canadians to top civil 
service posts. He enveighs against French Canadians consid­
ering such proposals, urging that "we don't want to correct 
injustice; we want to throw off our minority status."^
He concludes by saying in Pourquoi that, above all, in­
dependence is a matter of will. ,fIf a nation is based
5
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essentially on a collective will to live, then its indepen­
dence is essentially a matter of will ... Never in the his­
tory of the world has it been easier for conquored peoples 
to attain independence . We are living in the twentieth
Q
century, the Golden Age of independence•”
Radical Separatism; Revolution and the F.L.Q.
Although all of the previously-mentioned political 
parties spurned violence in favor of a political solution 
to Quebec's demands, this changed in 19&3 with the formation
of the FLQ, a small group of young fanatics calling them-
/ /
selves the Front de la liberation quebecoise.
Because the FLQ, both in its program and actions, 
represents an aberration from the tactics used by other 
separatist organizations in their pursuit of an independent 
Quebec, the FLQ's methods cannot be considered representative 
of the means by which most Quebeckers would seek a break 
with English Canada. Nonetheless, their deeds and words 
do demonstrate the mounting frustration felt by many young 
Quebeckers with the status quo and the slow pace of change.
A great deal about the FLQ remains shrouded in mystery. 
One helpful insight has come from Dr. Gustave Morf in his 
Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ. Morf has put 
together a number of details about the backgrounds of some
8 .
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of the members of the FLQ through intervies he conducted 
with the terrorits after their confinement to the peniten­
tiary •
The FLQ was an imported movement, modeled on the
Belgian resistance during World War II, the Algerian
National Liberation Front, and the Cuban revolution.
In general, most of the organization's members had
problems at home, unhappy family lives, and difficulty in
school, while a few came from good middle-class families.
In many ways, the FLQ members represented the highly
emotional, demanding, and rebellious adolescent culture
of which they were a part.
Because of his age and wartime experience, George
11Schoeters may be considered the father of the FLQ.
Schoeters himself was an illegitimate child, born in 
Belgium, who never knew his father. At the age of twelve, 
he became acquainted with the Belgian partisans who 
organized the resistance against the Nazis. The partisans 
employed him as a spy and messenger because of his youth 
and small stature. He observed the Belgians defending 
themselves against the Nazis with lies, deceit, fraud, 
civil disobedience, bombs and murder. "It is not surprising," 
observes Morf, "that a young man brought up in these cir­
cumstances ... would have a difficult time after the war in
12adapting himself to an orderly life."
10 ^ 
Gustave Morf, Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the
FLQ (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970), p. 20.
11
Ibid.
12 '
Ibid . , p. 21 •
138
In 1951 > Schoeters emigrated to Canada through the 
efforts of a friend whom he had met in Europe, and sub­
sequently joined the "Young Catholic Movement." He was 
placed with a family in Montreal (his first real family) 
and worked, briefly, as a restaurant helper in British 
Columbia, moved back to Montreal after a year in hopes of 
becoming an electrician, and finally entered the 
University of Montreal, where he studied economics and 
sociology.
The atmosphere at the university at that time was 
highly nationalistic, and it may be that he was influenced 
by the more militant students there. It appears that he 
often took part in discussions and that his experience 
as a freedom fighter gave him a certain prestige.
In 1957# he married a French Canadian girl from a very 
good family and was, by his own account, quite happy. But 
his interests soon became diverted to other areas. Morf 
remarks, "He was obviously a restless person, always in 
search of something new, something better, something 
different.1,13
Not long after his graduation from the university, 
Schoeters met Fiedel Castro, who came to Montreal on a 
visit following his successful revolution in Cuba. Con­
vinced of the sincerity of Castro's invitation for
13
Ibid., p. 22.
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students to come to Cuba to help with agrarian reform, he 
and his wife went to Cuba; she returned shortly thereafter 
because she was pregnant. Schoeters remained in Cuba for 
approximately one year, but he came back a somewhat dis­
appointed man. He saw that Castro's theories left much to 
be desired when put into practice.
Ever restless, he did not remain long with his family.
In 1961, he visited Rome, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria and 
Switzerland. While in Algeria, he was in touch with the 
National Liberation Front. Upon his return to Canada, he 
became a member of the RIN, but he did not find it radical 
enough. He then formed the Reseau de resistance (RR), 
which was inspired by the Belgian resistance but was con­
tent for the moment to paint slogans on walls.
Finally, part of the RR split away and called itself
✓ /
the Front de la liberation quebegoise, or FLQ. As with its 
Belgian, Algerian, and Cuban models, this was to be the 
underground movement devoted to defeating the English 
"occupant" by force. Schoeters himself had brought instructions 
from Algeria for making Molotov cocktails and time bombs.
He himself did not participate personally in the dynmite 
thefts or the construction of bombs; his role was more in 
the nature of a co-ordmator.
14Ibid., p. 23
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A detailed recital of the bombings and kidnappings of 
the FLQ during the I960*s and early 70*s, and Trudeau's 
imposition of the Emergency War Measures Act, is not 
necessary here. Many of these incidents have been 
described in the previous chapter on Quebec nationalism, 
and thus the reader is referred to those pages. What will 
be asserted is that the FLQ, condemned for its acts of 
violence and failing ultimately to ‘'liberate" Quebec 
from the clutches of the English "oppressors," nevertheless 
did succeed in obtaining its goals of riveting Canada's 
attention on Quebec and generating publicity for its 
cause•
While the more moderate members of separatist movements 
certainly loathed such violence, the concerns of the FLQ 
with respect to job discrimination against French Canadians 
and "outside" exploitation of the province were picked up 
by the "ballot box" separatist groups such as the RIN.
Shortly after the FLQ arrests in 19&3 and 19&L, the RIN 
reiterated its demands 1 ) that there be more acceptance 
of the French language and culture? 2) that there be 
better job opportunities for French Canadians? and 3) that 
there be special rights and privileges for Quebec. It 
claimed that only lip service was being paid to the notion 
of a "bi-cultural" nation, guaranteed by the British North 
America Act. It cited the fact that only 13 percent of the
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government jobs nationwide went to French Canadians, who
represented 30 percent of the population. Also, both industry,
and natural resources continued to be controlled from
1 *>outside the province. -
Premier Lesage took steps to appease the nationalists 
and to strengthen his position. For example, he demanded 
that federal tax reforms be implemented so that more revenue 
would Iflow back to the province of Quebec. Prime Minister 
Pearson at first delayed any fiscal revamping and in­
stead sought to pacify the nationalists by other means.
There had been a proposal to use an adaptation of the 
Union Jack as the Canadian national flag, which was 
understandably anathema to the Quebe<jois. Pearson then 
proposed three maple leaves on a white background with 
vertical blue bars on each side--ostehsibly representing 
union from sea to sea. The Quebegois were certainly happy 
about the alternation, but it hardly placated their
seconomic desires. Lesage and Resources Minister Rene 
Levesque were soon at work preparing yet another set of 
programs for Quebec, and further demands for Ottawa.
In March of 1965» the Lesage administration put out its 
long-range economic plan. Citing the dichotomy between 
Montreal and the rural areas, uneven growth, and per capita 
income in Quebec that was 13 percent below the national
15
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average. The top priority was the achievement of* more 
provincial control over tax revenues. Further, there 
was the omnipresent need to get the Quebegois into more 
places of economic authority. The plan, for which Levesque 
is credited, included: 1 ) nationalization of electric 
power (as it was felt that the economy could be shaped 
in the desired direction by preferential rate schedules 
to French-speaking companies); 2) the establishment
. S S S / *
of the Societe Generale du Fmancement du Quebec as a 
general investment corporation(this would supply 
advanced capital to firms that were in French Canadian 
hands); 3) the construction of a 225 million-dollar 
steel mill; and 4) increased investment in human resources, 
especially through education.
But with the Liberal Lesage administration already 
spending a huge budget on agricultural development, highways, 
and social services, the capital needed to implement 
Lesage*s proposals did not exist. Thus, Lesage restated 
his demands in modified form, requesting that a minimum 
of 47 percent of Quebec's personal income tax revenue be 
returned to the province. Pearson gave in to Lesage*s 
demands•
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In 1966, Daniel Johnson’s Union Nationale Party ous­
ted the Liberals after a six-year tenure. A. post-mortem 
on his administration is not necessary, but the charge 
that he attempted to do too much (or too little, from 
the separatist point of view) should be answered. First, 
his policies were generally sound. He realized that 
education needed more attention and funding, and was 
willing to implement much-needed reforms. The fact that, 
as the young became more educated, they became more 
dissatisfied with their lot in life as French Canadians 
cannot be laid at Lesage's feet. French Canadians had 
been in an inferior position for years, and their reaction 
was inevitable. What many largely ignored at the time 
was the fact that Lesage had taken a major step toward
modernizing the province and moving Quebec into the
1 6twentieth century.
Federalists were anxious in I966 about how well the
separatist parties would do. V/hen the two separatist parties
that ran candidates, the RIN and the newly-formed Ral-
liement Nationale (RN), did little more than splinter
some of the Liberal vote, federalists were overjoyed. To
be sure, this splintering was probably the reason for
the victory of the UN party; but the achievements of the
17RIN and RN for the separatist cause were negligible.
1 6
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The Formation of the Parti Quebecois
In 1967f Rene Levesque formally broke away from the
/
Liberal party and published his Option Quebec. This
six-thousand word volume outlined Levesque’s vision for
Quebec and Canada. As far as being a concrete bludprint
for action,however, the work left much to be desired.
Levesque’s biographer, Peter Desbarats, holds that Option 
✓
Quebec is "disjointed and emotional ... the work of a
18propagandist rather- than a political philosopher."
Levesque appealed in Option directly to French Canadians, 
whom, he asserted, constitute a nation no matter in which 
province they reside. It is only in Quebec, however, that 
French Canadians can actually claim a specific, geographical 
area for themselves, an area where their customs and lan­
guage will be totally accepted, an area over which they 
must exert greater economic and political control if they 
do not wish to see the province dominated and controlled by 
outsiders, i.e. those of non-French origin.
In Levesque’s view, Canada is a political entity com­
posed of two separate nations, English and French, and the 
advancement of the former was achieved largely through the 
exploitation and domination of the latter. In order for 
Quebec to truly develop, it will be necessary for the
18 ✓
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province to claim greater control over such areas as in­
dustry and commerce, citizenship and immigration, certain 
aspects of internalional relations, savings institutions, and 
internal agencies of development and industrialization.
Other areas of importance to be negotiated with the federal 
government include territorial claims between Quebec and 
Labrador, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. These 
demands, Levesque hold?-, are the "bare minimum" that Quebec 
should require.
Levesque®s Opt ion did not get the complete sympathy 
and endorsement of the French Canadian press. The Montreal 
Star editorialized that Levesque®s proposal was nothing more 
than "a union constantly seeking ad hoc solutions through
permanent consultive committees, which sounds like the
19
federal parliament under another name," Another critic,
Renaude Lapointe of La Presse.held that, as contemporary 
Quebecois are "better educated, more dynamic, and more in­
fluential than ever before," Levesque's suggestions should 
be totally rejected. He accused Levesque of failing to
admit that "90 percent ' of our weaknesses and shortcomings
20
are our own fault."
The prototype of the Parti Quebegois was Levesque's
    — =*------
Mouvement Souverainete Association. founded in 19^7* IT was 
formed from the union of Levesque's separatist group
19
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with the RIN and the RM. The aim of the group was to 
unify all elememts which supported independence in 
Quebec# Levesque found some difficulty in uniting the 
RN and the RIN with the MSA. The rift between these two 
organizations resulted largely from a personality conflict 
between RN leader Marcel Chaput and Pierre Bourgault of 
the RIN# Nevertheless, all three leaders realized that 
none of the separatist organizations, by themselves, were 
capable of mustering the necessary political and financial 
support to forward the separatist cause# Thus a compromise 
was reached when Levesque absorbed the RN and the RIN into 
the MSA. At the convention unifying the three groups, the 
MSA declared its intention to become a political party 
within six months#
✓
Levesque’s Parti Quebegois was formally launched in
1968, In his opening address to the delegates of the PQ,
Levesque did not actually call for independence; instead
he advocated a new program of participatory democracy
that would go against the "outdated and rigid social,
14economic, and political structure#"
When the FLQ began its campaign of bombings, robbery 
and arson, the Quebec provincial government requested help 
from Ottawa to combat the terrorist wave# Levesque himself 
was among the most outspoken in denouncing the terrorists
14 ,
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Nevertheless, he continued to call for changes in the 
system that would, he argued, make it more responsive 
to the needs of Quebeckers, He appealed especially to 
youth and labor, stressing that society had to make a 
place for the newly-enfranchised students and the un­
employed •
As the 1970 election campaign began to take shape,
it was clear that the primary contest would be between
the Liberals and the Parti Quebecois, A poll conducted
just prior to the election showed the Liberals with
37 percent of the popular support, the Parti Quebegois
with 29 percent, the Union, Nationale with 15 percent,
1 Sand the Creditistes with 15 percent* Levesque con­
tributed to the success of the PQ in a number of wayss 
he appealed to the youth, to the left, and to the dis­
contented. Although his program was nationalist, his 
tone was subdued. He asked the Quebecois not to believe 
that the economic price of independence was too high, 
and pleaded with them to withdraw their old fears and 
their subservient attitude towards English Canada and 
the local establishment.
Levesque’s tactics also had an effect on the strat­
egies of other parties. The Union Nationale, for example, 
called for a referendum on independence before 197^ unless a new
15
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constitution had been drafted. Many of the Liberals
in other provinces waited to see when Pierre Trudeau
and the Liberal government in Ottawa would intervene to
counter the challenge from Levesque. Although Trudeau
did not actively intervene in the campaign, there
were other federalists working hard, through various
means, to assure a Liberal victory. One English-
Canadian controlled investment firm advised its clients
to ship their securities and liquid assets outside the
16
province until after the election. In addition, the 
English language Montreal dailies played up these moves 
as a sure sign that a PQ victory would mean financial 
collapse for the province.Whether such actions had any 
effect in persuading the non-committed to vote Liberal 
rather than PQ or UN cannot be determined. What is 
certain is that they increased the separatists* anger 
and did nothing to ease the discord between French and 
English within the province.
The PQ and the Election of 1970
When the results of the 1970 election became apparent, 
it was clear that the PQ had sustained a major defeat 
despite what earlier opinion polls had forcast. The actual 
breakdown of support showed the following:
16 ^
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% of Total vote
17
Party Seats
Liberals 
Parti Quebecois 
Union Nationale 
Creditiste 
Others
72
7
17
12
0
41.8 
23.0 
19.6 
11.1
^•5
The federalists, who touted the triumph of the Liberals 
as a resounding "no" to separation, could not hide the 
serious economic and social problems that remained. What 
was also obvious was the shift of electoral support for 
the various parties. Urban voters rejected the Union 
Nationale outrightt while the rural areas (traditionally
bastions of support for the UN) supported the Creditistes 
in larger numbers than ever before( taking nine seats from
swung the balance in: the Liberals favor by siphoning 
support from the Union Nationale and assuring the Liberal 
vict ory•
The PQ's strength came overwhelmingly from the urban 
areas. In the lower-income areas of Montreal, it won five 
seats and did well in other areas of the city, running 
second to the Liberals in all other election districts of 
the city. Except for the four overwhelmingly English 
constituencies, the Liberals secured only 373»757 votes
/
the UN and three from the Liberals). The Creditistes also
17
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to 2^9»251 for the Parti Quebecois. The PQ also showed
strength in the suburbs of Montreal, polling more than
one fifth of the vote. In Quebec City, it bested the
Liberals in the more depressed areas and ran a close
second in the suburbs.
Election observers noted that seven out of ten voters
rejected separatism. This number included all those who
supported the Creditistes and the Union Nationale. despite
the UN's ambiguity on the constitutional issue. The PQ's
analysts drew other conclusions, however. They claimed
that the Liberal candidate, Bourassa, owed his victory
19to English-speaking Quebec.  ^ They supported their argument
by citing the conclusion of one analyst, Bernard Smith,
who had divided the constituencies in the city of Montreal
into areas ranging from 80-90 percent to 0-10 percent
French Canadian. His findings showed that English Canadians
had voted Liberal and that the difference between Liberals
s
and the Parti Quebegois often varied with the percentage of 
non-French voters in the constituency• Only in 9 of the 
38 seats in Montreal and its environs, he argued, did the 
Liberals secure a higher percentage of the French Canadian 
vote than did the P Q . ^
Examining the French Canadian vote as a whole, he conclu­
ded that French-speaking Quebec had given the Liberals 32.6
18
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percent of its support, 28.7 to the PQ, 2E.2 to the UN and
1^.5 to others. Because of this, some Believed that, with
this election, the line had been drawn between French
21
and English Canadians in Quebec.
The PQ charged that the influence of non-French-speaking 
Canadians tended to distort the parliamentary process. Leves­
que stated that the English-speaking voters (Anglophone bloc) 
had swung the tide in favor of the Liberals. He also charged 
manipulation by the English-speaking media®" I have never 
experienced such disgust,'1 Levesque said," as that which I 
experienced because of the way information was manipulated 
in the Anglo-Saxon establishment at Montreal with its
propagenda media, its disrespect for a population which it
22
treated like natives."
19?l“-?6--Building Support for the P.Q.
The constitutional reforms called for by Trudeau cul-
22
mmated in 1971. m  the so-called Victoria Charter. The 
Charter proposed the continuation of the federal state in 
basically the same form, adding a few articles to entrench 
language rights and giving Ontario and Quebec a veto over 
constitutional amendment. Opposition from Quebec came swiftly, 
as Premier Bourassa was unable to quell the nationalists who
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held -that the Charter did not go far enough in areas of 
decentralization or special status for Quebec* Bourassa, 
complying with the nationalists ' demands, refused the 
Charter's provisions* The stalemate produced a situation 
in which many French-speaking intellectuals were more 
drav/n to the idea of a separate state*
The PQ announced its intention to run separatist 
candidates in the next federal election, claming that 
a poll showed that 53 percent of Montreal's French-speaking 
population supported its objectives* Meanwhile, 
there were those like Prime Minister Trudeau who argued 
that separatism was no longer a real challenge* Those 
who were already for separatism might be more intense 
in their beliefs, he argued, but actual support had 
declined. A different view was taken by distinguished 
political scientistLion Dion, director of research 
for the Bilingualism and Bicultural Commission, who held 
that without more radical and imaginative solutions than 
those already proposed, the country would have to 
accept the inevitability of a separate state of Quebec.
Dion proposed the right of self-determination for Quebec 
and all other provinces, large-scale institutional 
bilingualism in the federal civil service, major
2lp .
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jurisdictional and administrative decentralization by the
federal government, and an end to the thinking on such
concepts as "special status" and the "two nations theory."
"No power in the world," Dion said," can stop French-
speaking Quebegois from seeing themselves as a unique
25
society and nation."
The P Q , meantime, continued to draw support from 
the intellectual community and also found allies in 
the trade union movement. In September, 1971? the CNTU 
came forward with a document entitled "Quebec has no 
future in the present economic system." The question of 
separatism was virtually ignored, and its only conclusion 
was that Quebec should be a socialist state. However, 
labor leader Louis Laberge called for a united front to 
oppose the capitalist system and came out in favor of the 
Parti Quebegois as the best party for the workers. Sub­
sequently, the F^Q (Quebec Federation of Labor) adopted a 
position paper which called for Quebec's right to self- 
determination, including independencer if it was achieved
2?
in accordance with the needs and aspirations >bf the workers. 
The FTQ held that French should be the only working language 
in the province and gave its executive a mandate to call 
for a general strike, if necessary.
""Ibid.. p. 56.
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Support from the radical trade union movement provided 
the PQ with an opportunity to corner some of the vast labor 
vote. But it also involved a degree of risk in that the 
party might alienate a large segment of its middle-class 
support along with the more' moderate trade unionists.
Because Levesque refused to move any further to the left, 
he faced opposition from both inside and outside the party.
He had contemplated resigning, but he felt he had a role 
to play in preventing the party from being taken over by 
the left.
At the PQ*s 1971 convention, Levesque handily defeated
/
the more radical Andre baroque for the party's leadership 
position. He faced sterner opposition from 1,200 delegates 
who wished to abolish minority schools(i.e. schools for 
English-speaking residents in Quebec) in any future in­
dependent state. The left-wing elements of the party 
continued to exert pressure, asking for active PQ invol­
vement in labor strikes and demonstrations. Only by 
a narrow vote of 6-5 was the party's executive committee 
able to turn down a resolution demanding the party's official
participation in a planned demonstration that many felt
27would lead to violence. (
Labor leaders reacted with extreme disgruntlement to
the PQ's decision not to participate in the demonstration.
27 .Ibid 0
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Levesque, however, tooka strong stand against the more
radical labor leaders and invited the FTQ's Robert Burns
28
to "go if he wants to," He attacked any who advocated
violence, and reiterated that the Parti Quebecois had
committed itself to the achievement of independence through
democratic means.
It was because of Levesque's intervention that the
radical labor movement was forced to shelve, at least
for the time being, its demands for a more leftist
Parti Quebecois. In the wake of the FLQ bombings and
kidnappings of 1970, and the rift with radical labor, the
PQ suffered some loss of membership. Indications were
that phrty membership had fallen from 80,000 to 30,000
* 29
between 1970 and 1971* Nonetheless, Levesque realized 
that if his party were to to become more than a terrorist 
group or radical labor organization, he would have to keep 
a tight rein on those who threatened to make the PQ any­
thing other than a legitimate party with broad appeal 
to all classes.
Levesque's aim In 1972 was to devise a campaign strategy 
that would keep the Liberals on the defensive. His method 
was to introduce a variety of separatist charges that would 
attract media attention, build PQ membership, and increase
Ibid., p. 61.
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support for the PQ in the upcoming by-elections. The PQ 
campaign focused on such areas as patriation of the con­
stitution, the low number of Quebeckers in the federal 
civil service, the cost of federalism, the difference 
between Quebec's 13 million and Ontario's 200 million 
dollars per year of federal research money, Ontario's 
higher standard of living, and Ottawa's treatment of 
Quebec's agricultural sector.
The PQ's hopes for victory were dashed in the 
Tremblay by-election of April, 1972. Labor support for 
the PQ in the election had been questionable after 
Levesque's equivocation on support for the unions.
After spending considerable time and effort in the cam­
paign, and with only two parties running, the results 
dealt a heavy blow to Levesque and his party.
By 19731 "the PQ had begun mending fences with the labor
moevment, pasting over differences concerning strategy and
methods for a time. Although the PQ's platform of 1973
had a more socialist orientation, there were futher
attempts by more radical labor members to shift the party's
30platform still further left. For example, the platform did 
call for changes in economic planning, regulation of foreign 
ownership, financial institutions and other areas dealing
157
with social policy. But some members of the radical
labor movement drafted a orogram entitled Ouand nous
31 .
serons vraiment chez nous , which proposed such things 
as. direct worker participation in management and even 
went so far as to require industry to turn over power 
to workers' soviets in an independent Quebec, Levesque, 
however, persuaded the party convention to drop such 
radical proposals.
What emerged from the PQ's convention that year 
was a modified program that was still far to the left 
of anything proposed by the other national parties.
It called for Increased national and regional planning, 
the abolition of finance companies, urged stricter con­
trols over financial institutions, requested nationalization 
of such companies as Canadian Pacific, and advocated 
greater control over foreign investment and foreign- 
owned companies. Levesque's major contribution to the 
platform was a section dealing with the French language-, 
which stated that French would be the sole official and 
working language in an Independent Quebec,
In order to increase Its credibility, the PQ drew up a 
proposed Quebec budget to accompany the 1973 platform 
based on the 1973-7^ provincial budget. It proposed in­
creases in the volume of services and in civil service 
salaries. Levesque stated that Quebec would take its share
31
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of the federal debt, since a portion of that debt was in­
curred by Quebec, As for corporations, he said that pro­
visions would be made for the incorporation of those 
companies that had previously been Canadian. Corporations 
would have to abide by the rules of a Foreign Investment 
Code as it pertained to foreign ownership, and a certain 
percentage of the corporation would have to fall under 
Quebec ownership.
The remainder of the platform called for the establish­
ment of a central bank, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
a customs union with Canada, In addition, the possibility 
of a common currency between the two nations was discussed, 
although Levesque admitted thatithis would be one of the 
most difficult things to achieve, Quebec might have to be 
prepared to issue its own money in the event that Canada 
did not agree to a common currency,
s
In order to ease the economic fears of many Quebegois, 
and despite its pro-independence rhetoric, the FQ made a 
concerted effort to persuade the electorate that a vote for 
the PQ would not necessarily mean a vote for independence, 
Levesque noted that two referenda had been necessary before 
Newfoundland entered the confederation. No moves would be 
made In the direction of independence until the Quebec 
population had given its full approval through referendum, 
Levesque insisted.
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Support from the trade unions, which had. wavered in 
the period 1971-72, again came to the PQ in 1973. The 
PQ welcomed labor's support, but was careful not to ally 
itself with the more‘militant trade union leaders. The 
CNTU (Confederation of National Trade Unions) issued a 
statement that was not absolutely P Q , but was definitely/- 
anti-Liberal• The FTQ held in its statements that the 
Bourassa regime was the most anti-labor government in 
Quebec history. FTQ leader Louis Laberge called on his 
members to support candidates sympathetic to the labor 
movement, adding that most of these could be found in the
/ 33Parti Quebegois.
The election returns in'the fall of 1973 provided the
Liberals with the victory they sought. Liberal leader
Robert Bourassafs campaign had been skillful, and in
general the province's economy was doing well despite
inflation and unemployment« mhere had been little labor
unrest, and government spending had been kept under con-
34'trol in four budgets without increased taxes.
As in 1970, the PQ increased its percentage of the 
popular vote, this time in every riding (election district) 
except East Montreal. It also showed gains of more than 
10 percent in 2k constituencies, received over 4-0 percent
33
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35of the vote in 26 ridings, 21 of which were in Montreal.
The Liberals, however, had a distinct advantage in that in 
50 seats there was no contest at all. The Liberals received 
twice as many votes as their nearest competitors.
The Liberals had built their campaign on Bourassa*s 
personality. The Liberals' slogan "Bourassa construit," 
"Bourassa builds," implied that Levesque destroys. The 
Liberals* platform, A New Plan of Action, was a 75-page 
"review" of Liberal accomplishments and promises to do 
even more. For example, it promised to create tax exemp­
tions for small and medium-sized business and increase 
family allowances. In short, the government relied on its 
record and attacked separatism as a movement that would 
cause Quebec catastrophic economic and social harm.
The PQ had concentrated its efforts toward diminishing 
the perceived economic consequences of a separate Quebec, 
and stressing that cultural sovereignty would be worth the 
price. The Liberals countered that cultural sovereignty 
would continue to receive their attention, but it would not 
come at the heavy costs that would follow a PQ victory.
3 5 I b i d . . p .  97
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During the election, Levesque had warned that a serious 
situation would exist if the English-speaking minority in 
Quebec kept a party in power that was not supported by 
a majority of the French-speaking electorate# This was 
another reference to his contention that the Anglophone 
bloc had too much control over Quebec politics# Ironically, 
the results of the 1973 election showed that, while English- 
speaking Quebec had overwhelmingly supported the Liberals, 
the PQ had gained support from the non-French-speaking 
electorate# The PQ had increased its percentage of the 
English-speaking vote to six percent, twice that of 1970.
This support came primarily from the low-income sections 
of Montreal, but there was also a small amount of white 
and blue-collar support outside Montreal. No white collar 
support came from Montreal itself.
An opinion poll taken after the election showed that 
the major reason for the Liberal victory was the party's 
stand with respect to retaining the constitution, as 
opposed to actual voter satisfaction with the government's 
performance# While 81 percent of Liberal voters stated that 
they voted Liberal because of the party's stand on the con­
stitution, only U0 percent held that theirs was a vote of
37satisfaction with the government.
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Following the election, Levesque held that the Liberals' 
scare tactics with respect to separatism had succeeded ■ and 
that one day Quebeckers would realize their dreams; of 
becoming a separate nation. Levesque continued to mediate 
in the PQ's internal conflicts between moderates, like 
Claude Morin, and radicals such as Robert Bums, Some in 
the PQ, such as Morin, began to sense that a change in the 
party's rhetoric would be necessary before it could defeat 
the Liberals, and Morin himself began to speak of "in­
dependence in stages" and even of the possibility of a cul­
turally sovereign Quebec within an economically unified 
Canada. This sounded almost like Bourassa's suggestion on 
the eve of the election that there should be a culturally 
secure Quebec linked economically to Qanada.
The Liberals ended the year without giving further 
details concerning their attitudes toward constitutional 
reform and cultural sovereignty, but it was clear that they 
would have to take some initiative in these areas if they 
were to counter the separatist challenge and contain Levesque. 
The following two years would determine how successful they 
would be both with respect to cultural sovereignty and their 
management of the province's economy.
Prelude to 1976; The Liberal Party in Disarray
I63
The years 197^ and 1975 proved a time of transition for 
the Parti Quebecois in its attempts to broaden support and 
analyze past mistakes. Ironically, during this period, it 
was the Liberal Party that took the initiative in the 
area of cultural sovereignty. Sensing dissatisfaction within 
the province because immigrants were being educated in 
English, the Liberals passed Bill 22, making French the 
official language of the province, requiring that French 
be the language of usage in the provincial government, and 
mandating the use of French in the internal affairs of the 
business world. ^
The most controversial of the bill's provisions concer­
ned its requirements in education. It mandated that French 
be the language of instruction in the public schools, and 
that the teaching of English could neither begin nor cease 
without the approval of the Ministry of Education. Further, 
an even more controversial point of the bill required that all 
children in the province take an examination to demonstrate 
their skills in English. All children failing to show a 
knowledge of the English language on this examination were 
to be placed in French schools. The children of Anglophone 
parents could continue to attend English-speaking schools and 
38
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be educated in English, immigrant children would have to 
enter French schools.
The PQ Victory
Feeling secure with the Liberals' earlier victories
in 1970 and 1973s Quebec's Liberal Premier, Robert Bourassa,
stated in January, 1976, that he did not feel the need to
call an election that year. Nonetheless, by the fall of
1976 Bourassa held that he needed a mandate to deal with
the federal government on constitutional matters and the
39
challenge from the trade unions.
Although other Liberals stated their confidence in 
winning any contest in 1976, much had happended in the 
province to undermine support for the party. Tremendous 
cost overruns on pbbllc projects such as the James Bay
hydroelectric installation and the Montreal Olympic Games
40
had put severe strains on the province's budget. In addition,
investigations supported suspicions that some Liberal
politicians had been guilty of serious maladministration
41
of campaign funds,if not actual criminal misconduct. An in­
dication of public discontent was revealed in a public 
opinion poll conducted by the Center for Public Opinion 
Research in the Spring of 1976, It showed that dissatisfaction 
with the government had Increased from 35 percent In
3 0
* Raymond Hudon," The lp?6 Quebec Election," Queen * s 
Quarterly(Snring 1977)» Vol. 14, Mo. 1•, p. 18.
40
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October of 1973» to 5^ percent in November, 1974, to 66
percent in January, 1976.
The Liberals* troubles continued to multiply through­
out the spring and summer months of 1976. Teacher walkouts 
continued because of their dissatisfaction with Bill 22.
Labor unrest among public sector employees caused work 
stoppages in the high schools and hydroelectric facilities
that enraged the general public.
Quebec's educational establishment remained in disarray, 
as immigrant children were compelled to take crash courses 
in French. Families were upset by the government-required 
testing, and provincial courts were flooded with parental 
appeals. Some parents openly defied the law, and some 
school officials admitted thousands of students who had 
failed the English-language test.
The government announcement that it would gradually ex­
tend the use of French to include air-traffic control 
brought outrage from the English-speaking Pilots and Con­
trollers Association. Only after considerable pressure from 
English Canada did the Quebec government relent on this plan. 
The French Canadian reaction to the English triumph in the 
air traffic control dispute was intense. Two key Quebec 
ministers, Jean Marchand and Guy St. Pierre, resigned, and
42
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the French-speaking pilots, controllers, and technicians
sought to have the decision not to use French in Quebec's
airports reversed by the courts. The Quebec legislature,
the National Assembly, showed its support for the French-
speaking controllers by passing a resolution giving the 
controllers $25$000 to help defray the controllers* legal
fees •
All the while, the PQ took stock of the situation,
Levesque in a press interview said,
The cup is full and any attempt to impose more 
French will provoke a violent reaction from the 
English-speaking community ,,. That is plainly 
what is involved; English Canada is moving now 
to a rejection of Quebec's demands. Without 
openly wishing that Quebec would leave, not 
going so far as to throw us out the door if
we don't decide to go, it is certain that En­
glish Canada is no longer in the mood to
tolerate either the smallest concession to
Quebec or any acceleration of bilingualism, ^
Moreover, the PQ and other French Canadian observers 
noted the fact that James Richardson has resigned from 
the Trudeau Cabinet to protest the possible entrenchment 
of French language rights in any new constitution, thus 
adding to French Canadian suspicions that English Canada 
was not really interested in offering French Canada any 
protection for its language and culture.
^3Ibid,
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By Septermber, 1976, it was clear that many Liberal 
party members wanted Bourassa to call an election. First, 
they wished to dispel the belief that the majority of 
Quebeckers favored the Parti Quebegois, Second, Bourassa 
himself held that he needed a mandate to challenge 
Trudeau's move to patriate the constitution. At the same 
time, Bourassa blasted the PQ's proposals for "sovereignty/ 
association" as being unrealistic, unworkable, extreme 
and dangerous.
The Liberals made their platform public in a campaign 
document entitled Program 76, The program outlined Liberal 
initiatives in the areas of labor law, public finance, 
federal and provincial powers, the Supreme Court and the 
judiciary, and budget ceilings and equalization payments.
In particular, the platform stressed reform in the right- 
to-strike law.
Levesque followed an astute strategy of not giving the 
Liberals more ammunition on the separatism issue. The PQ 
kept a low profile and did everything to avoid mentioning 
separatism. Bourassa, however, continued to challange 
Levesque to a debate on the economics of separatism, and 
federalism, and Levesque's refusal to debate brought charges 
of PQ cowardice from the Liberals. Levesque, however, re­
mained unmoved.
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The PQ continued to capitalize on the general dis­
satisfaction with Liberal economic policies. Moreover, 
it had vastly improved its regional and local organizational 
structures and was successful in raising $1,200,000 in 
campaign funds. The PQ made every effort to play down 
the separatist issue despite Liberal attempts to draw it 
out during the campaign. Time and again, Levesque urged 
PQ members to organize, to campaign vigorously, and to 
eschew the ideological debate. The PQ*s strategy was to 
concentrate on Bourassa*s record and to stress that it 
offered the only viable alternative. Carefully wording its 
campaign literature, the PQ also emphasized that, if 
elected, no move toward independence would be made without 
the approval of the plan through a province-wide referendum.
The Verdict-The Vote of November 15, 1976
When the results were counted, it was clear that the 
PQ had gained 41.^ percent of the vote, or 71 seats. The 
Liberals, meanwhile, had dropped from 102 seats in 1973 
to 26 in 1976, Even the Union Nationale showed a gain of 
11 seats, or 18.2 percent of the vote. The actual breakdown 
was as follows:
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The breadth of the PQ victory was also apparent, with 
the party registering gains in West Montreal (Anglophone) 
and Eastern Quebec. The party dominated in urban and 
semi-urban Quebec, with the exception of some of the 
non-French ethnic ridings in Montreal. If one considers 
the vote in terms of language, it is clear that the PQ 
gained 5^ percent of the French Canadian vote, while 
French Canadians accounted for 26 percent of the Liberal 
vote. With respect to the geographic distribution of the 
French-speaking vote, support came from Montreal, with 
73 percent, and 50 percent elsewhere in the province.
Analysis of 1976
While one observer contends that, "Although no one 
expected that the Liberals would emerge unscathed ... no 
one anticipated the slaughter of November 15**' he is only 
partially correct. On the one hand, after the election, 
while most major newspapers such as the New York Times,
The London Times and the Washington Post, carried stories 
dealing with the "surprising" results in Quebec, The Wall 
Street Journal, on the other hand, reported the 
results as casually as if Rockefeller had won another 
gubernatorial race in New York. Perhaps the reason
Hudon, p. 23.
^^Saywell, p. 12.
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was that the Journal is largely unconcerned with political 
issues such the the "cultural problem," but, more likely, 
it was because the paper places heavy emphasis on 
economic issues. Moreover, the election that brought 
the PQ to power was a result of the desire for economic 
change that superseded the fear of the separatist movement. 
A sluggish economy with high inflation, high unemployment, 
a record budget deficit, labor unrest, and charges of 
corruption was an accurate description of Quebec under 
the Bourassa administration. These were the issues which 
Levesque stressed and, as in the 1973 election, he 
attempted to downplay the separatist part of the PQ plat­
form. Bourassa, however, without a strong economic record 
to show, waged his entire campaign on the anti-separatism 
issue, a tactic that, in the end, failed.
Furthermore, Levesque also deserves considerable 
credit for a masterful campaign. He was able to keep 
distant from the radical movements and thus obtain the 
support of the middle class. He also stressed the more 
fundamental issues important to all citizens, such as 
adequate services and a higher standard of living. What 
is more, the separatist issue, upon which his party was 
predicated, was not neglected but certainly de-emphasized,
at least publically. Indeed, he tried at all times to 
equate Quebec autonomy with economic benefits. Bourassa, 
on the other hand, having torn the country apart with 
the language issue, and faced with a miserable economic 
past, had to propound on the evils of separatism as his 
sole campaign issue.
CHAPTER V
TRUDEAU AND LEVESQUE; THE CLASH OF IDEAS
To understand the conflict between separatists and 
federalists, it is necessary to examine the fundamental 
debate between Rene Levesque and Pierre Trudeau. This 
debate, which began in the i960 ' s , is the backdrop to 
everything that has occurred in the 1970’s and 80 *s. Thus, 
the purpose of this chapter is to examine the background 
and respective world-views of both men, to trace their 
relationship to the present, and to discover how their 
beliefs may contribute to Quebec's future in Canada.
One observer has accurately capsulized the conflict 
between Trudeau and Levesque. Desbarats notes that,
Trudeau saw the separatist movement as an 
expression of the "profound insecurity and 
ancient fears" of the French Canadian people, 
and as an anachronistic attempt to "shut the 
doors and block the frontiers" against the 
outside world. For Levesque, the movement 
was exactly the opposite; an escape from 
the stifling restrictions of Confederation 
to the freedom and responsibility of adult 
nationhood•
Both men looked at the history of French 
Canada since the conquest and saw the same 
stroy of shame and humiliation, and reached 
opposite conclusions. Each saw freedom in 
his own option, and saw the other as a 
prisoner of Quebec's past.
Peter Desbarats, Rene; A Canadian in Search of a 
Country (Toronto; McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 17^.
172
173
Trudeau's ideas are best expounded in two books, 
Approaches to Politics and Federalism and the French 
Canadians. In Approaches, Trudeau's aim is to examine 
those theories which have been used to justify the uses 
of power throughout history, and to point out some of the 
uses and abuses of power by the corrupt regime of Maurice 
Duplessis in Quebec during the 193°'s, ^0's and 50's. 
Approaches is a more general work, devoted to Trudeau's 
feelings concerning the relationship between ruler and 
ruled. In Federalism, however, he takes a closer look 
at the history of French Canadian development, and examines 
such things as the nature of constitutional conflict, the 
history of French-English relations, and the origins of 
Anglo-Canadian and French-Canadian nationalisms,
Levesque's ideas can be garnered from his major work,
✓
Option Quebec, and by examining a number of articles he 
has written concerning French Canadian demands and the 
platform of the Parti QuebeQois. It should be noted 
that, whereas Trudeau's writings deal with political 
philosophy, Levesque's tend to be more polemical and 
aimed at a specific audience he is attempting to con­
vince regarding the desirability of an independent Quebec.
We shall begin by looking at Trudeau's ideas.
1 74
Trudeau and Quebec
An observer of the Canadian scene and recent biogra­
pher of Pierre Trudeau has stated: "Whatever expectations 
others attached to him, Trudeau himself has never made it 
a secret that it was the Quebec issue that led him to
2
enter politics and eventually become Prime Minister."
Trudeau claims, "Each man has his own reasons, I suppose, 
as driving forces; but mine were twofold: one was to make 
sure that Quebec wouldn't leave Canada through separatism, 
and the other was to make sure that Canada wouldn't shove 
Quebec out through narrowmindedness•
Any attempt to deal with Trudeau's handling of the 
Quebec Issue must take into account the fact that many 
of the problems existed long before he became Prime Minis­
ter? some of them were beyond his control and a few are a 
direct result of his own actions. Some observers contend 
that, in some ways, Trudeau contributed to the spread of 
separatist sentiment in Quebec. Others, however, hold that 
he contributed far more to the containment of that sentiment,
and that there is reason to believe the situation might have
4been far worse without the role he played.
2
George Raswanski, Trudeau (New York: Taplinger Press, 
1978), p. 311. “
3
Pierre E. Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians 
(New York: St. Martins, 19*68)', P* ix.
4
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Brief Biographical Sketch
Pierre Elliot Trudeau was born in Montreal in 1919*
After graduation from Brebeuf College in 1940, he studied 
law at the University of Montreal. While at the university, 
he opposed the conscription of Canadians for service 
in Europe during World War II and actively campaigned for 
Jean Drapeau, the mayor of Montreal and an anti-conscrip­
tion candidate. Following his graduation from law school 
in 1943, he worked as a law clerk for a short time. Short­
ly thereafter, he quit work and embarked on a world tour 
which lasted several years. During the l950*Sf Trudeau 
became actively interested in politics and founded a 
political journal, Cite Libre. He joined the Liberal 
party in 19^5 and was a successful candidate for a seat 
in the Canadian Parliament in I966. He became Minister 
of Justice in 19^7 and was elected Prime Minister in
1968 •
Federalism and the French Canadians
Trudeau states in his forward to Federalism and the 
French Canadians that the only common factor to be found 
in his thinking over the years has been his opposition to 
accepted opinion. Like many progressive Canadians of his
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day, Trudeau observed the stifling influence of the 
Duplessis regime on Quebec’s society: its opposition 
to modernization; its corruption; its lack of progressive 
ideas. "I fought this regime until its downfall in i960.,"-* 
Trudeau remarks.
Trudeau argues that, while he desired change during 
the Duplessis days, he was also a fierce supporter of 
provincial autonomy. With the coming of the "Quiet 
Revolution" and the Lesage administration, however, the 
forces of change and modernization carried the notion of 
provincial autonomy to the extreme. The province’s politics 
lacked a balance between provincial autonomy for Quebec, 
on the one hand, and the possibility of excessive federal 
dominance, on the other.
Moreover, while the Quebec modernization drive pro­
duced a greater sophistication, a higher level of 
eduation, and a more urban outlook among Quebecois, 
the forces of Quebec nationalism, instead of lessening, 
turned from being inward-looking and defensive to being 
aggressive, demanding, and, in some cases, separatist.
5^Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p. xix.
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This modernized nationalism produced a greater sense 
of grievance toward English Canada. It found its 
greatest appeal among the province's youth and the 
labor movement. Trudeau:claims that his decision to 
enter politics in 1965 came in response to his desire to 
counter this extreme form of nationalism.
Trudeau inveighs against the notion of nationalism
primarily because he feels it is a threat to democracy.
His stance is grounded in the belief that "a truly
democratic government cannot be 'nationalist * because
it must pursue the good of all its citizens, without
prejudice to ethnic origin."^ Moreover, Trudeau maintains,
the history of nationalist movements has brought about
the worst possible situations for people caught up by
their spurious logic. The greatest tragedy of nationalism,
he claims, is that much suffering and death have taken
place to defend an absurd concept. "That is way the principle
of nationalism has brought to the world two centuries
7
of war, and not one single final soultion," Trudeau argues.
6Ibid., p. 156.
7Ibid.. p. 158.
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As for the separatists who espouse the doctrine of 
sovereignty, Trudeau holds that "those who procliam it 
for the nation of French Canada are not only reactionary, 
they are preposterous." He holds that the French Canadians 
could not constitute a perfect society any more than
Q
"the five million Sikhs of Punjab."
Trudeau also holds that separatists err in their
assumption that independence and progress are essentially
the same. Unlike many nationalistic thinkers of the
developing world, Trudeau rejects the notion that "good
9
government is no substitute for self-government." He 
adds that such emphasis on sovereignty above all else 
gives indication of the separatists* "muddled thinking" 
because self-government does not mean national self-
10determination or "showing off one's linguistic brilliance."
He attacks nationalists such as Marcel Chaput, who draw 
on the experiences of Asian and African states to claim 
independence. The fact that a state has within its 
boundaries people who speak more than one language or have 
more than one religion, Trudeau argues, does n-ot necessitate 
a separate state for each one of these groups. India, Trudeau 
notes, is a sovereign republic in which four languages are 
recognized along with eight principal religions, several
Q
Ibid., p. 170.
9 .
Ibid., p. 151c
10
Ibid., p. 152•
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of Which are implacably opposed to each other. Other states, 
such as Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Malaya and Burma, also have wide 
divergences in ethnic and religious character. If all 
of these states incorporate so many different languages, 
attitudes, religions, and ways of life, why cannot the 
Canadian federation embrace two cultures and two languages, 
Trudeau asks?
The history of progress and civilization, Trudeau
claims, is the chronicle of subordination of tribal
"nationalism" to wider interests. The nation is not a
biological reality, that is, a community that springs
from the very nature of man, and history has shown that
man has done very well without it. What is more, he
remarks, "the tiny portion of history marked by the
emergence of nation states is also the period of the most
11degrading collective hatred the world has ever seen."
Like the protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Trudeau 
argues that nationalism often gives rise to power-seeking 
megalomaniacs, like Napoleon. "Napoleon," Niebuhr claimed, 
"could bathe Europe in blood for the sake of gratifying 
his overweening lust for power, as long as he 
could pose as the tool of French patriotism and as
11
Ibid., p. 157*
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12the instrument of revolutionary fervor#"
Federalism and the Constitutional Question
Trudeau is both sympathetic and highly critical of 
the way in which Quebec has managed its own affairs over 
the years# On the one hand, he acknowledges that Quebeckers 
have suffered under an intense prejudice from Anglo- 
Canadians. "From the moment of delivery of the Royal Pro­
clamation of 1?63," he claims, "the intention was obvious:
18the French Canadian was to be completely assimilated." J
Because the British would not allow themselves to occupy
an inferior position, "they invented all kinds of strategems
by which democracy was made to mean government by the 
14minority#"
The fact that Quebec remained a solid bastion of French
culture and language gave rise to an aggressive Anglo-
Canadian nationalism that, in turn, resulted "inevitably"
in a more intense French Canadian nationalism. Quebeckers
were thus faced with two choices, according to Trudeaus 1)
they could respond with a rival version of the French
Canadian nation; 2) they could scrap the idea of a nation
state and move toward making Canada a multi-national state.
The first choice, he notes, was, and still is, that of the
1 ^separatists or advocates of independence. ^
12
Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society(New 
York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1932), pp. x-xii.
13
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English intransigence aside, Trudeau is quick to 
point out that French Canadians themselves did a number 
of things to exacerbate an already miserable situation.
For one thing, he takes a critical view of the place 
democracy has had in Quebec's past. French Canadians, 
he holds, never really believed in democracy for them­
selves "and English Canadians have not really wanted it 
16
for others." Before 1763» Trudeau notes, French Canadians 
were under the authoritarian rule of the French monarchy, 
the Church and the seigneurial system. British rule, 
according to Trudeau, brought to French Canada the first 
principles of self-government. He cites the observation 
of Lord Dorchester to the Colonial Office in 1788 that 
three quarters of the French Canadians were actually 
opposed to any form of self-rule. Thus, when the Con­
stitutional Act of 1791 brought in some measure of
representative government, "Canadiennes were neither
17psychologically nor politically prepared for it."
Moreover, once Quebec had actually joined the Con­
federation in I867, its government made no attempt to 
make the best of the situation by modernizing the province, 
Trudeau says. It did nothing to use manpower and investment
advantageously and was "downright regressive In the measures 
18
it took." The basic characteristic of Quebec's economy
1 Ibid.. p. 103.
^ Ibid. , p. 104.
18Ibid., pp. 16-17,
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for more than a century was the absence of a coherent 
policy on both public and private Investment. He then 
compares the policies of the English-speaking provinces 
favorably with those of Quebec in terms of their em­
phasis on directing corporations, nationalization, 
education, health insurance, and all public projects to 
the benefit of all those in the province.
Quebec's major fault, therefore, lay in the failure 
of its government to assume the role that modern govern­
ments have taken in assuring an activist direction and 
regulation of economic forces. In the name of French 
linguistic and religious values, and believing in a 
non-interventionist role for the provincial government,
Quebec severely hampered its ability to compete with 
those provinces which had modernized. Hence, Quebec 
remained in the backwaters largely due to its own 
decisions*— or at least the decisions of certain groups 
within the province, namely the bourgeoisie and the 
clergy.
To be sure, English Canadians had contributed to the 
skepticism with which French Canadians viewed their 
democratic institutions. Trudeau cites the facts that:
1) although French Canadians comprised 9^ percent of
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the population of Quebec, they comprised only 60 percent
of the representatives of the provincial assembly^? 2)
French Canadians were in a minority in both the
elective and non-elective bodies— the Legislature and
Executive Council. Moreover, some British administrators,
such as Governor Craig, "did much to quash what might
19have been a nascent belief in democracy."
The French Canadians were left with two possible 
choices for the democratic institutions at their command;
1) to obstruct and sabotage the federal parliament, similar 
to the Irish strategy at Westminster or 2) the outward 
acceptance of the parliamentary game but without any in­
ward allegiance to its principles. The French Canadians 
opted for the latter, Trudeau says, "because the rebellions
of the 1830*s and 18^0*s showed that sabotage led to 
,,20suppression."
The result of all this was that French Canadians
spurned all ideologies except nationalism and supported
those which stood for ethnic rights. Because they felt
unable to share equally with Anglo-Canadians the rights
and privileges of Canadian citizenship, they "resolved
to pursue only the French Canadian weal, and to safeguard
21the latter, they cheated against the former."
Ibid.. p. 105 
20Ibid., p. 106.
2 1 I b i d . , p .  1 0 7 .
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The Realities of Separatism
With the forgoing arguments as background, Trudeau 
turns his attention in Federalism and the French Canadians 
to the realities of Quebec's economic and political 
situation in North America and the possibilities for 
achieving independence. First, he notes, the economy of 
Quebec is closely linked to that of Canada, and both are 
dominated by the United States* Each of these areas tends 
to benefit from the free-flowing movement of capital, 
employment, and technology. Second, French is the mother 
tongue of five or six million people, while English is 
spoken by one hundred and eighty-two million* Hence,
Quebec is one of the few territories in the entire 
Western hemisphere in which French-speaking people are 
grouped in sufficient numbers to be a political society.
However, the realities of the North American economy
and the linguistic dimensions of Quebec society are such
that "no amount of exhortation— even incorporated into
22
a constitutional document--can change." What is always 
ignored among separatists, Trudeau states, is the fact 
that all classes benefit from the free movement of goods 
and knowledge, capital and technology, while all classes 
suffer a lower standard of living if the state takes
22
Ibid., p. 9.
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steps— in the name of linguistic and cultural autonomy—  
to interdict the flow between provinces and states not 
of the same language. For Trudeau, the consequences of 
a separate state of Quebec would bear most heavily on 
the working classes. It is they, he says, "in the end 
always have to pay; it is they who would suffer most 
from a lowering of the standard of living, who would be 
hardest hit byna period of political and social stagnation, 
and who would be the first to suffer from unemployment 
and destitution."^
The flow of technology and the creation of research 
facilities is of primary importance in the economic 
development of a nation, Trudeau says. He cites the ob­
servations of French economist Louis Armand, who noted 
that the possession of raw materials , capital, and labor 
are not enough to allow a nation to advance in the modern 
world. What is important is "the number and quality of 
research workers ceaselessly contributing to the progress 
of science and technology. What their researchers need is
equipment that costs billions of dollars, and quickly
2 U
becomes obsolete." To have these items, Armand says,"it
is not enough to be wealthy: you must be colossally rich."
Armand concludes that "needs destroy the ideas of nations,
impose a sharing of manpower, markets and capital. There are
2 5
no longer any solution on a national scale."
23
Ibid. , r>. 15*
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the French Canadians, p . 13.
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Trudeau feels that Armand's warning should be heeded.
Laws and constitutions that bring about a situation that is
not favorable to the entry of capital and technology result
in a "country ... hopelessly outclassed economically ...
26its industries soon outdated and inefficient." He urges
that nations must be willing to sacrifice some of their
national sovereignty or be willing to pay the price in
economic and social backwardness. Those who argue that
such openness to foreign capital results in economic
dependence, sometimes described as "colonization" or
"colonialism," have missed the point entirely, Trudeau
claims. "The answer," he says, " is to use foreign capital
within the framework of rational economic development; to
create indigenous capital and direct it toward key sectors
of the future: computers, services and industry in the age
of nuclear energy." Hence, Trudeau maintains, the separatists'
approach to economic Independence is so much wasted effort;
it is a solution "whereby more energy is consumed in combating
disagreeable but irrevocable realities than in contributing
2 8some satisfactory compromise."
Federalism and Constitutional Change
In answer to those who claim that constitutional guaran­
tees are the solution to Quebec's problems, Trudeau holds
26
Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p . 13•
27
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that it is an illusion to think that language and culture 
can be safeguarded merely by changing the wording of a 
document. Trudeau addresses French Canada's two major 
demands for constitutional change: 1) the demand for 
an "entrenched" Bill of Rights that would enumerate and 
make unassailable French Canadians' rights with respect 
to language and culture, and would prevent discrimination 
against French Canadians in employment; 2) the demand for 
a "special status" for Quebec within the framework of the 
Canadian federation.
Trudeau, however, has always opposed a special con­
stitutional status for Quebec, arguing that it would be 
utterly impossible to implement. How, for example, could 
a constitution be created that would give Quebec greater 
powers than other provinces without simultaneously reducing 
Quebec's power in Ottawa? How could Quebec be made the 
national state of French Canadians with really special 
powers without abandoning at the same time demands for the 
parity of French and English in Ottawa, and thouughout the 
rest of the country? Moreover, he says, a culture "makes 
progress through the exchange of ideas and through 
challenge " and special status is "an option that in the
long run ... can only tend to weaken values protected ...
29against competition." 7 
29Ibid. , p. 33 •
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Reasons for Quebec to Opt for Federalism
Trudeau holds that Quebec's most viable option is to 
remain within the current federal structure, though with 
some changes. The federal system now in place offers more 
in the way of concrete, practical solutions to Quebec's 
needs, he believes, than any sweeping changes proposed by 
the separatists. Formal proposals could be made to in­
corporate a "Bill of Rights" into the constitution, to 
change the organic law relating to the central government 
to give it a more authentically federal character, and to 
enact provisions for greater decentralization. Trudeau
argues that "natural forces are presently favoring
30
provincial autonomy," and that if those who ask for con­
stitutional change would wait a bit longer the provinces then 
will have established more autonomous administrations that 
will be difficult to dislodge, "and Quebec will have found 
several allies in its struggle for an improved federal 
system •
While the Canadian constitution created a country 
where French Canadians could compete on an equal basis 
with English Canadians, Trudeau notes that "unfortunately 
... the rules of the constitutional game were not always 
upheld."^2 This meant that French Canadians' educational
30
Ibid., pp. 44-^5.
^ Ibid. , p# 24,5.
^Ibid . , p. J+7 •
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and political rights were ignored throughout the country, 
and thus they came to believe that they were secure in 
those rights only in Quebec. What will be required, he 
states, is a transformation of these "rules of the game."
The constitution must be worded s.o that any French-speaking 
community, anywhere in Canada, can fully enjoy its lin­
guistic rights. Specifically, this would mean that, in 
education for example, French-speaking people must have 
identical rights concerning taxes, subsidies, and legislation 
on education. Moreover, absolute equality for the two 
languages would be required at the federal level, and 
"official status" would be given to the two languages in any 
province where French-speake.rs constitute 15 'percent of 
the population or more.
Trudeau notes that while written constitutional
guarantees would be of great help in solving the current
33
impasse, "an immense transformation of attitudes" will
be necessary on the part of both French-speaking and
English-speaking Canadians:
If this is achieved sterile chauvinism will 
disappear from our Canadian way of life and 
other"useful reforms will follow suit with­
out much difficulty. If, on the other hand, 
this essential is not achieved, there is 
really no point in carrying the discussion 
any further, for this will mean that Canada 
will continue to be swept periodically by 
the stroms of ethnic dispute, and will 
gradually become a spiritually sterile land, 
from which both peace and greatness have been 
banished. 3^
33jbid., pp. 50-51• 
3^Ibid • , p. 52 .
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Rene Levesque-The Man and the Dream
John Saywell has written of the man behind the
current Quebec independence movement;
The catalyst in the movement for indepen­
dence was Rene Levesque, Without him it 
is unlikely that /the election victory/ 
of November 15 would have happened—  
certainly not as early as 197&» Not only 
did Levesque ensure high visibility and 
credibility to the movement for indepen­
dence, but he also earned, in Quebec and 
across Canada, a reputation as a sound 
and progressive politician. In less than 
ten years he hed built a party that could 
appeal as a real, indeed the only, alter­
native to the Liberal government of 
Robert Bourassa. It was a remarkable 
accomplishment, 35
Levesque's career, even before his entry into politics, 
was every bit as varied and cosmopolitan as that of Pierre 
Trudeau. In fact, were one to make characterizations, one 
could say that Trudeau's exposure to politics and world 
affairs came as a result of a bohemian wanderlust coupled 
with the fact that he was rich enough to fulfill his 
dreams. Levesque, on the other hand, worked his way around 
the world and showed more drive and purpose in reaching 
his goals than Trudeau, who is where he is today largely 
by chance.
Like Trudeau, Levesque was a product of the professional
35 /John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Quebecois, 1967-
1976 (Toronto; University of Toronto Press, 1977?» P* 1-
class* His father, Dominique Levesque, was an attorney in
the town of New Carlisle on the Gaspe/ peninsula in Quebec*
Rene himself was born on August 22, 1922, in the village
of Paspebiac, not far from New Carlisle*
Levesque attended the local, secular elementary
school, where he recalls that the teacher spoke better
English than French, because it was a bilingual school*
At age eleven, he entered a Jesuit seminary school, where,
he remembers, he became more conscious of problems other
than his owns politics, nationhood, language and French
Canadian rights, for example* He notes that Quebec
during the 1930’s was a province under the. control of
business monopolies, such as the one which controlled
hydro-electric power* Many, including the Jesuits, called
for government-sponsored economic reforms, to "put an
end to economic dictatorship" and ensure a more equitable
distribution of wealth* ^
Levesque remembers that during his high school years,
a group of young political activists formed Action
liberale nationale, or National Liberal Action Party,
which espoused social and economic liberation for French
Canadians and which, as Provencher notes, was at that time
38
"the only real provincial party*" Other groups, such as
s  ^ Jean Provencher, Rene Levesque: Portrait of a 
Quebecois(Montreal: The Gage Press, 1976), pT 12 •
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Jeune Canada, L'Association Catholique de la Jeunesse
Canadienne (Catholic Association of Canadian Youth) ,
and Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots) demanded roles
of greater importance for Quebecjois in the province's
industries, decried the domination of foreign capital
and rejected confederation. One youthful organizer*
✓
Rudolphe Dube, published Leur inquietude under the 
pen name of Francois Hertel. Hertel argued that indepen­
dence for Quebec was inevitable:
Why is Quebec always crawling on all fours?
Because of Ottawa. In my opinion, as long 
as the federal system keeps Quebec under 
Ottawa's wing, we will never accomplish 
anything. Whichever political party saves 
us will have to present as the first and 
most important part of its program with­
drawal from Confederation. 39
Interestingly, in i960, when the Liberal Party program 
was £eing re-examined, Levesque would recall the platform 
of the Action liberale nationale.
Between 1933 and 1937» while Levesque attended Laval 
secondary school, he continued to hone his writing talents 
publishing short stories in the student newspaper. In 1937 
he became an announcer and news editor at the local radio 
station in New Carlisle, a position that was to influence
39
Ibid., p. 22.
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greatly his later career. Following his father's death 
the same year, however, his mother moved the family to 
Montreal.
In 1938, Levesque enrolled at Gernier College, 
another Jesuit-run institution. His journalistic in­
terests continued there, as he became a regular con­
tributor to the school newspaper, often writing on 
economics and international affairs. His pattern of 
political success in later life may have been for- 
shadowed by an article called L*esprit. sportif dans 
la vie (The Sporting Spirit in Life)in which he wrote,
"If you have higher goals than your own personal 
success, do not forget that you are a French Canadian, 
that your young people have been mired in lassitude 
for generations and that if the masses do not act 
this nation— your nation— is lost. Every descendant
of the 60,000 defeated in 1?60 must stand up and be 
40
counted•"
Following his high school baccalaureat in 1940,
Levesque worked part-time in broadcasting at a radio 
station in Quebec City while pursuing studies in law 
at Laval University. It was at Laval that Levesque ran 
afoul.of the school's strict disciplinary code. He
Ibid., p. 30.
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was expelled for smoking and forced to stay out of class 
until he apologized* He did not apologize and did not 
return to class. He told his mother, after the rector 
appealed to her to persuade him to return, "I'm not 
interested in passing those exams, because I'll never 
practice .law. All I want to do in life is write, nothing 
else•"
By 1943» he turned to professional reporting. In 
December. he enlisted with the Office of War Information 
(OWI) in Montreal to cover the. war in Europe. His bi­
lingual abilities assured his position , and he was sent 
to London to cover the last two years of the war. His 
work brought him recognition from both European and 
North American broadcasters, and upon his return from 
Europe in 1946 Levesque was offered a position on the 
staff of the Canadian Broadcasting Company's International 
Service. In 1951» he returned to war reporting, this time 
as a correspondent with the Canadian brigade attached to 
the United Nations Combat forces in Korea.
Levesque's return to peacetime broadcasting gave him 
the opportunity for numerous assignments and interviews.
He covered the coronation of Queen Elizabeth and was 
granted the first interview allowed a western journalist 
41
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with Nikita Khrushchev after his rise to power.
In the mid-1950's, Levesque resigned his position 
with the CBC to become a freelance journalist. He was 
quickly offered the opportunity to produce and host 
a weekly news and information program, Point de Mire, 
which drew praise from both journalists and the 
general public for its high standards and accuracy.
Before the late 1950's, Levesque had shownJlittle 
interest in anything other than journalism. This changed 
when be became Involved in a labor dispute between the 
producers and management of the CBC. In 1959» the 
producers appealed directly to the federal government 
to:' intervene to break the stalemate between the two 
parties. Prime Minister Dieffenbaker and Labor Minister 
Michael Starr refused, an action Levesque later said 
persuaded him to enter politics.
Levesque accounts for his decision to enter politics 
in four ways: first, he had developed a taste for politics 
during the producer-strike? second, he felt the need to 
bring about the defeat of the Union Natlonale.? third, 
he approved of the Liberal program? and fourth, he was in­
fluenced by the strong sense of justice exhibited by
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the Quebec Liberal leader, Georges-Emile Lapalme, along 
with Lapalme*s fervent opposition to the Duplessis 
regime. What made the Liberal platform of i960 so 
appealing, Levesque said, was its emphasis on educational 
and civil service reform, economic planning, the 
creation of a ministry of natural resources, the es­
tablishment of hospital insurance, and the creation of 
a labor code and workmen's compensation*boards•
Levesque was approached by Jean Lesage, then 
Quebec's Premier and leader of the Liberal party, to 
run in the next provincial election in 1962. He was 
successful in his bid for the riding, despite the fact 
that the Union Nationale had placed another candidate 
named "Rene^ Levesque” on the ballot. Under the Liberal 
administration, Levesque was named Minister of Public 
Works.
Levesque began with a sweeping reorganization of
the Ministry of Public Works. He spoke often on public
policy issues pertaining to resource development,
education,,and culture. His public statements began to
arouse discussion among both English and French Canadians,
especially when he said that Quebecois were living under
43
the "yoke of colonialism." He called for Quebecois to 
k-2.
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"realize. e•* destiny through the exercise of intelligence
44
and expertise and not through 'revenge of the cradle,'"
He announced his intention during the next session of 
the government to introduce a bill proposing the creation 
of a general investment corporation, and stated his 
desire that the province's hydro-electric industry be 
placed in the public sector. At an international confer­
ence on resources, he told his audience that Quebec in­
tended to assert itself in the field of natural resour­
ces •
We in Quebec feel it is essential that the 
responsibility for these foundations — in 
this field as well as in many others— must 
rest with us at the provincial level. The 
constitution has delegated these respon­
sibilities to us, and, in terms of our 
national interest, it is of vital impor­
tance to French Canadians that the day-to- 
day handling of economic affairs such as 
planning and policy-making, no matter what 
their nature, be left to u s.^3'
Levesque further questioned the means and purposes
of confederation. It was, he told a Montreal audience,
"an experiment compromised by a cumulative series of
errors repeated unthinkingly for decades. If the necessary
adjustments are not made, the experiment will simply 
46
fail." Levesque's statements had a disquieting effect 
on the English-speaking community. He once told a
44
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group of English-speaking listeners, "We French Canadians
have no real need of you* The great threat to confederation
lies in the fact-that we are *.*, only interested in it
47
out of a sense of obligation rather than real concern.”
If Levesque's statements caused concern among 
English-speakers, his later actions wodld prove even more 
alarming to many. For example, in I96I , Levesque announced 
his intention to restructure completely Quebec's hydro­
electric industry. His decision stemmed, he said, from 
the fact that, under the Union Nationale, Hydro-Quebec 
had been forced to make large capital investments to 
produce electricity that was sold to private companies, 
many of which were controlled from outside the province. 
Quebec's consumers, he argued, were being forced to foot 
the bill to enrich outsiders. "Amalgamation.will put :to 
an end," he said, "to the massive subsidies being paid 
out to non-residents of the province." He meant, in other 
words, to nationalize Hydro-Quebec.
The storm of protest over Levesque's decision gave 
ample opportunity for public discussion of the proposal. 
Although his reports were filled with statistics about 
the use of power, he made the reasons for the decision 
clear in an address to the Canadian Club.
47
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Our province must grow and it must do 
so in a way that benefits the majority 
of the population. This means that— and 
let us be very clear and frank about this 
in a way that continually benefits the 
French Canadian nation, which has and 
will only have one physical base, to call 
its own: the Province of Quebec.^
While many in the provincial cabinet disagreed 
vehemently with Levesquevs decision to nationalize 
Hydro-Quebec, Premier Jean Lesage, one of the most 
outspoken opponents of the move at first, later backed
/s
him. The Liberals 1962 campaign slogan, ,fMaitres
59
chez nous,.w fitted well with Levesque's action. The
Liberals asked the people of Quebec to support the
nationalization of electricity, principally because
it would mean "the end of our colonial status and the
real beginning of economic independence.” The English-
speaking community, however, was less enthusiastic.
Mr. McDiarmid, President of Lincoln National Life, said
that Levesque was a "'Robbespierre' who acted as if all
52
aristocrats should be guillotined.” Another English
53
businessman compared Levesque to Castro. Despite these
attacks, the Quebec electorate voted a resounding "yes”
to the question of nationalization in a provincial
referendum.
If9
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50----"masters in our own house”
^Saywell, p. 186.
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During the mid-1960's, Levesque continued to question 
the value of Canadian federalism. He told a Toronto 
audience that "to be honestly Canadian, I shouldn’t have 
to feel like a native leaving his reservation every time 
I leave Quebec. I don’t find two great cultures. I feel 
like a foreigner." J In an interview with the Toronto Star, 
he said. "Confederation isn't sacred, you know. It is 
just a bargain made 100 years ago. It has become a bad 
bargain. Sometimes the only thing you can do with a 
bad bargain is to get out of it, and that can be done 
democratically.
When questioned about what changes he would make in 
the I867 BNA Act, however, Levesque was less explicit.
As one observer notes, "Levesque replied that he did not 
know for sure and expressed the fear that discussions might 
be reduced to a question of semantics ••• Levesque believed 
in the virtues of planning as a means of realizing Quebec's 
'social contract,' but since that had yet to be defined, 
Quebec was unable to describe its basic principles to 
English Canadians."^
Some hint as to what adjustments Levesque had in mind 
came in a 196^ meeting of the Young Liberal Association.
At the meeting, Levesque maintained that, "Quebec is
54
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suffering within the confines of an outmoded, obsolete con­
federation, and the status quo is untenable. • •/eJ ither 
Quebec will become an associate state within Canada, with 
a status guaranteeing it the economic, political and cul­
tural powers necessary for its growth as a nation, or else
57
Quebec will become independent.”
While the debate concerning confederation continued, 
the radical FLQ emerged with its answersbombings and in­
timidation. Levesque at once declared the violence an 
unacceptable tool to achieve independence. His view was 
that “any person or group can advocate political or social 
changes, however, radical they may appear to be to certain 
people, and can use legitimate channels to gather support.
In this context, physical violence and terroritst tactics
58
are criminal and stupid.”
Levesque's reaffirmation of Quebec's uniqueness and
his denunciation of the terrorists struck a responsive
chord with many Qpebegois. Writer and filmmaker, Jacques
Godbout, wrote of him:
Although he thought of himself as a pop­
ularizing journalist, he had become the 
first citizen to communicate intelligent­
ly with his fellow citizens. Ren^ Levesque 
was a myth long before he realized it.
Rene Levesque, our. latest and most modern 
myth, came from a long line of heroes:
After all, we've made Papineau a household 
word. What will happen to Levesque? A mag­
nificent burial or revolution? 59
57Ibid., p. 205. 
58Ibid., p. 207.
59Ibid•, p. 208.
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Levesque appealed especially to members of the trade 
union movement, whom he supported in various strike actions 
against such firms as the Noranda Mining Company. Although 
some feared that Levesque's siding with the trade unionists 
against Noranda foreshadowed a proposal to nationalize 
the mining industry, Levesque said he intended no such 
thing. Instead, he concentrated on his earlier questioning 
of the structure of federalism and constitutional reform.
In an interview with the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir, 
Levesque said, ’’Today's conflict is no longer the tradition- 
al conflict between majority and minority. It is a con­
flict between two majorities? the English-speaking majority 
in Canada and the French-speaking majority in Quebec. We've
taken a long time to get started but we're on our way, and
6 oQuebec's evolution can't be stopped now."
Levesque again threw himself into the fray with state­
ments about the treatment of French Canadians. He said 
that many businesses were "arrogant and ignorant" of the 
fact that 80 percent of Quebec's population is French,
and he warned them to be "civilized" and respect the
61French position while there is still time. He followed this
with a statement that "the awakened French Canada is not
against any group or its rights, only against the entrenched
6 2privileges of a dominant minority."
60
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By 1966, the Liberal party's promises# though 
thoroughly debated, had not been implemented. Reform 
was slow in coming, with little evidence that the 
Liberals had done much to effect basic change. Lesage 
rearranged his cabinet, putting Levesque in charge of 
the Ministry of Family and Social Welfare, where Levesque 
announced his intention to introduce a program of medicare 
for the poor, a universal health insurance plan, and a 
comprehensive social welfare policy#
While the Liberals knew that they had not satisfied 
everyone with respect to their proposed reforms, the 
election of 1966 proved to be a tremendous upset. The 
Liberals gained only 5° delegates while the Union 
Nationale under Daniel Johnson elected 56. Some at­
tributed the Liberal defeat to the Union Nationale's 
fresh approach and aggressive election strategy; others 
held that the newly-formed RIN(Rassemblement pour l fin­
dependence nationale), by being on the ballot in 13 
ridings, had made the difference between Liberals and 
the UN. The Montreal newspaper. Le Devoir took a harsher 
line toward the Liberals and editorialized that,
The Liberals were the architects of their 
own defeatsthey were too sure of themselves 
and at the same time incapable of masking
204*
or reparing the numerous flaws that had 
appeared here and there in their machine 
before it was too late. They succumbed 
once again to their usual weakness— com­
placency. 6 3
Whaever else might be said, it is certain that the defeat
did lead to some soul-searching by the Liberals to discover
what had actually gone wrong.
The Liberal defeat did nothing to make Levesque tone
down his anti-colonial rhetoric. Provencher remarks that
Levesque became more convinced that Quebec was a colony,
"an underdeveloped society ... lacking in character and
pride, though paradoxically well fed and comfortable, lulled
by the elite and its puppet kings into the kind of utter
64*mediocrity that would be fatal to it .•••
In I96?, Levesque escalated his campaign against 
Quebec*s colonial status on a speaking tour of the western 
provinces, in which he said, "Quebec is the same as 
Rhodesia— a privileged minority governs a deprived majority." ^
At the same time, he warned English Canada, "Either Quebec
66gets a new deal or eventually it will get out."
Although still a deputy and member of the Liberal party, 
Levesque found himself increasingly at odds with the Liberal 
leadership over the constitutional question® At the Party's 
executive committee meeting in the fall of 1967, the agenda
63Ibid.. p. 22k.
6^Ibid.. p. 227.
5Ibid., p. 231.
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was set for six subjects to be given priority in the 
forthcoming party convention, an agenda that did not 
include the constitutional 'question. While the party 
executive later changed its position to allow dis­
cussion of the constitution, they charged the party’s 
Political Commission on Constitutional Affairs with the 
task of preparing the report to be submitted to the 
delegates, leaving Levesque out of the discussion 
entirely.
Levesque decided that the time had come for a
direct confrontation with the party's leadership. One
of his supporters, from the Laurier riding, placed
the question of sovereignty before the delegates in
no uncertain terms in a document entitled,"What Does
Quebec Want?" which declared,
For our own good, we must dare to seize 
for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec, 
the right to all the essential components 
of independence, i.e. the complete mas­
tery of every last area of basic collec­
tive decision-making,..., This means that 
Quebec must become sovereign as soon as 
possible. • •
There is no reason why we, as future neigh­
bors, should not voluntarily remain assoc­
iates and partners in a common enterprise, 
which would conform to the second great 
trend of our timessthe new economic groups, 
customs unions, common markets, etc. • • •
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Nothing says we must throw these things away? 
on the contrary, there is every reason to 
maintain the framework.
V/e propose a system that would allow our two 
majorities to extricate themselves from an 
archaic federal framework in which our two 
very distinct "personalities” paralyze each 
other by dint of pretending to have a third 
personality common to both. 67
The Liberal leadership made it clear that they had 
no intention of adopting Levesque's call for an indepen­
dent Quebec. Eric Kierans, a member of the party executive, 
stated that separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada
would "hurl the peonle of Quebec into misery, poverty,
68
and unemployment." The Liberal party’s 1966 convention 
was marked by strife and disunity between members who 
supported Jean Lesage and those who favored Levesque. 
Kierans stated that it was time to "sweep separatism out
'6,9
of the Liberal party and Quebec once and for all." He 
further suggested, in his opening address, that, now 
that his proposal had been rejected, Levesque and his 
supporters should leave the party. Levesque submitted 
his resignation and made official his break with the 
Liberals•
Although Levesque had been ousted dhe facto from the 
Liberal ranks, he had the nucleus of a new political
67
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organization with the other disenchanted Liberals who
resigned with him. A group of Liberals and ex-Liberals
gathered in Montreal on November 18, 1967, "to shape
and organize the sovereignty-association thesis which
70has arisen in every part of Quebec. " 1 While some wanted
to name the orgainzation after Levesque himself, e.g.
Mouvement Levesque. Option Levesque or Theses Levesque,
he was strongly opposed to the suggestion. "I am only
an instrument of the movement and that is all I want
to be," he declared. Not wishing to form a new
political party, at least for the moment, the group's
ad hoc steering committee decided to keep the format
of a political organization, giving it the name Mouvement-
Sovereignty Association (MSA)•
There was still a great deal of vagueness concerning
what the MSA's program would be like. Levesque held that
the movement would have "no dogmas," would be "a popular
movement organized by and for all the people," and
would use the state as the "driving force" for political
change since, the party's leaders claimed, "the majority
of those measures which have done the most -to shape Quebec's
7 3evolution since i960 were taken by the government."
In order to give wider dissemination to his views on
7°Ibid.. p. 2H-5 .
71Ibid., p. 247.
72Ibid.. p. 249.
73Ibid.. p. 255.
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the independence question, Levesque released his book 
Option Quebec in January, 19680 It was a book that he
described as a Vlittle sovereignty/association dic- 
7A
tionary." The book's release did, in fact, do much to 
give Levesque the attention he sought, for crowds of 
ordinary people and journalists flocked to autographing 
sessions. More important, however, was that in I968,
Levesque broke away from the Liberal party and formed 
the Parti Quebecois. Up to that time, the separatist 
movement had lacked a single, jcentral leader. By 1968, 
Levesque had become a very popular figure, as he had 
led the opposition against Duplessis and had pushed for 
the nationalization of Hydro-Quebec. Moreover, he had 
a ready-made base of support when he left the Liberal 
party. During the 1960's the Liberal party was the only 
quasi-leftist party with any substance in Quebec politics,
s-
and it was Rene Levesque who provided the leftist tendencies. 
When Levesque left the Liberals, the party moved more to 
the center,.lleaving a vacuum which the PQ filled.
With his views on the subject of independence clear 
after the publication of Option Quebec, he now had the 
second necessary component of a real political force, a 
political party— the PQ—  which he would use to implement 
his ideas of sovereignty/association in the 1970's and beyond.
7^
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CHAPTER VI 
THE PQ IN POWER-1976-1983
Levesque's first order of business was to assure the
place of the French language in Quebec society. Despite
strong hostility from the English-speaking minority in
Quebec, the PQ government introduced the controversial
Bill 101 in the Quebec Assembly. By a 7^-21 vote, the
Assembly passed the measure that would make French the
sole official language in the province, and it proclaimed
- the right of the French-speaking majority to use its
language everywhere in the provinces in business, in
industry, and in .government. It retained the controversial
requirement that all persons coming to live in Quebec
must send their children to French-speaking schools. The
Bill also required that companies operating in Quebec be
able to communicate with their employees and the public in
2
French, or be fined. The only concession that it made to 
companies was to allow them to conduct court proceedings
MUse of French Ordered," The Washington Post. April 
2, 1977, p. AlO. --------
2
Henry Giniger, "Quebec Introduces Language Bill in 
Assembly with Few Concessions to English-speaking Minority," 
The New York Times, April 28, 1977, p. A8.
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in English, but only if all parties to'the litigation 
agreed. Private companies were given until 1983 to meet 
the requirements? 1) that executives and personnel have 
a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that the number 
of French-speaking personnel at all levels be increased; 
and 3) that French be used in all documents and inter­
nal communication. It authorized the establishment of a 
French language office to see that these regulations 
were carried out and enforced.
h
English Canadians reacted sharply to the measure.
Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "unacceptable" 
and a violation of the "human rights" of English-speaking 
Canadians.Levesque countered that, "the evolution of 
Quebec is that the majority is going to act like a majority, 
and some people can't take that ... It's too bad, but that's 
the way it is,"^ Trudeau further charged that the PQ was 
encouraging separatist sentiment and influencing public 
opinion by attempting to pass off its own propagenda efforts 
as unbiased "news." He claimed that the French section, of 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was espousing separatism 
through biased news reports, and decried that the PQ had in­
filtrated television and radio news and was "destroying the 
country." "Almost everyone," Trudeau told the Canadian
3 . . . . .Henry Giniger, "Quebec Regime's White Paper Declares 
Province a French Society," The New York Times. April 2.
1977, p. 6c.
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Parliament, ’’including high officials of the CBC, would be
prepared to concede that the overwhelming majority of CBC
employees are of separatist leanings. - He congratulated
Andre Ouellet, Minister of Urban Affairs, for drawing up
a list of those employees ’’out to destroy the country" and
8promised that they would be removed. Many, however, felt 
that Trudeau was not countering the separatist challenge 
on concrete issues, but merely engaging in a witch-hunt.
A practical politician, however, Trudeau realized that 
he would have to negotiate and compromise with the separatists 
if he wanted to keep the confederation intact. Declaring in 
an address before Parliament that his government was will­
ing to consider constitutional changes to advance the 
cultural aspirations of the disaffected French-speaking 
minorities, he announced the formation of a new governmental 
group to be called the Task Force on Canadian unity, and 
maintained that to save Quebec and halt the developing rift
between the two language groups, English-speakers must
a
become reconciled to more French in their lives. What is
more, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a willingness
. . 10to face the constitutional issue. I cannot emphasize
strongly enough that the question of unity is .not
7
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confined to the issue of language nor confined geographically
11to the province of Quebec." He listed numerous dissatis­
factions in other provinces, such as the feeling of 
westerners that their interests were under-represented in 
a central government dominated by more populous Ontario 
and Quebec and the unhappiness of the once-prosperous 
eastern provinces over their economic imbalance with the 
more affluent central and western areas.
The Ottawa government announced that it would be 
willing to allow the Parti Quebecois to go ahead with 
its proposed provincial language legislation because of 
what Secretary of State Roberts called the "insecurity
of French Canada about the future of its language in
12an overwhelmingly English-speaking country."
The Anglophone community was not receptive to the 
Liberal government's overtures to the French Canadian 
community concerning minority and language rights. The 
major English language school board in Quebec, for ex­
ample , stated that it would accept pupils whether or not
13they qualified under Quebec's new language law. Because the 
defiant schools faced a cut-off of funds from the Quebec 
provincial government, English-speaking parents launched 
a drive to set up private schools to avoid having to
11 "Ottawa Yields to Quebec on Language Temporarily,"
The New York Times. June 23, 1977, p. All.
12
Ibidc
Henry Giniger,"English Language Schools in Quebec 
Defy New Law," The New York Times. September .5, 1977, p.
213
send their children to French ones.
Meanwhile, the Anglophone business community in Quebec 
began to react to the new laws. Despite Levesque's asser­
tions that business need not fear the PQ government, a 
report released in the spring of 1977 showed that 91 
companies had moved their corporate headquarters out of
the province between the time of the November 1976
1election and February 1977* Trudeau, to whom the PQ was 
anathema, was nevertheless a French Canadian deeply con­
cerned about the well-being of his home province. He 
"implored" and "beseeched" companies in Quebec not to 
play into separatist hands by stempeding to English-speaking 
Canada. "The best way to insure a separatist victory is 
not to stay and fight but to run away," he said in a Mon­
treal press conference. Nevertheless, in a move to shore 
up the province's sagging economy, the Quebec government 
threatened to take over the Asbestos Corporation, a sub- 
sidiary of the U.S.-controlled General Dynamics Corporation, 
if it refused to sell its facilities to French Canadian 
interests. One year later, the huge Anglo-controlled Sun
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. moved its headquarters from
17Montreal to Toronto. (
1^ . .Henry Giniger, "Exodus of Business Quickens in Quebec," 
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As if Trudeau's problems with Quebec were not enough,
the separatist drive in French Canada promptedrestiveness
in the western provinces, where dissatisfaction with the
18federal system was much in evidence. In March 1977»
British Columbia's Premier, William R. Bennett, proposed
that Ottawa replace the "rigid federal system," as he
called it, with a more "flexible" union of five regional
groupings: the Atlantic provinces? Quebec; Ontario? the
Prairie provinces-Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba? and
19British Columbia. Bennett held that the 110-year old 
framework, devised when British Columbia was still a 
separate territory, was unsuited to modern-day Canada.
His plan called for the five regional bodies, working with­
in the ten provinces, to exercise control over local tax
20spending and the executive powers now vested m  Ottawa.
Bennett's proposals were carried a step further 
by three groups that advocated an independent western 
state to include British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, and the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. The 
source of dissatisfaction for the western provinces, they 
claimed, stemmed from economic grievences against federally- 
controlled tariffs and freight rates that hit western pocket- 
books especially hard. They claimed that the protective
18
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tariffs imposed by Ottawa made imported good more expen-
21sive than they should be. Fixed rates by Ottawa caught 
the western provinces "coming and going" one critic con­
tended, as they kept up the cost of shipping raw products
to eastern factories and bringing the same materials
21back in the form of fabricated articles. "You can 
make a good economic case against confederation," con­
tended Douglas Christie, president of the New Committee
22for Western Independence.
Meanwhile, many in Quebec's English-speaking minority
continued to express doubts and fears about the passage of
language legislation designed to make French the primary
language of the province in all matters of commerce,
23business, government and education. Quebec's legislature
made no major concessions on Bill 101, and Camille Laurin,
Quebec's Minister of Cultural Development, told a news
conference that the English-speaking community was being
2k-"unduly alarmist." The English-language press countered 
by citing Article 37 of the Bill, which forbade employers 
from requiring the knowledge of any language other than 
French as a condition of employment, unless the employer 
could prove that the job required such knowledge. The PQ 
government continued to insist that the purpose of the
21
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legislation was to increase the role of French Canadians 
in the economy, on the ground that, up to that time, they
2hf
had been kept in subordinate positions.
While English-speaking groups throughout the province
mobilized to resist what they felt was a grave infringement
on their liberties by the PQ government, other groups,
such as the Canadian Institute for Public Affairs, held
discussions concerning the English-speaking provinces®
lack of effort to make their French-speaking minorities
feel at home, and the encouragement that such a lack
2 <
gives to separatist sentiment.  ^ One noted critic of Canada's
language policies, Marc Lalonde, the federal minister of
health and supporter of Trudeau's bilingual. policies,
warned a Toronto audience that if the rising elite of French-
speaking young people in Quebec are deprived of opportunites
in the public and private sectors, "they will find the
temptation to have these opportunites in a separate Quebec
2 6quite irresistable." Lalonde further denounced Ontario's 
provincial government for "equivocal results," despite Its 
claim to the provision of a full range of services for 
French-speaking Ontarians. Noting that the rate 
of establishment of French schools had been slow, he warned 
that "English-speaking Ontarians should not comfort 
2A
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government on the fight to keep Canada unified, it would
supplement the work of the six-man team formed earlier
31by Trudeau, called the National Unity Group, ^
In a speech opening a two-day Parliamentary debate 
on national unity, Trudeau outlined his ideas for con­
stitutional changes to deal with linguistic rivalries 
and other Influences affecting national unity, Trudeau 
set up a constitutional advisory borad under Donald S,
Thorsen, a former Duputy Minister of Justice, Among the 
changes recommended was a provision transferring respon­
sibility from the provinces to the federal government
for educational affairs affecting what Trudeau called
32"official language minority groups," Under the transfer, 
the federal government would be able to provide remedies 
In cases where provincial governments had been slow or 
unwilling to provide French schools in overwhelmingly 
English-speaking communities. Thus, the education of Quebec 
children from English-speaking homes would be under rules 
determined by Ottawa, not Quebec, Trudeau proposed that 
the controversial language policy advocated by the PQ be 
changed to shift the empahsis to language training in the 
schools. This was suggested in order to accommodate reluctant 
and often resentful English-speaking civil servants, who 
were passed the age of easily learning a second language,
31
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Levesque’s campaign to secure independence with 
association began to take shape in the spring of 1977«
From the start, the PQ government was engaged In an 
increasingly bitter battle on four fronts; 1) opposition 
from the federal government in Ottawa, 2) the other 
provinces, 3) the business community, and 4) the local 
English-speaking minority. All had in common their opposition 
to Levesque's attempt to make Quebec almost exclusively French.
The English-speaking minority v/as particularly aggressive, 
because it believed that Levesque's efforts were directed 
toward restricting its size and the use of its language. A 
group of 115 prominent English-speaking educators, business­
men, and members of professions denounced Levesque's proposal 
for the exclusive use of French as "a document which con­
veys the impression that the English-speaking minority can
33and should be suppressed• The group forwarded a 
statement to the government in Ottawa which defended bi­
lingualism as an economic necessity for Quebec and asserted 
that the English-speaking minority had made great strides 
toward learning French. The group dismissed as outdated 
the "stereotype" picture fostered by Levesque's government 
of a monolithic, wealthy and powerful English-speaking 
minority dominating a poor and underprivileged French
•4. 34ma jonty.
Henry Giniger,"Quebec's Plan to Quit Canada Bitterly 
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34
Ibid.
220
Levesque insisted, however, that the "stereotype” 
picture referred to by the group was not inaccurate 
and was precisely the situation that obtained in Quebec,
His new language policy, he said, was designed to correct 
the imbalance. In a radio address, he stated that, while 
all English-speakers were not millionaires,'"collectively, 
as a community, the English minority in Quebec has always 
been in a dominant position.
Quebec's English-speaking business community strongly 
opposed Levesque's language measures. Its view, epitomized 
by Earl W, McLaughlin, president and chairman of the Royal 
Bank of Canada, held that businesses that conducted 
their affairs internationally had to operate in English, 
and that Levesque's language legislation would not be 
likely to encourage head offices to establish or to remain 
in Montreal. McLaughlin did not state at the time that 
the Royal Bank would move out of the province if the language 
policy went into effect, but he did say afterward that this 
would occur if Quebec became independent•^  The Montreal 
Board of Trade backed McLaughlin's statements by publishing 
a study of 13 major corporations with head offices in the
35
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province. The study asserted that the province would
lose a billion dollars per year if the head offices 
37moved out. By the fall of 1977 $ Quebec's language
policy had, according to John F. Sims, forced 150 
businesses out of the province and led both corporations 
and individuals to transfer hundreds of millions of 
dollars to other parts of Canada or the United States.
Levesque was careful to refute fears that a government 
dedicated to the preservation of its majority language, 
and to an independent Quebec, would disrupt common economic 
and military* ties, especially when it came to joint management 
and defense of the St. Lawrence Seaway, NORAD and NATO.-^
On economic and commercial issues, however, Levesque's 
previous statements over many years concerning the excessive 
influence of foreign capital in Quebec's economy could not 
be ignored.
Levesque stated that his blueprint for the new economic 
order he envisioned, or "independence with association," was 
based on a "northern common market," which economic thinkers 
of the separatist movement claimed would include the United 
States.^ Quebec's Minister of Finance, Jacques Parizeau, 
when questioned about barriers that might exist between Quebec
37Ibid.
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and the other provinces, stated that "it would be absurd to
41have a tariff battle between Quebec and Ontario." These
are Canada's two great industrial centers, he noted, and a 
significant part of the production in the Montreal area is 
geared for the Toronto market and vice-versa.
A critical mistake, Quebec's Minister of Industry and 
Commerce, Rodrique Tremblay, held is that "Canadian national 
policy for 100 years has been to force Canadians to look 
from nopth to south, and instead look from east to west a
policy reinforced by tariff policies, transportation and
. * 42communications systems."
All of the PQ's statements notwithstanding, Levesque's 
assurances to financial and industrial leaders in Canada 
and the United States that a vote for "separation" (a 
word banned from his administration®s vocabulary) would 
not mean national ization" could not hide the fact that 
emotional issues might make Levesque's dream of a "common 
market" impossible. Trudeau warned Levesque not to take 
such an arrangement for granted. And even Parizeau himself 
doubted that there could be a common currency between Quebec 
and the rest of Canada because of the importance exchanges
41^ Ibid.
42
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have in economic policy.
Amid the threats of business flight in the wake of
the PQ victory and the subsequent language legislation,
Levesque attempted to assuage fears that might lead to
Quebec's economic collapse. Careful not to use the words
"separation" or "separatism," he spoke instead of
"sovereignty/association®He approached the financial
and industrial leaders in Canada and the United States
to reassure them that there would be no wholesale takeover
of existing investment or prohibition of future investment,
only "necessary" changes to make it more responsive to
44Quebec's interests. Again, Prime Minister Trudeau warned- 
that Quebec (read Levesque) should not take the PQ plan of 
an econcmic association or common market for granted if the 
province left the confederation.
In the fall of 1977 came the revelation that a security 
unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had illegally 
broken into Parti Quebecois headquarters in Montreal in 1973» 
and had seized records and other information. v The PQ 
immediately put its propaganda machine into high gear, 
charging federal officials with "scandalous acts" and com­
paring the RCMP to the Watergate conspiritors. Although
43Nora Beloff, "Problems for Quebec's Secessionists,"
The Washington Post. November 13, 1977, p. 03*
44
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the federal government did order an investigation of the
RCMP's activities, the PQ spokesmen told reporters that
they had long suspected that the RCMP had been spying on
them, despite the Mounted Police claim that the break-
in had been undertaken for reasons of "national security."
At the time of the break-in, Premier Levesque was in
France seeking support for his cause, French President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing told Levesque that he could count
on French "understanding, confidence and support" regardless
47of what path Quebec decided to take. Before he left France,
Levesque was named to the Grand Office of the Legion of
Honor by Giscardj but this time France was not about to
provoke an international incident similar to the one de Gaulle
provoked in Quebec in 19&7*
The remainder of 1977 saw both federalists and separatists
jockying for position in the propaganda war for the minds
and hearts of French Canadians* Acrimoneous accusations
were directed by separatists at federalists and vice-
versa. Separatists charged that the province has lost almost
nine billion dollars since 1961 because of its association 
48with Canada, They released several polls purportedly showing
49strong support for independence, '
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In the spring of 1978, Trudeau celebrated his tenth
anniversary as Canada's Prime Minister, and the longest-
ruling democratic leader in the West* Yet, for a man
who had been elected to office largely on a platform of
national unity, Trudeau might well have wondered if his
ten years in office had amounted to anything* The nation
was more divided that at any time since he had first
been elected in I968. The Canadian economy had gone from
prosperity to financial slump, and inflation, which had
been at 5*6 percent in 1976, had risen to 9*5 percent by 
*
1978. Unemployment had risen from 5*i percent in 197^ 
to 8*3 percent in January, 1978*
By the spring of 1979, Trudeau's policiticaL fortunes 
had suffered a dramatic reversal. The Progressive Con­
servatives, led by 39-year old Joe Clark, defeated the 
Liberals— large on economic issues. The Conservatives 
won 135 of 282 seats compared with the Liberals*114. ^  
Clark's western background— he was b o m  in a small town 
at the foot of the Rockies' in Alberta— led many to 
suspect that he was not the right man to deal with Quebec 
and would not be very sympathetic or effective with the 
French Canadians. In an interview on Public Television's
■^"In Office A Decade: Trudeau's Hardest Task, To Keep 
Canada Together,” Daily Press. Newnort News, VA, Aoril 6 , 
1978, p. 37.
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MaoNeil-Lehrer Report. Clark sought to dispel notions 
that he could not handle the Quebec issue. He told 
Robert MacNeil:
First of all we will make clear that the pro­
posal put forward by the government of Quebec 
^sovereignty/association/ is absolutely in­
compatible with any Canadian federal system 
and that it would be most improbable that 
there would be any possibility of association 
working. They can*t have it both ways; they 
can't have political independence and economic 
association ... There's just no soft option.
Nevertheless, Clark recognized that Quebec did have legitimate 
grievances, and he told MacNeil:
There has grown up in Quebec a legitimate deter­
mination to find more cultural freedom as a people. 
The great majority of the people of that province 
speak French, not English, as their first language. 
They have fe.lt far too limited within the context 
of our present constitutional arrangements. They 
have sensed that the rest of the country, and par­
ticularly the former government^were not prepared 
to move to make the kind of changes that would 
allow them to achieve their cultural freedom here 
at home in Canada. So what we've got to do as a 
new government is to demonstrate that it is possible 
for us to introduce the kinds of reforms that give 
Quebeckers more cultural security and yet remain 
within a strong,, large nation. The former govern­
ment had taken quite a rigid line on a question 
like jurisdictions over resources, which is im­
portant in wealth generating terms. I think we 
can convince a number of Quebeckers who would 
prefer to stay in Canada but who are concerned 
that the status quo might force them out. I think 
we can persuade these people that they are, with a 
new government here, better able to find the future 
they've been looking for within a reformed Canadian 
federalism. 53
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However much the Quebec issue concerned Clark, it was 
his handling of the economy which, by the spring of 1980, 
had turned his political fortunes around. Austerity 
measures to cut the inflation rate had produced even 
higher unemployment and fear of a major recession. His 
advocacy of an 18-cent-per-gallon gasoline tax was strong- 
ly opposed throughout Canada* Clark insisted that the 
austerity measures were necessary to rectify years of 
"free ride" fiscal policies under the Liberals, but Trudeau 
retorted that Clark's budget punished the middle and low 
income groups'while hardly touching the affluent.
In the national elections of February 18, 1980, the 
Liberals regained their supremacy over the Conservatives, 
thus placing Trudeau at the helm once more to deal with 
the separatist challenge. ^  Levesque had declared his in­
tention to hold a referendum on the issue of "sovereignty/ 
association" upon his election in 1976, and even before 
Clark's defeat Levesque had fired the opening salvo in his 
campaign to persuade the province to seek independence•
He introduced a 118-page white paper that recited the long 
history of the sensitive relations between English and 
French Canada, and asserted that it was too late to strike 
up a new relationship within the existing framework. In.
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an emotional appeal to the province*s electorate, Levesque
declared that he expected "at the great crossroads of the
referendum to choose the only road that can open the
horizon and guarantee us a free, proud, and adult national 
57existence • "v
Levesque, however, was careful to dispel the fears
that a "yes” vote in the referendum would mean a sudden
rupture in economic ties with the rest of Canada, for
public opinion polls showed that Quebeckers did not want
58outright independence."'' The PQ campaign slogans made 
no reference, to s e par at ism , but claimed instead that 
sovereignty/association meant that French and English 
Quebeckers would live as equals. Federalist opponents 
of the PQ, however, charged that a "yes" vote in the 
referendum would mean therbreakup of Canada and would place 
Quebec in perilous waters. Quebec Liberal leader Claude 
Ryan and his supporters argued that the only way for Quebec 
to remain in close economic association with Canada was 
within the federal system, as one o? Canada’s ten provinces. 
Liberals accused the PQ of seeking to obscure the economic 
consequences *trhat a breakup of Canada would entail. Polls 
immediately prior to the referendum indicated that 5^ 
percent would vote "yes" to negotiate sovereignty/ as­
sociation," but almost the same percentage indicated that
57Dusko Doder,"Quebec Government Opens Drive Seeking 
Provincial Sovereignty,"The Washington Post, November 2," 
1079, p. A29.
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60they would reject outright independence.
In the wake of the Trudeau vicotry, Levesque announced
that the long-awaited independence referendum would be
61held on May 20, I98O. Although he. had not set a definite 
date for the referendum on independence when he was elected 
in 1976, the choice of this particular time reflected his 
belief that the pro-independence forces had gained a 
substantial advantage in the pre-referendum campaign. One 
reason for this was that the Canadian Supreme Court had 
declared parts of the law making French the sole official 
language in Quebec unconstitutional; and although the Court 
had confined itself to the relatively narrow issue of langua 
used in the provincial legislature, the 9-0 decision called 
into question other parts of the law designed to give the 
French language primacy in all walks of life and business. 
Levesque immediately seized on the fact that Canada's high 
court also struck down a similar law in the western 
province of Manitoba, where English was declared the sole 
official language in 1890. "It took 90 years to clallenge 
the Manitoba law, but only two years to overrule Quebec," 
Levesque said.^
Levesque made the point all through the campaign that a 
11 yes" vote in the referendum would bring about no abrupt
60
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changes* "We will negotiate and if need be hold another 
referendum or elections," he told a Montreal audience, 
Trudeau, however, accused Levesque of presenting Quebec­
kers with an ambiguous choice* "If they had asked a clear 
question to the Quebecois, *Do you want independence or 
not?' the Quebecois would have answered a resounding 'no,'" 
said Trudeau* In the closing days of the referendum 
campaign, Levesque said that there was a "surge of 
solidarity” across the province for a "yes" vote on the 
referendum, and he appealed to non-Frdnch groups to join 
the "mainstream of solidarity" so that they might share 
the victory he was confident of achieving. Public opinion 
polls in April showed that ^8 percent of those questioned
supported Levesque, ^3 percent were opposed, with 9
66percent undecided.
Many observers in both Canada and the United States 
anxiously awaited the referendum return. Pollsters said 
that the vote was either too close to call or gave the 
separatists a slight edge. But when the results were 
finally in, it was apparent that the PQ had suffered a 
stunning defeat. Liberal Claude Ryan, leader of the 
opposition to sovereignty/association, held a percent
lead over Levesque's forces. Quebecois had said "non" to
T 66 Levesque.
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Prime Minister Trudeau, in a conciliatory gesture,
proposed a new Canadian constitution in a move designed
to reassure Quebec that the "deep aspirations" of its
French-speaking majority would be secured in the new 
67charter. But 3*000 embittered young nationalists, dis­
gruntled by their defeat in the provincial referendum, 
marched on a predominantly English-speaking residential 
neighborhood in Montreal, breaking windows, throwing 
rocks, and clashing with riot police. At least eight 
people were seriously injured in the melee. Another 
group of 2,000 marched down St. Catherine Street in 
Montreal, burning Canadian flags and smashing shop windows. 
It was obvious that the separatists* dream of a "free 
Quebec" would not die easily.
Trudeau vowed that a brand new constitution would re­
place the British North America Act, and he announced that 
he would send Finance Minister Jean Chretin to begin ex­
ploratory talks with the premiers of all the provinces in 
an effort to seek common ground for a new constitution. 
Trudeau indicated that he was willing to give the provinces 
greater automomy at the expense of the federal government. 
His only conditions were 1) that Canada remain a true
67
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federation, with the federal parliament retaining "real
powers," and 2) the new charter include a bill of rights
and freedoms including the provision securing French
linguistic rights. "For us, everything else is
negotiable," he said. Both Ryan and Trudeau challenged
Levesque to accept the will of the majority and to
participate in good faith and loyalty "in the development
70of a new federalism."
In the post-election debate, however, analysts noted 
that, despite the federalist victory over the separatists,
t 'it
The prevailing view is that the victory of 
the federalist forces has, for the time 
being, checked the thrust of Quebec's 
secession. But the victory was purchased 
with large and vague promises from Trudeau,
Ryan, and key English-speaking politicians.
The redemption of these promises causes 
more concern for the winners than the losers, 
and many argue that there is a long distance 
between accepting the need for change and 
making specific changes acceptable to all ^
the disparate provinces in this vast country.
As the influential Toronto Globe and Mail put it, "It
should be recognized by Canadians outside Quebec that
when we urge the people of Quebec to vote 'no' we are
committing ourselves to the negotiation of change, real
and possibly wrenching change, in the structure of the
72confederation as we know it."
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM
The final word on Quebec's relationship with English- 
speaking Canada has, of course, yet to be written, and 
thus one cannot point to any clear act, policy or program 
that has remedied all of Quebec's complaints while satis­
fying at the same time English Canada's conception of 
.federalism * Perhaps the only general conclusion that can 
be drawn is^that, if history is any indication, the Quebec 
"problem" may not be resolved for decades or even centuries 
to come. As Marcel Rioux claims, "It is almost four centuries' 
since Champlain founded Quebec. Why is there today more
than ever a Quebec 'question*1 • •• a question asked for
1
such a long time that it is flagrantly up to date."
If we accept the question posed by Rioux, then all of
the issues raised in this thesis, federalism, nationalism,
constitutional reform, separatist parties, and particulrly
✓
the rise of the Parti Quebepois, are really elements of 
a larger issue, namely, can Canada and will Canada be able 
to devise a solution to allow French and English-speaking 
Canadians to live in harmony? Or will these groups continue
1Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question, trans• James Boake 
(Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1971)» P* 3«
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to struggle in the coming years within an uneasy and un­
satisfactory arrangement that suits neither side? One 
may legitimately ask, given the history of the tempestuous 
relationship between French and English-speaking Canada, 
whether there will be more Riels, Papineaus, Schoeters's 
and Levesques, The researcher of these questions senses 
that the answer may lie with those who are adept at using 
a crystal ball, rather than with those who rely on the 
empirical data and statistics of political science. Lacking 
such clairvoyance, I can only hope to draw some general 
conclusions ''from the information set forth in previous 
chapters•
It can be seen that there continues to be a strong
sense of identity among French Canadians with respect to
their language, customs, and homeland, Quebec, Nationalist
sentiment, like the folkways of tribal cultures, is passed
from generation to generation. The youthful French Canadians
✓
who supported the Parti Quebepois in the elections of 1976, 
1982, and the referendum campaign of .I98I have much in 
common with their ancestors who. fought alongside Papineau 
and answered the call of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society,
Is this nationalism strong because Quebeckers feel a 
natural sense of pride in their own language, heritage and 
institutions, or is French Canadian nationalism merely
235
a reaction to the presence of the "outside threat," the 
"oppressive foreigner," the English Canadian and the 
"Yankee" American? Will nationalism take the more 
peaceful forms of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society, or 
does the future hold the prospect that radical terrorist 
groups, like the FLQ,will again emerge to express French 
Canadian frustrations through bombings, kidnappings, and 
other forms of violence? Will Quebeckers be content to 
confine their nationalist aspirations to socialist or 
social democratic forms, or will fascist, communist or 
nihilist forms of nationalism take the place of the more 
moderate expression of French Canadian nationalism?
My conclusion is that Quebec nationalists will continue 
to use the ballot box as their primary means of expressing 
nationalist sentiment, especially now that they have a 
viable separatist party at their disposal that is clearly 
capable of winning elections. Moreover, the PQ shows ample 
evidence that it will remain on the political scene in 
Quebec for at least the immediate future. Thus, nationalists 
will use the electoral option unless English Canada shows 
a complete unwillingness to show appropriate sensitivity 
to Quebec's language and takes regressive steps to confine 
French Canadians to a subordinate position in the life of the 
nation.
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As for how accommodation will be achieved between the
two clutures, perhaps some answers lie in the new Canadian
constitution. The patriation of the constitution in 1982
marked a milestone in Canadian political history. Certainly
it may be said that, of the democratic governments of the
twentieth century, Canada was an anomaly in that ite constitution
could only be changed by a foreign government. With the
patriation of the constitution, Canada has now assumed both
the form and substance of an independent nation, "a true
2national character for the first time."
The new* constitution's provisions that are of greatest 
concern to Quebec are, of course, those dealing with minority 
rights and the treatment of the French language. The ques­
tion remains whether the entrenchment in the constitution 
of French Canadian language rights, to safeguard French 
Canada's mother tongue, will be any more effective than, 
say, the First and Fifteenth amendments of the U.S.
Constitution have been in protecting the rights of blacks, 
hispanics, and other minorities in the United States? What 
is more, while minorities in the United States may, on 
occasion, offer convincing proof that their rights to fair 
housing, non-discriminatory employment and freedom from 
racial harrassment have been violated, the French Canadian 
cannot bring suit against a British Columbia innkeeper, 
an Alberta restauranteur, or an Ontario government official
2
"Canada's Constitutional Reform Gains," The Denver Post, 
December 3» 1981, p. 25A.
simply because one, or all, of these individuals is unable 
to communicate with him in French, which he is accustomed 
to in Quebec.
What the constitution can guarantee is that the French 
Canadian will be able to carry on an active dialogue with 
his federal government in his own language; that his 
province, whether it be Quebec, Manitoba, Ontario, or any 
other province, will not abridge his right to maintain 
schools where his language may be taught, and where his 
religion and customs may be practiced. He must be certain 
that his institutions will not be abolished or persecuted 
simply because they are different from those of the majority 
in any province.
In chapter III on federalism, I discussed the con- 
sociational model of elite compromise and accommodation.
It was demonstrated that the consociational model no longer 
effectively operates to diminish conflict, and this 
hypothesis appears to have gained additional support during 
the constitutional negotiations of 1980. Levesque obstructed 
constitutional proposals which would make illegal the 
parts of Quebec's language law (Bill 101) which declared 
French as the sole official language of Quebec. Federal- 
provincial discord escalated during the constitutional
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Perhaps, however, we may he seeing a new form of 
consociational democracy taking place, hot involving the 
elites, but rather the direct accommodation of the electorate 
to reduce tensions. Levesque's leadership was rejected in 
Quebec when a proposal for sovereignty/association was voted 
down in the referendum of 1980. This may be an indication 
that, while one of Quebec's elite's— specifically the PQ—  
wishes to see cleavages exacerbated, the general population 
is doing what it can, through the ballot box, to reduce 
tensions between Quebec, its sister provinces and Ottawa.
The Future of Levesque and the Parti Quebecois
At the time of the PQ defeat in the referendum on
sovereignty/association in 1981, many felt that the days
of the PQ as a majority government were numbered. However,
many federalists, and even other observers, were surprised
when the PQ was re-elected by a comfortable margin in the
1981 provincial election. It garnered 80 of 122 seats in
the Quebec National Assembly, as opposed to for
0
the Liberal party. This victory could do nothing but fuel 
sentiment for separatism, and Quebec's Education Minister, 
Camille Laurin, told a cheering election-victory crowd that
Q
"soon we will be making Quebec a country."7
8
"Separatists Win Handily in Quebec Election," The Denver 
Post, April 14, I98I , p. 3.
9 .
Ibid.
In Ottawa, Prime Minster Trudeau and his Liberal 
government were obviously dismayed. The PQ victory 
gave Levesque what he felt was a mandate t,o take a 
tough position on the issue of the patriation of the 
constitution, which came before the federal parliament 
in late 1981. It is also certain that Levesque's victory 
gave him further encouragement to implement and enforce 
the province's strict language laws regarding the use 
of French,
In. the later half of 1982 and the first months of 
1983» however, Levesque's popularity appears to have
suffered a steep downturn, A recent poll in 1983 showed
10
that he had only a 25 percent approval rating, and even a 
longtime-separatist and early supporter of Levesque,
Pierre Bourgault, wrote that Levesque makes independence 
"look like the worst possible thing that could happen 
to Quebec,""Indeed," Bourgault claimed, "when he now says 
he doesn't have enough power within the confines of con­
federation, I can only say 'thank God he doesn't have more
11
powers, what would he do then?'"
Many also claim that Levesque has badly mismanaged 
the province's economy. Currently, Quebec has the highest 
unemployment rate in Canada, 1^ percent, which is two 
percentage points above the national average. In addition,
10
"Lessons of Language in French Quebec," Newsweek,
18 April, 1983, p, 16,
11 . ,
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it is estimated that 160,000 people have left the province,
the vast majority of them members of the English-speaking 
12
minority. Following the example of Sun-Life, the nation's 
largest insurance company, which moved its headquarters 
from Montreal to Toronto, the Bank of Montreal recently 
warned that it, too, may relocate outside the province.
There also appears to be growing dissatisfaction,
/ _even among French -speaking Quebegois, concerning Levesque’s
language legislation. For example, a hotel owner near the 
Maine border was cited recently for displaying a sign that 
read "Bar Open," prompting one Quebec citizen to refer to 
the enforcers of the the language legislation as "tongue
*3.
troopers." .Levesque, meanwhile, continues to insist 
that he will press forward with his original objectives 
for "sovereignty/association."
A comprehensive appraisal of Rene Levesque's career 
would be premature at this time, for he has not been in 
office long enough to be judged either a failure or 
success in the eyes of his only major constituency, the 
Quebegois. What may be said with certainty in 1983 is 
that Levesque has succeeded in using French Canadian 
assertiveness in the areas of language and minority rights 
to his political advantage. While some ridiculed his
12
Ibid.
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proposals in 19?6 , and were certain that he would be 
defeated in the next provincial election, they have been 
proven wrong, as the 1981 election shows.
In examining Levesque's political style, one is temp­
ted to make comparisons beteen him and the Frenchman who 
shouted "vivre le Quebec libre" from the balcony of the 
Montreal City Hall in 1967, Charles de Gaulle, Like de Gaulle, 
Levesque used the referendum on the sovereignty/association 
issue in 1980, and de Gaulle used the referendum on the
question of the direct election of the ^resident of France 
14
in I962, Interestingly, de Gaulle himself proposed a 
"sovereignty/association” arrangement for Algeria in lieu 
of complete independence when his program for dealing with 
the Algerian crisis of the early i960 Vs failed to satisfy 
the FLN. 15
Other comparisons are also appropriate. For example, 
de Gaulle based his world-view on the primacy of the nation­
state, and jealously guarded French sovereignty against
encroachment by any regional organization that proposed
16
European unity at the expense of French sovereignty.
Similarly, Levesque views Quebec as a nation-state and is 
making every effort to see that the province's sovereignty 
is not compromised in a federal system. One could also hold
14Henry W, Ehrmann, Politics in France(Boston * Little,
Brown, 1976), pp. 125-126.
^»To France With Love,M Newsweek^ 14 November, 1977, P* 67*
l6Karl V/. Deutsch, Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance 
(New Yorks John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 19^7), P» 37.
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that both Levesque and de Gaulle used the "politics of 'no,'"
17or the veto. De Gaulle dramatically withdrew French forces
from NATO and vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market.
Levesque has employed similar tactics at federal-provincial
conferences. For example, he tried to veto Trudeau's move
18
to patriate the constitution. De Gaulle also used the
"politics of the empty chair" at conferences and negotiations,
a gesture intended to detract from the legitimacy of the
proceedings by dramatizing the absence of an important
partner who could argue that he had not been consulted on
the issue and that any agreement was not binding, therefore,
19’
on’the French people. Rather than boycott an important 
conference, however, Levesque has chosen to be present-- 
and vocal--in his denunciation of any policy with which 
he disagrees. It is only after he fails to obtain what 
he wants from federal or provincial leaders that he threatens 
to go his own way. History has shown, however, that Levesque's 
threats are" more of a nuisance, to bog down proceedings, than 
an actual plan of action which he intends to carry out.
Trudeau and French Canada
As Trudeau's biographer, George Radwanski points out,
"At the most simplistic level, it is possible to say that 
a separatist government is now In power in Quebec, the risk
17
Edward A. Kolodziei, French International Policy under
de Gaulle and Pompidou (Ithaca: Cornell University Press"] 1974) ,
pT 46T.
18
"Canada's Constitution Reform Gains," The Denver Post. 
December 3, 1981, p. 25A.
19
Kolodziei, p. 461-462.
2kk
of the breakup of the confederation is more immediate than
in 1968, and therefore Trudeau has failed to achieve his
principal objective. But that would reduce the exceedingly
complex interplay of historical, social, and political
20forces to a mindless syllogism.”
The careful observer, however, can be more generous 
than Radwanski, for the PQ has now been in power almost 
seven years and Quebec has not left the confederation. 
Trudeau’s decision to run for Prime Minister in 1978, after 
having served longer than any other elected leader of the 
free world, is understandable in the context of his aspira­
tions. Another leader, perhaps, would have been content to 
let someone else take the helm of the nation after having 
completed such a long, and often frustrating, tenure in 
office. But Trudeau wished to see at least some of his ob­
jectives come to fruition and refused to leave at a time 
when the confederation needed the presence of a French 
Canadian prime minister to deal with Quebec separatism and 
the constitutional issues that remained unresolved.
At 6k 9 Trudeau will probably not remain Canada’s leader 
much longer. But he may decide to stay in the game until 
Levesque is no longer in charger of the government of Quebec. 
Trudeau views Levesque as his nemessis; Levesque views Trudeau 
as his. The contest for Quebec may be determined by which of 
the two has the greatest political longevity.
20George Radwanski, Trudeau (Mew York! Taplinger Press,
1968), p. 311.
Obstacles to Independence-Present and Future
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Despite the PQ*s sweeping victory in I98I , there are 
a number of obstacles to achieving independence through 
the electoral process* The very nature of attempting to 
achieve independence through the electoral process creates 
problems for the PQ for, as the campaign for independence 
becomes immersed in the process of elections, other issues,
21
of which the separatist cause is only one, come to the fore* 
While individuals may support separatism in opinion polls, 
in the context of elections they may find other issues more 
important, such as the state of the economy* Examples of 
this can be found in the substantial number of Francophones 
who declared themselves supporters of Quebec independence yet 
voted for the anti-separatist Liberal party in the elections 
of I970 and 1973* Conversely, individuals who do not believe 
in separatism may see the separatist party as a vehicle for 
registering economic protest, or other kinds of dissatisfaction, 
as the 1976 election appears to demonstrate. Finally, separatist 
leaders may be tempted to water-down their commitment to 
separatism in order to maintain their anti-separatist 
electoral clientele* This appears to have been the case with 
the PQ's election strategy in 1976, and again in I98I.
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, which in­
volve the general environment In which the FQ must operate, 
there are also a number of important issues which the party
21
Dale Postgate and Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social 
Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1976). p. 193.
Zb6
must settle internally if it wishes to be successful in 
the future* The first of these is that the PQ faces the 
challenge of maintaining the-support of a wide-ranging 
clientele which may share little more than a general 
commitment to independence, and which may have different 
and contradictory interests regarding other issues* With 
respect to this first point, Postgate and IvlcRoberts 
point out,
The most obvious conflict among Parti Quebe^ois 
clientele is the conflict among economic groups.
An interesting dilemma for the PQ is that, just 
as the "new middle class" and working class 
Francophones may be led by quite different 
grievances to support Quebec independence, so 
they may have quite contradictory expectations 
of what Quebec independence would accomplish; 
one group seeking to continue the technocratic, 
political modernization of the "Quiet Revolution" 
and the other seeking to bring the Quebeci^govern­
ment firmly under working-class control*
These tensions were evident in 1971 when the PQ was 
asked to show its solidarity with Quebec's militant trade 
unions. Although the PQ has managed to avoid major conflict 
among groups which support it, this does not mean that it 
will continue to be successful. There continue to be radical 
elements among the PQ's supporters, such as Marxists and left- 
wing militants, who see a class struggle within the Francophone 
community and want an independence movement that is on the
22
Ibid.
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side of the Francophone working class. The leftists are 
often dismayed by the readiness of the Parti Qnehegols 
to accept a continued role for private enterprise within 
any new Quebec state, and even to accept American invest­
ment. "For many left-wingers," Postgate and McRoberts 
point out, "it is not possible to 'civilize* American
23
capital." In addition, division exists among adherents
of the Quebec independence movement concerning the place
that Anglophones should have within the new Qbebec state.
The PQ would allow English language schools to*persist,
but the total enrollment would be fixed according to the
proportion of Anglophones within the new Quebec state at
the time of the first census. New immigrants would be
required to attend French schools. PQ conventions have
witnessed intense struggles between "moderate" and "radical"
factions over this issue. The authority of Rene*Levesque
has at times been necessary to maintain support for the
24"moderate" position.
One may thus conclude that, in 1983, the Parti Quebegois, 
despite some internal division, is strong as a political 
force in the province and that, at least for the immediate 
future, the PQ will continue to shape the province's political 
system. Indeed, the PQ has succeeded in transforming the
23
Ibid., p. 194.
?4Ibid •
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province's party system from one dominated by the Liberals
and the Union Nat ionale t to a two-party system dominated
by the Liberals and the PQ, What makes the PQ different
from past third party movements is that "the strong
✓
commitment of the Parti Quebecois voters to the party's
ideology differentiates it from the other 'successful'
third party, the federal Social Credit party. Whereas
the Social Credit party may be able to attribute some
of its success to economic protest, the PQ's success has
been based on a combination of economic protest and the
presence of widespread support for the PQ's separatist
26
ideology This helps to explain its success," Further,
by Postgaije and McRoberts' measure, "Purely economic
dissatisfaction could have been contained within the
existing Liberal-Union Nationale two-party system? without
an ideologically based rejection of these parties, there
would not have been as great a need to turn to a third 
27
partjr, "
The contest between separatists and federalists will 
undoubtedly continue, even after the passing of Levesque 
and Trudeau, Until such time as Quebeckers are supremely 
confident that they will be able to cope with the economic 
consequences of independence, a separate state of Quebec
Ibid.. p. 192.
Ibid.
27 .Ibid .
249
will not materialize* But, until then, Quebecois will
certainly use the separatist movement, and organizations
like the Parti Quebecois, as bargaining chips to obtain
concessions from Ottawa* In this respect, Quebec may
have a tool at its disposal that is unique to any province
in the worlds a method to wring concessions from the
central government by a continued threat to leave the
confederation, to secede without actually having to secede*
Such an arrangement may be described as blackmail, but at
least it is a "crime" that can be committed without bloodshed,
without civil war, something that neither federalists nor
separatists wish to see. The relationship between French
and English Canada was observed by a leading French Canadian
politician shortly after confederation and is, perhaps, as
accurate today as it was in 1867« He said, "English and
French, we climb a double flight of stairs towards the
destinies reserved for us on this continent, without knowing
each other, without meeting each other, and without even
28seeing each other, except on the landing of politics."
28
John Saywell, Canada* Past and Present (Toronto*
Clark, Irwin, 1975)» p. 56.
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